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Introduction 
Most producers do not sell their goods directly to the final users; between them stands 
a set of intermediaries performing a variety of functions. These intermediaries 
constitute a marketing channel (also called a trade channel or distribution channel) 
(Kotler & Keller, 2006: 432). The effectiveness and efficiency of distribution channel 
is one of the critical factors for company success. The distribution channel can also be 
built as the competitive advantage of the manufactures (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001: 
429). Distribution channels are more than simple collections of firms tied together by 
various flows. They are complex behavioural systems in which people and companies 
interact to accomplish individual, company, and channel goals (Kotler & Armstrong, 
2001: 435). Therefore, producers need to motivate channel members to achieve 
optimum performance and manage their behaviours. Channel Incentive Programs 
(CIP) are most frequently used instruments to achieve these goals (Gilliland, 2001; 
Qin, 2006). However, based on the author‟s experiences, the producers sometimes 
neglect some important factors that affect the effectiveness of the programs in a 
dynamic business environment. Thus, the results are different from what the 
producers and/or channel members expected. 
Many studies and theories (Kotler & Keller, 2006: 447, Kotler & Armstrong, 
2001:449, Rosenbloom 1999: 186, Rolnicki 1998: 168; Gilliland, 2001; Qin, 2006; 
etc.) have pointed out CIP is not only a method of compensation to the channel 
members but a set of management processes to guide their behaviours. Gilliland 
(2001) argued that channel research has tended to focus on the dyadic nature of the 
incentive arrangement, where it is unique to one supplier‟s relationship with one 
particular reseller. Therefore, an alternative view is to consider CIP as one of the 
interactive factors in the ecological business environment. The author tends to believe 
that CIP is a set of multilateral complicated business processes, which involve 
economical and social factors.  
The proposed study will identify the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of CIP. 
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With the knowledge, producers can improve CIP‟s design and implementation to 
reach win-win situation with channel members in the long-term. The proposed study 
will also benefit other marketing researchers. By given limited time and resource, the 
author will focus on business-to-business (B-to-B) market, which includes 
government and enterprise customers, in the People’s Republic of China (China). The 
author will conduct most part of the research in Motorola‟s Government and 
Enterprise Mobility Business Unit (EMB). EMB provides professional two-way radio 
and mobile computing products to government and enterprise customers. Most of the 
products are distributed through about 500 channel members. They are distributors, 
resellers, retailers (POS), solution partners, system integrators, global alliances, etc. It 
covers different kinds of B-to-B channels and different kinds of channel structures, 
from one-step to multiple steps. Thus, Motorola EMB provides a good marketing 
channel sample for the proposed study. 
In the following sections, firstly, the author will further explain the reason why the 
subject is important to the channel distribution business; define the objective of the 
overall research and identify specific research questions. Secondly, the findings of the 
preliminary literature review and a hypothetical framework are also set out. Thirdly, 
the rationale behind the proposed methodologies is explained and the methodologies 
are mapped. Fourthly, the proposal for document 3, 4 and 5 are outlined. Finally, the 
possible ethical and political issues are listed with the outcomes of the proposed study 
in the last section. 
There are not definitive and it is expected that some modifications may occur prior to 
submission of each document. 
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1. Subject and Objectives 
Why study the critical factors that affect the 
effectiveness of CIP in China B-to-B market? 
Distribution channel is important. Most of producers use intermediaries to bring their 
products to market. They try to forge a distribution channel – a set of interdependent 
organizations involved in the process of making a product or service available for use 
or consumption by the consumer or business user (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001:432). As 
Donald Fites, the former CEO of Caterpillar, described, “After the product leaves our 
door, the dealers take over. They are the ones on the frontline. They‟re the ones who 
live with the product for its lifetime. They‟re the ones customer see. Although we 
offer financing and insurance, they arrange those deals for customers. They‟re out 
there making sure that when a machine is delivered, it‟s in the condition it‟s suppose 
to be in. They‟re out there training a customer‟s operators. They service a product 
frequently throughout its life, carefully monitoring a machine‟s health and scheduling 
repairs to prevent costly downtime. The customer… knows that there is a 
$20-billion-plus company called Caterpillar. But the dealers create the image of a 
company doesn‟t just stand behind its product but with its products, anywhere in the 
world.” (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001: 429) The effectiveness and efficiency of 
distribution channel is one of the critical success factors to the company success. 
Some manufacturers, like Caterpillar, are leveraging the distribution channel as their 
competitive advantage over other manufacturers. (Rosenbloom 1999: 177) Many 
studies have proven that the channel advantage also applies to the companies 
operating in China market, in addition, with cultural and economical uniqueness (Yi 
& Jaffe, 2006; Qin, 2006).  
The distribution channel functions are also changing with the business and the market. 
Philip Kotler pointed out in his latest edition book – Marketing Management, “Too 
many U.S. manufacturers think their job is done once the product leaves the 
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factory. …… They should make a whole-channel view of the problem of distributing 
products to final users (Kotler & Keller, 2006: 633).” After about ten years “golden 
age” to NMCs, China market became one of the most competitive markets in the 
world since late 1990‟s. In a hypercompetitive economy with increasingly rational 
buyers faced with abundant choices, a company can win only by fine-running the 
value delivery process and choosing, providing and communicating superior value 
(Kotler and Keller 2006:34). More than the product and service fulfilment functions, 
the distribution channel is participating in almost every stage of value creation and 
delivery in China. As Yi & Jaffe (2006) argued, it is expected that channels become 
more productive as measured by average sales per establishment (wholesale and retail) 
as economic development progresses. Therefore, a producer needs to consider more 
and more factors when they design, develop, and implement the channel incentive 
programs. 
Distribution channel is an eco-system with balanced different powers and forces. As 
Kotler and Armstrong pointed out, distribution channels are more than simple 
collections of firms tied together by various flows. They are complex behavioural 
systems in which people and companies interact to accomplish individual, company, 
and channel goals. A distribution channel consists of independent business perform 
different functions based on their value and strength. Ideally, because of the success of 
individual channel members depends on overall channel success, all channel firms 
should work together smoothly. They should understand and accept their roles, 
coordinate their goals and activities, and cooperate to attain overall channel goals. By 
cooperating, they can more effectively serve and satisfy the target market. However, 
individual channel members rarely take such a broad view. They are usually more 
concerned with their own short-run goals and their dealing with those firms closest to 
them in the channel (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001: 435). In the business market, 
companies selling business goods and services often face well-trained and 
well-informed professional buyers who are skilled in evaluating competitive offerings 
(Kotler & Keller, 2006: 11). As described in Caterpillar case, the channel members 
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establish and manage the client relationship excessively. Therefore, once the 
distribution channel established, the producer cannot change the channel structure and 
channel members frequently and dramatically. Channel incentive programs are the 
most frequently used instruments by the producers to manage the conflict and 
motivate the channel members to top performance (Gilliland, 2001). As an interactive 
proceeding process, incentive program design, development and implementation must 
consider mutual benefits of multiple parties and sustainability.  
Kotler and Keller pointed out (2006: 447), being able to stimulate channel members to 
top performance, a company needs to determine channel members‟ needs and 
construct a channel positioning so that its channel offering is tailored to provide 
superior value for them. Channel members‟ needs could be vastly different from one 
another. This job becomes more challenging to a global marketer considering the 
legislation and culture implications. What are those factors affecting the effectiveness 
of channel incentive programs most significantly in China B-to-B market? Much 
researches has been conducted in recent the years (Gilliland, 2001; Yi & Jaffe, 2006; 
Qin, 2006; Zhuang et al, 2007), however, the author didn‟t find a holistic report in 
area of CIP effectiveness analysis.  
In summary, producers design, develop and implement channel incentive programs to 
manage and motivate the distribution channel member based on the understanding of 
their needs and the market environments. The traditional marketing theories in CIP, 
represented by Kotler and Rosenbloom, are more focused on customer value and 
channel partners‟ needs, but put less emphasis on other market environment factors, 
like competition, culture, communication, cooperation, etc. Producer might neglect 
some critical factors that affect the effectiveness of the programs. The program result 
could be quite different from what the producer expected. With better understanding 
of the critical factors to the success of the channel incentive programs, the producers 
and channel members can reach win-win situation in long-term. 
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Objective 
The primary objective of this study is to identify the critical factors that affect the 
effectiveness of channel incentive programs in China B-to-B market. This study will 
provide a holistic framework for producers to build a decision process for channel 
incentive programs. It will also help the channel members understand the key factors 
that producers may consider. The author believes that an effective channel incentive 
program must reflect in balance of these critical factors to achieve win-win solution.  
Research questions 
The author developed research questions as follow,  
 Why channel incentive program is important in B-to-B market? 
 What are the criteria that the producers use to measure the effectiveness of 
channel incentive programs? 
 What are the issues limiting the effectiveness of channel incentive programs? 
 What are the factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive 
program most in producers‟ and channel member‟s views? Do they think 
differently or not, and why?  
 How can we evaluate those factors to identify the most critical ones? 
 What are the interactions among critical factors in the dynamic business and 
different culture environment? Can we build a framework? 
 How can the producers leverage the findings of proposed study to improve 
channel incentive program effectiveness? 
Channel Incentive Programs Effectiveness 
According to marketing textbooks, channel incentive program is one of the tactics 
used by manufacturers to maximize overall channel performance and influence 
channel members‟ behaviours. (Kotler & Keller, 2006: 447, Kotler & Armstrong, 
2001:449, Rosenbloom 1999: 186, Rolnicki 1998: 168) They highlighted that 
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producer‟s objectives and channel members‟ needs are two most critical factors to the 
success of channel incentive programs in general. They also articulated that to 
effectively leverage channel incentive programs can be quite challenging due to the 
complexity of channel system. (Rosenbloom 1999: 306, Rolnicki 1998: 24) Kotler 
and Armstrong (2001: 435) argued that the distribution channels are complex 
behaviour systems. However, those books provide neither a holistic view of the 
factors that influence the effectiveness of channel incentive programs nor the way of 
evaluating the effectiveness of the channel incentive programs. Interestingly, the 
books did provide many suggestions on how to motivate the channel members 
effectively based on their observation of common used tactics and programs (Rolnicki 
1998: 171, Rosenbloom 1999: 187). Gilliland (2001) pointed out that channel 
research has tended to focus on the dyadic nature of the incentive arrangement, where 
it is unique to one supplier‟s relationship with one particular reseller. An alternative 
view is to consider as part of a supplier‟s standard operating management with its 
resellers, where a standard package of incentives is made available to almost all 
channel members. From this perspective, the incentive contract is important because 
most suppliers have dozens, if not hundreds or thousands, of geographically dispersed 
intermediaries. Thus, how to evaluate the effectiveness of channel incentive programs 
is worthy of investigation. 
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2. Preliminary Literature Review 
As Fisher (2007: 122) articulated, defining the concepts and creating a conceptual 
framework is means of simplifying the research task. These two processes help the 
searcher clear away all the issues and materials that are not germane to the topic and 
research question and they also provide a „map‟ of the field of study. Considering the 
complexity of channel incentive programs (Gilliland, 2001), the author chooses the 
structure approach rather than grounded approach (Fisher, 2007: 123) to guide this 
study. It might bring in some risks that limit the study in a preliminary hypothesis. 
However, the author will keep the flexibility of changing the preliminary hypothesis 
and conceptual framework along with the progress of the study.  
Conceptual Framework 
One hypothesis is there are a number of critical factors that affect the effectiveness of 
channel incentive programs in business-to-business markets. Another hypothesis is 
that some factors are relatively culture independent and some are more culture 
sensitive. The producers need to balance the critical factors to make channel incentive 
programs more effectively based on different producers‟ objectives and channel 
members‟ needs. 
By reference Porter‟s (1980: 4) five forces driving industry competition, the author 











Figure 1 - Competitive Environment of Channel Members 
Based on the hypothesis described above and experiences, the author tentatively maps 












Figure 2 – a hypothetical framework  
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Theories and Concepts 
There are many theories are considered as the corner stones of the proposed study. 
Within limited time, the author explored the marketing theories (Kotler & Keller, 
2006; Kotler & Armstrong, 2001) and marketing channels theories (Rosenbloom, 
1999; Rolnicki 1998). There are more theories to be explored during the literature 
review, for examples, transaction cost theory (Williamson and Masten, 1999), sense 
making theory in organizations (Weick, 1995) behavioural game theory (Camerer, 
2003), etc. More researches can be also helpful to the proposed study, for an instance, 
culture diversity in global business (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998). The 
author noticed that, in recent years, there are many researches studies of marketing 
channels had been done in China. (Yi and Jaffe, 2006; Qin, 2006; Zhuang, et al, 2007; 
Xiao and Guo, 2004; etc.) Those researches covered wide ranges from channel 
structure evaluation, channel motivation to channel conflict management. It is 
important to pay more attention on those literatures during the literature review. By 
leveraging the structured approach, the author defines the following concepts leading 
to further literature review. 
Channel incentive: Objectives and Types 
Channel incentive programs can be more complicated than most of people recognized. 
By leveraging grounded methodology, Gilliland (2001) studied 170 unique channel 
incentives used in 59 high technology suppliers' channel programs in B-to-B market. 
He built a channel incentives classification scheme. The incentives are organized into 
five major categories: credible channel policies, market development support, 
supplemental contact, high-powered incentives, and end-user encouragements. He 
also identified 16 subcategories linked with different desirable channel members‟ 
behaviors. Qin (2006) did similar reach in China, but from distributors‟ standpoints. 
She identified seven kinds of supports that producers provided to the distribution 
channels. Obviously, better understanding of the objectives and types builds the 
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essential ground of the proposed study. 
Customer Value and Producer Costs: Marketing Theories 
Nowadays, more and more people agree that the value delivery is the ultimate goal of 
any marketing activities. The author tends to believe that the measurements of 
channel incentive programs is to maximize the value to both end customers and 
channel members at the lowest producer‟s cost. Kotler and Keller (2006: 15) 
articulated that business shifted from a product-centric, “make-and-sell” philosophy, 
to a customer centric, “sense-and-respond” philosophy since mid-1950s. The 
company wants to be more effective than their competitors in creating, delivering, and 
communicating superior customer value to its chosen target markets. In the past 
decades, enabled by the new technologies, some companies reach beyond traditional 
marketing by introduce holistic marketing concept. The holistic marketing concept is 
based on the development, design and implementation of marketing programs, and 
activities that recognize their breadth and interdependencies. For components of 
holistic marketing are relationship marketing, integrated marketing, integrated 
marketing, internal marketing and social responsibility marketing. (Kotler & Keller, 
2006: 17) As part of the value network (Kotler & Keller, 2006: 435), distribution 
channel is to convert potential buyers into profitable orders. Not only serve the 
markets, they must also make markets. Moreover, the distribution channel functions 
are more than selling and delivering product and service to the buyer or users. They 
contribute to every process in “value creation and delivery sequence (Kotler & Keller, 
2006: 34)”. The producer needs to balance “push and pull strategies” (Kotler & Keller, 
2006: 432). 
Channel Needs and Wants: Motivation Theory  
The values to the channel members must address their needs and wants, which the 
motivation coming from. According to Maslow (1943), human behaviours are driven 
by different motivations; and the motivations can be classified based on the objectives 
that human wants to achieve. This theory also applies to analysis the motivations of 
channel members. Setting up and maintaining superior marketing channels for making 
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products and services available to customers usually involves a relatively long-term 
period to plan and implement. (Rosenbloom, 1999: 5). It is challenging to gain 
channel members‟ long-term commitment and motivate them consistently since they 
tend to think relative about short-term benefit (Shipley, et al., 1984). Shipley et al. 
further cited the study made by Hofstede (1978) who found that individual channel 
members in different countries are motivated by different things. Many studies have 
been done in regards to channel motivation and satisfaction. (Shipley, et al. 1984; 
Kim, 1998; Wang, et al. 2007; Qin, 2006; etc.)  
Competition and Cooperation: Behavioural Game Theory 
Distribution channel members are living in a complicated dynamic competition 
environment as described in figure 1. One of the most controversial ones is the 
competition among channel members of same producer, normally called “channel 
conflicts”. As Kotler & Armstrong (2001: 436) pointed out, some conflicts in the 
channel take the form of healthy competition. Such competition can be good for the 
channel – without it, the channel could become passive and non-innovative. 
Sometimes conflict can damage the channel. For the channel as a whole to perform 
well, each channel member‟s role must be specified and channel conflict must be 
managed. Cooperation, role assignment, and conflict management in the channel are 
attained through strong channel leadership of producer. Obviously, the producers 
encourage the competitions which increase sales revenue and total margin; but they 
discourage the competition among channel members potentially harmful to the 
revenue and margin gain. However, in most of the situations, end customers think 
oppositely. Normally, customers encourage the competition at any level in any form to 
lower the cost.  
In traditional marketing theory, channel incentive programs are tactic based on the 
assumption of information parity and fully rationalized decision. In the authors‟ view, 
the channel behaviours are not fully rational in most of the time. That makes 
behavioural gaming theory (Camerer, 2003) more relevant when we try to discover 
the factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive programs.  
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Culture and Communication: Culture Diversity and Sensemaking Theory 
Trompenaars and Hampden-turner wrote a book in 1998 about culture differences and 
how they affect the process of doing business and managing. They declared that,  
“We cannot understand why individuals and organizations act as they do without 
considering the meanings they attribute to their environment. ……. One culture 
may be inspired by the very thing that depresses another.” (p. 19) 
Obviously, culture affects CIP effectiveness in many ways.  For instance, the impact 
of interpersonal Guanxi to marketing channel behaviors has been studied in a research. 
Guanxi is a typical Chinese unique concept that involves rich explicit and implicit 
meanings. The research found that the Guanxi between the boundary individuals of 
firms did have significant and direct influence on the firms behaviors toward each 
other in channel dyads. (Zhuang, et al, 2007) Trompenaars and Hampden-turner (1998: 
6) cited Schein‟s (1985) argument about where culture comes from: culture is the way 
in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas.  
As Trompenaars and Hampden-turner (1998: 1) declared that people can never 
understand other cultures and even it is impossible ever completely to understand 
people of their own culture. Therefore, the Sensemaking theory (Weick, 1995) might 
be helpful to explain the behaviours of channel members. Based on past experiences, 
the channel members build their “frame of reference”. Channel incentive programs as 
the stimulus are launched into the framework. Channel members go through the 
process of perceiving, interpreting, believing and acting process to make sure their 
behaviours make sense by all means. Another important research studies hysteresis 
phenomena in marketing. Zhuang et al published their study in 2001. It provides an 
alternative view on channel loyalty and reluctance to change. 
Summary 
Obviously, these factors are co-related and affected each other. Those factors reflect 
the nature of channel business. Based on the preliminary review above, the author 
identified, but not limited to, the major areas that will be studied in further critical 
 17 
literature review.  Those are channel incentive, customer value, producer cost, 




Rationale behind Methodology 
Fisher (2007: 40) pointed out that methodology raises all sorts of philosophical 
questions about what it is possible for researchers to know and how valid their claims 
to knowledge might be. Therefore, as a new researcher, the author tried to understand 
the differences between methodology and method and different kinds of 
methodologies and methods. Based on the understandings, the author tentatively 
selects a basket of methodologies and methods to work on this proposed study.  
A methodology shows how research questions are articulated with questions asked in 
the field (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002: 29). The author tends to apply interpretive 
approach as main methodology, and use realist approach and action research at 
different stages of the proposed study.  
Interpretive Approach 
The interpretive approach will deliver the qualitative research in the proposed study. 
As Fisher (2007: 47) argued that the interpretive researcher see the link between 
understanding and action as mediated through people‟s thinking, values and 
relationships with each other. The author believes the link between channel members‟ 
action and incentive program is indirect. That means there are other factors affect the 
effectiveness of channel incentive programs; and the channel members are not always 
clear the options for action. The complexity of channel incentive programs (Gilliland, 
2001) can also support the selection of interpretive approach. 
Interpretive researchers often take a processual perspective (Fisher, 2007: 49). From 
the processual viewpoint, the world is seen as an ambiguous place that people have to 
struggle to make sense of (Watson, 1994: Ch. 1). Fisher continuously declared that 
process are „complex and dynamic‟ rather than linear and sequential. As described 
before, the channel business environment is complicated with dynamic competitions. 
Neither the producer nor the channel members are able to predict the effectiveness of 
a channel incentive program precisely. The factors affect the effectiveness are 
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dialogic. Fisher (2007: 50) points out that a complex understanding of a subject can 
only be achieved through close involvement with the subject of research. The author 
has opportunities to participate in the design, development, implementation and 
evaluation of the channel programs. The author considered grounded 
approach .Grounded theory methodologies inductively derive frameworks by directly 
studying the phenomenon of interest as Gilliland (2001) cited the theory published by 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Strauss & Corbin (1990). However, by given the time 
and resource limitation, structure approach seems to be more practical to achieve the 
objectives within reasonable time.  
Realist Approach 
The realist approach delivers the quantitative research in the proposed study. By 
comparing positivist and realist approach, the author chose realist approach. The 
realists tend to believe that the knowledge we acquire can give good indications of 
what should be done (Fisher 2007: 42). This character will contributes to solid down 
the criteria and major issues in measurement of the effectiveness. Realist research 
looks for associations between variables, and where possible tries to establish chain of 
cause and effect (Fisher, 2007: 42). This stance will help the author analyze the 
impact of critical factors to the effectiveness more precisely. Typically, realist 
researcher would involve structuring a problem by breaking it into its constituent parts. 
The relationship between these parts would then be studied, looking for recurrent 
patterns and associations (Fisher, 2007: 42). The hypotheses of the interactions of the 
critical factors will be tested by this approach. The empirical analysis will be 
tentatively considered as preferable approach since it is widely used by other 
marketing channel researchers (Gilliland, 2000; Mehta et al, 2001; Palmatier, et al, 
2006; Koza & Dant 2007; etc.)  
Action Research 
From an action research standpoint, action and understating become enmeshed 
together in a cycle of learning in which there is a constant movement between 
reflection and action. (Fisher, 2007: 53) In the last stage of proposed study, the author 
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will apply the findings in one or two real business cases to improve the effectiveness 
of channel incentive programs. By leveraging action research methodology, the 
practice might be improved. (Elliott, 1991 in Fisher 2007: 54) 
 
 21 
4. Research Design and Document Outline 
Research Design 
If we understand the research strategies as different ways of conceptualizing how 
business and management should be studied (Bryman & Bell, 2007: XXIX), then a 
research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis data (Bryman & 
Bell, 2007: 40). The research strategy can be categorized into quantitative and 
qualitative (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 28) and described in different kinds of 
methodological stances (Fisher, 2007: 15, 40). According to Bryman and Bell (2007: 
71), research design can also be classified into five categories. In this proposed study, 
the author tentatively selects comparative design in both qualitative research and 
quantitative research.  
As described before, Motorola and Symbol were two independent companies in China 
B-to-B market before 2006. Even now, two different sets of channel incentive 
programs are using respectively. In each set, there are different kinds of programs 
serving different business objectives. Those programs are offered different channel 
members in different product lines. In proposed study, a group of selected channel 
incentive programs will be analyzed comparatively. With the comparison, the factors 
that affect the effectiveness of the programs will be identified qualitatively. 
Comparative analysis will also contribute in the quantitative research to define the 
interactions of those critical factors. Moreover, it will be applied to evaluate the 
effectiveness improvements in practice of the theory at the last stage of research. 
According to most of books about business research method, the basic elements are 
similar – topic selection, literature review, concept and theory framework formulation, 
conducting the study with selected methods, completing the analysis, writing up the 
findings and drawing conclusions. It is important to point out that, in practice, 
research is not a sequential process although a basic logic to the process can be 
defined (Fishier 2007: 3). Therefore, the research design needs to be flexible to 
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change; and the research plan can support the different stages of project be pursued in 
parallel.   
Document 2  
An extensive literature review is a crucial part, which build the foundation of a 
research project (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 93; Fishier, 2007: 98). It allows the research 
project to build upon the existing literatures. Fisher (2007: 98) emphasized the 
importance of criticism that makes the dissertation more robust. Byman and Bell 
(2007: 95) declared that the literature review provides the basis on which to justify the 
research questions and build the research design. The author tentatively selects the 
structure approach to explore the qualitative study. It should be judicious to draft and 
develop a conceptual framework during the literature review according to Fisher‟s 
arguments (2007: 125). 
General information on marketing channel will be included in the literature review but 
focus will be placed on channel motivation through incentive programs in China 
B-to-B market. The factors might affect the effectiveness of channel incentive 
programs will be explored. Those factors may include producers‟ objectives and costs, 
channel wants and needs, customer value delivery, channel cooperation, channel 
conflict and competition, communication and culture, etc. 
The literature includes following sub-headings: 
- The functions of channel incentive programs and the measurements of program 
effectiveness; 
- The factors that affect the program effectiveness: issues and drives; 
- Critical review and evaluating the contributions made in this study area;  
- A conceptual framework: interactive factors affecting the effectiveness of channel 
programs in a dynamic business environment. 
The literature review will also guide the proposed study in strengthening the research 
questions, designs and methods by learning from relevant literatures. 
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Document 3 
It is a qualitative research by interpretative approach. A set of channel incentive 
programs will be selected from two different business units. Those programs represent 
different types of channel incentive programs (Gilliland, 2001). A series of focus 
group and in-depth interviews will be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
those programs and identify the factors that affect the program effectiveness. Focus 
groups and in-depth interview will be conducted: 
- From different business perspectives, e.g. producers (Motorola and Symbol), 
channel members (distributors, resellers, retailers, etc.) and customers 
(governments, large enterprises, small and medium companies, etc.);  
- From different business roles and responsibilities, e.g. producer channel manager, 
producer marketing managers, producer large account sales persons, the owner of 
channel members, senior management of channel members, sales persons of 
channel members, etc. 
- From different sub-groups, e.g. year of service, experiences, length of business 
relationships, loyalty to the producer, etc.  
Participants will be selected from throughout the sales value chain. A draft of 
open-ended questions will be developed after the literature review. 
Document 4 
This document will focus on quantitative research by realism approach. The research 
will measure the impacts of the critical factors, which identified in Document 2, to the 
effectiveness of the incentive programs. A questionnaire will be designed and 
administered to a scale of channel members, in order to ascertain the views of a 
representative selection of the population, under study.  
Considering the number of G&PS and EMB channel members (about 250 each), the 
about 300 sales peoples will be selected (about 150 each) by random. The margin of 
error will be managed within 95%. (Fisher, 2007: 190) The questionnaire will be 
designed in a Likert scales format. The author notices the advantage and 
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disadvantage of Likert scales highlighted by Fisher (2007: 197) and Bryman & Bell 
(2007: 249). Cronbach’s Alpha and SPSS will be applied to check the reliability of 
statements and analyze the result.   
The questionnaire will be further developed once the literature review is completed 
and finalized when the results of the focus groups and interviews are conducted. An 
independent survey company might be hired to ensure the neutrality. 
Document 5 
An action research builds on the findings of document three and four in document five. 
This research will ascertain and improve the theory by practicing in two to three real 
business cases. It will make the proposed research more practical.  
The research can be started from a marketing program design workshop, which 
conducted in either G&PS or EMB channel business unit. The channel incentive 
program will be implemented and a measured based on the theory discovered in 
previous studies. A refined instrument will be administered to collect the independent 
views and opinions of channel members. Comparative analysis will be leveraged to 
summarize the results.  
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5. The Risk and Issues 
Political and Ethical 
Being the leader of G&PS channel business in China, the author participates in many 
design works of channel incentive programs. It provides a fair understanding of 
channel incentive programs and effectiveness evaluation experiences. However, the 
author is also aware of the danger of subjectivity, like “the judge” as a researcher‟s 
role (Fisher, 2007: 58). The author will make every effort to circumvent this. 
The complexity of the subject involves many concepts and terminologies, which 
defined differently in different theories or circumstances. The concept of “channel 
conflict”, as an example, Kolter and Armstrong (2001:435) defined as “disagreement 
among marketing channel members on goals and roles – who should do what and for 
what reward” in 2001; However, for same concept, Kolter and Keller (2006:455) 
defined as “when one channel member‟s actions prevent the channel from achieving 
its goal.” These two definitions are holding different standpoints. The author will 
make all the efforts to define the major concepts as precisely as possible in the 
literature review and map them clearly in a conceptual framework.  
Some trade-offs have to be made in the research. The author notices the study might 
limit to two lines of businesses in Motorola, which might not be able to represent the 
B-to-B industries in China. However, the data accessibility might limit the author to 
reach channel members of other companies to make such an in-depth research. Time 
and resources are the factors that affect the duration and reliability of the results. For 
instance, it is realized that grounded approach could be the best route in qualitative 
research (Fisher, 2007: 125), but time constrain might force the author to choose 
structured approach finally. The author believes there are more factors need to balance 
at different stage of the research. The trade-offs will be highlighted in the analysis 
reports if applicable.  
Methodological pluralism is another risk. As Fisher (2007: 56) pointed out, “If you 
are doing interpretivist research, then there is no way that an element of realism can 
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add to it. This is because taking a positivist perspective would undermine the 
methodological basis of the interpretivist approach.” After the literature review, one 
methodology will be selected as prime based on the defined concepts and conceptual 
framework. The author will apply only one methodology at each stage of research. 
The author hopes that the conclusions of the different researches can support each 
other.  
The sensitivity and confidentiality are also viewed as potential ethical issues. Most of 
interviews might be audio-taped to facilitate the compilation of data. It will be 
highlighted at the beginning of the focus groups and interviews that the sessions are 
taped. Every encounters and participants will be given the opportunity to decline to 
participate. The business data that utilized in the research might be classified as 
Motorola proprieties and confidential. The author needs to acquire Motorola‟s 
permission to publish the research result via any academic or business publications.  
Outcomes 
The proposed research will have concomitant benefits for three principle beneficiaries, 
namely the author, the host organization and marketing researchers generally:  
The author will:  
 understand the subject systematically and develop the in-depth cognition; 
 develop research skills in interpretive, realism and action approaches; 
 contribute a practical piece of research to the marketing channel study; 
 obtain a worth post graduate qualification for the efforts invested; 
 establish intellectual and academic abilities;  
 explore a widely spread business network, e.g. NTU society, NTU student 
community, etc. 
The host organization will benefit by:  
 gaining an understanding of a topic that widely used in the business but 
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poorly comprehended; 
 improving current business performance by applying the theory discovered 
and experience gained in the research; 
 facilitating future behavioural changes in the marketing channel by incentive 
programs;  
The marketing researchers will benefit by: 
 gaining a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the marketing 
channel incentive programs and the factors affecting the effectiveness; 
 facilitating comparisons with existing and previous research in marketing 
channel management area.  
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6. Research Plan and Timetable 
S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
Document 1 The research proposal
Document 2 Critical literature review and framework development
- Literature planning and reading
- Framework Development
- Discussion and deliberation
- Summary and conclusion
Document 3 Interpretive Research - identifying the critical factors
- Research planning and questions development
- In-depth interview and focus group discussion
- Information analysis and deliberation
- Summary and conclusion
Document 4 Realism Research - measuring the critical factors
- Research planning and questionnaire development
- Survey and data collection
- Data Analysis and deliberation
- Summary and conclusion
Document 5 Action Research - real case implementations
- Research planning and case development
- Case implementation and measurement
- Data Analysis and deliberation
- Summary and conclusion
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1.  Introduction and Objectives 
Software industry is one of the highest growing industries in the past twenty 
years. Especially, in the past 5 years, the global software market posted steady rates of 
growth and its trend is expected to continue over the forthcoming five years 
(Datamonitor, 2008). Datamonitor (2008) reported that the global software market 
generated total revenues of $251.5 billion in 2007, representing a compound annual 
growth rate of 7.2% for the period spanning 2003-2007. As an example, Microsoft 
revenue grew from 3.8 billion U.S. dollar to 60 billion U.S. dollar during last 15 
years.  
According to its end-user, software can be categorized into consumer software 
and business software. Ender-users of consumer software are ordinary computer users 
who need ―custom‖ programs of modest size, however, don‘t have the in-house 
capability or resources to develop software (Campbell-Kelly, 1995). Ender-users of 
business software come primarily from government of all levels, and large companies 
from a wide range of industries, their market is for very large programs that the 
organizations did not have technological capability to develop themselves 
(Campbell-Kelly, 1995). Business software is distinguished from consumer software 
in that its products focus on primary service activities and value chain activities and 
the integration of the software that support these activities. This study will focus on 
business software in China‘s government and enterprise market. 
The software manufacturer depends on channel to perform a variety of functions 
on its behalf. On one hand, business software is usually complex, so manufacturer‘s 
channel member should own a technical programming capability and knowledge of 
the targeted applications domain. On the other hand, Other than preload software and 
personal software, most of business software needs to be customized based on 
specific customer business environment. If enterprise customers are satisfied with 
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business software, they will be satisfied with the channel member who implement 
software and afford service, which leading to customer loyalty (Greenstein, 1997. P. 
179-192). So channel partners play important roles in business software sales and 
marketing. Like hardware products, channel partners also improved software 
producers‘ market coverage, customer fulfilments and services quality. Software 
channel partners, other than hardware sales agents, they are more tightened up by 
customer industries and skills of certain business software. Both software producers 
and software channels hardly switch from one to another because of high switching 
cost. However, John P. Murry & Heide (1998) reported that 74% of distributors agree 
that incentive and promotion allowances enhance their profitability, yet 65% believe 
they do not receive their fair share of manufacturers' incentive; on the other hand, 
85% of manufacturers believe the money given to retailers is ineffectively spent, and 
only 19% consider these expenditures good value. As noted by Ganesan (1993), 
channels and manufacturers often possess systematically different orientations toward 
their relationships. Differences in goals and preferences between a software company 
and its channel can lead to conflicts over how channel revenues and costs should be 
allocated among the participants and can produce incentive problems within the 
channel. So channel incentive is more important to manage and motivate the partners.  
In 1950‘s, the term software had not yet been coined (it first came into use in 
about 1959), and computer programs were not a tradable commodity (Rosen, 1967). 
Some computer manufacturers supplied (i.e., bundled) operating-system software as 
an integral part of the computer system, because computers were so slow and small at 
that time. However, the continued growth in the intensity of computer operations 
during 1990s provided a growing chance for company‘s internal development 
capabilities (Steinmueller, 1996, p. 131-153). Accordingly, firms began to reconsider 
the make or buy decision for their entire data processing activity. If another firm could 
provide the technological knowledge and human resources to implement specialized 
software solutions, choose among complex competing hardware offerings, and deliver 
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useful information services to internal users, why not buy these services rather than 
produce them in-house? The growing complexity of data processing technologies and 
markets pushed companies toward the "buy" solution and a number of companies 
emerged to satisfy this demand. Now, the computer software industry is growing 
rapidly and is of increasing importance for the international competitiveness of other 
high-technology industries and national economies (Steinmueller, 1996), however, 
because software was bundled as an integral part of the computer system before, it has 
still received surprisingly little attention from scholars. Comparing with hardware 
industry, there are few studies in software channel management. How could hardware 
channel incentive theories be applied to B-to-B market of software industry? What are 
the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive programs? How 
does Chinese culture influence the effectiveness? Can we discover a model to 
improve the channel incentive effectiveness in China‘s B-to-B software market? This 
review of literature is motivated by an interest in the answers to these questions.  
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2.  Approach and Context 
As noted in the introduction, channel relationship management has become a key 
factor in marketing research. Many companies begin to view channel members as 
their partnership and try to focus on establishing and maintaining lasting, stable 
exchange relationship with them. However, it is very difficult for them to establish 
lasting and stable relationship, because channel members‘ attitudes and objectives are 
not compatible usually. Effective approach to solve the question is that manufactures 
use appropriate governance mechanisms—such as incentive programs, monitoring 
processes, and enforceable contracts. Among these governance mechanisms, channel 
incentive program is an important mechanism which can maintain and coordinate 
successful exchange relationships. This is because incentive arrangements can be 
crafted such that the reseller will comply with the supplier in order to receive 
remuneration of some kind. Because channel incentives are so closely tied to specific 
performance, they play a key role in allowing many suppliers to maintain productive 
relationships with channel members. On the other hand, suppliers often propose 
incentive programs that fail to motivate resellers, causing the offered incentive to be 
rejected outright (Narus & Anderson, 1996). The rejection of an incentive is 
problematic because a supplier‘s potential to control its channel cannot be realized 
until the reseller accepts the offer and performs as specified (Frazier, 1999). So, it is 
necessary for us to study channel incentive programs and identify the critical factors 
that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive programs.  
In marketing channel research, a considerable amount of attention has been paid 
to channel incentive. Channel incentive has been typically defined as a series of 
mechanism to motivate channel members, including economic as well as 
non-economic mechanism. Past research has focused on three distinct views to assess 
the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive programs. They 
are (1) economy view which is from Channel Incentive Theories; (2) culture view 
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which from Chinese Culture & Value ―Guan-xi‖; (3) cognitive view which is from 
organization sensemaking. 
In case of economy view, this review explores channel incentive theories from 
economic view firstly. It begins with establishment of the CIP (channel incentive 
programs) concept, description of properties of CIP, and categorizing CIP. 
Then, in case of culture view, the review study channel incentive theories from 
non-economic view or culture view. Every culture distinguishes itself from others by 
the specific solutions it chooses to certain problems which reveal themselves as 
unique. A few across-culture studies show culture a significant factor influencing 
behaviour of channel members (Kale, 1986; Frazier et al., 1989). Different culture 
will lead to different behaviour of channel member. Considering Chinese culture is 
very different from western culture, universal applications of western management 
theory may not work in Chinese market. In many cases, marketing channel theories 
and its relevant results in western cannot be put into China directly. The method to 
solve this problem is to adjust western theories based on Chinese practices. The 
Chinese cultural root is Confucianism which emphasizes the importance of 
interdependent social connections. In China, the interpersonal connections or 
relationships are called Guanxi, which is a Chinese term. Guanxi is deeply embedded 
in the mindset of Chinese and in every aspect of their personal and organizational 
interactions (Park & Luo, 2001). Good guanxi can bring a wide range of benefits 
including securing rare resources, bypassing or short-cutting the bureaucratic maze, 
obtaining information and privilege, selling otherwise unsellable goods, providing 
insurance against uncertainty, and providing assistance when problems arise (Fan, 
2002). We will try to define Guanxi, identify the traits and levels of Guanxi, explore 
the relationship between Guanxi and channel behavior. 
This is then followed by review of organizational sense making from cognitive 
view. The paper reviews traditional organizational sense making and modern 
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organizational sense making including Hsee‘s theory, explains the influence on 
channel behaviour. 
The review will introduce two kinds of channel behaviour including channel 
coordination and channel conflict. It‘s well known that the result of channel conflict is 
not at their joint profit maximization levels and their profits are inferior to what could 
be achieved with coordinated behaviour. For manufacturers, they want to coordination 
with channel member to improve channel performance, but because of channel 
opportunism, channel member‘ behaviour will lead to conflict. It subsequently moves 
on to orientations amongst channel behaviour, which is the reason why the channel 
members take an action on channel coordination and channel conflict. 
Because improving distribution channel performance is every manufacturer‘s 
objective, then, the paper review the relationship between channel incentive programs 
(CIP) design and distribution channel performance, and consider the channel 
incentive programs design to improve performance. 
However, although this will not be clearly defined within the review structure, 
the over objective will be to identify the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of 





Figure 1.  Elements and relationships essential to the review 
It must be stressed however, that at this stage arguments are only partially 
developed. The main objective of the review is to provide the author with the 
opportunity to explore areas with which he is only partially familiar, and to provide a 
foundation for subsequent stages of investigation (DBA papers 3, 4, 5 and so on). 
Last but not least, in the every part in this review, the author will introduce the 



















3.  Channel Incentive Theories (economy view) 
Many manufacturers rely on distributors to sell their products. The contractual 
relationship between the manufacturer and the distributors is subject to the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problem. Therefore, it is very important for manufacturer 
to design incentive program to motivate distributors. Channel incentive programs 
(CIP) and channel incentive theories have become hot topic in western literature.  
Principal-agent Theory and Channel Incentive 
Agency theory has spawned a large amount of recent research in economics, 
finance, accounting, organizational behavior, political science, and sociology. Its 
proponents prophesy that a revolution is at hand, that agency and related theories can 
greatly improve our understanding of why organizations exist and how they work 
(Hesterly, Liebeskind, and Zenger 1990). An agency relationship is present whenever 
one party (the principal) depends on another party (the agent) to undertake some 
action on the principal's behalf. Hence, any employment relationship is an agency 
relationship. The hiring firm, or a manager representing the owners' interests, is the 
principal and the employee is the agent. Given that most marketing departments 
consist of multiple employees at various organizational levels (product managers, 
salespeople, etc.), developing and implementing marketing strategies and programs 
necessarily involves managing agency relationships. At a more fundamental level, 
agency relationships are pervasive in marketing because the essence of marketing is 
exchange, and "the agency relationship is … a significant component of almost all 
[exchange] transactions" (Arrow 1985). This is particularly true because most goods 
and services are distributed through intermediaries—such as wholesalers, retailers, or 




Channel incentive has received enormous interests from the economics, 
marketing, and operations literature in the past two decades. Most of the theoretic 
work used the principal-agent model to study various issues arising from channel 
incentive.  
In the principal-agent model, a principal delegates a task to an agent. The success 
of the task depends on the agent‘s certain input (e.g. sales effort) that is unobservable 
to the principal. The principal needs to afford motivation for the agent for his input. 
The incentive can only depend on some measure that is verifiable to both parties, e.g. 
the sales volume. Therefore, the principal‘s problem is to design an effective incentive 
scheme, while anticipating the agent‘s optimal response to any given contract and 
satisfying the agent‘s participation constraint. Holmstrom (1979) demonstrates the 
inefficiency manifested as the agent shirks in his input (i.e., the moral hazard), 
because the input of agent cannot be observed (and verified) by the principal. He also 
characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition for information that is valuable to 
alleviate the moral hazard problem. Meth (1996) studies a multi-task agency model 
where the agent can exert the mean-increasing effort and the variance-reducing effort. 
From the principal‘s standpoint, the variance-reducing effort reduces the outcome 
variance, thereby improving the principal‘s ability to use the outcome to infer the 
agent‘s mean-increasing effort. Nevertheless, inducing the variance-reducing effort 
also suffers from the moral hazard problem due to its own unobservability (Baiman, 
1990, p. 341-371; Bergen et al., 1992). 
A distribution channel constitutes a set of agency relationships (Bergen, 1992). 
The manufacturer depends on resellers to perform a variety of functions on its behalf, 
including the provision of shelf space, local advertising, point-of-purchase promotion, 
and implementation of an effective pricing strategy. However, differences in goals and 
preferences between a manufacturer and a reseller can lead to conflicts over how 
channel revenues and costs should be allocated among the participants and can 
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produce incentive problems within the channel. If a powerful manufacturer attempts 
to increase profits by offering relatively low margins to a reseller, for instance, that 
reseller may not have adequate incentives to promote or price the product very 
aggressively. In turn, the reseller's tendency to shirk by under-promoting or 
overpricing the product under such circumstances may lower sales volume and lead to 
a less than optimal amount of profit for the manufacturer. The contractual relationship 
between the manufacturer and the distributors is subject to the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problem. The former is mainly caused by the fact that the agents‘ 
sales efforts are often unobservable to the firm, while the latter arises because the 
agents typically have better information about the market demand due to their close 
contact with the consumers.  
Channel incentive has been studied extensively by using the principal-agent 
framework, where the firm (as the principal) design channel incentive scheme for its 
distributor (as the agents) who privately exert sales efforts (Coughlan, 1993; Albers, 
1996). A manufacturer might attempt to control the actions of the members of its 
distribution channel in several ways by making it incentive compatible for them to 
engage in actions consistent with the firm's objectives. Basu et al. (1985) consider a 
firm designing an incentive scheme for a single channel member. Since channel 
members effort is unobservable to the firm, the incentive has to be based on the final 
sales, which depends on the sales effort as well as random noise that is out of the 
distributor‘s control. Basu et al. (1985) characterizes the optimal compensation 
scheme (a function of the final sales) that maximizes the firm‘s expected profit and 
satisfies the salesperson‘s minimum utility requirement. In particular, Basu et al. 
(1985) examines how the structure of the optimal incentive scheme (e.g., the 
proportion of salary to total incentive) changes in some parameters such as the sales 
uncertainty, the distributor‘s risk attitude and reservation utility. In general, the form 
of the optimal incentive plan is complex and hard to implement, but in reality, the 
reality, the incentive scheme often has a simple structure. The question is how much 
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efficiency is lost due to its simplicity. Some research work said not much. Mantrala 
and Raman (1990) examine the performance of the quota-based plan, where the 
incentive remains constant if the sales is below a target and increases linearly is sales 
when the sales exceeds the target. Numerical results show that such a simple performs 
close to the optimal incentive plan as suggested by Basu et al. (1985). Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) argued that the linear incentive schemes could indeed be optimal 
under certain assumptions. Using Holmstrom and Milgrom‘s framework, Lal and 
Srinivasan (1993) study how the parameters (e.g., the fixed salary and the commission 
rate) of the linear contract change in the model parameters (e.g., the salesperson‘s risk 
aversion, cost of effort). In addition, they provide empirical studies to support the key 
conclusions drawn from the agency theory. 
A critical assumption made in the above-mentioned work is that both the firm 
and the salesperson have equal knowledge about the sales environment. This 
assumption of information symmetry, however, may not suit well in the sales 
environments where the distributor has superior information about the local market. In 
the settings with information asymmetry (e.g., the distributor privately observes part 
of sales uncertainty ex ante), a typical approach is to offer a menu of incentives and 
let the distributor self-select. The information is then revealed from the distributor‘s 
contract choice. Lal and Staelin (1986) give a model framework for the setting where 
the distributor‘s selling skills are the source of information asymmetry, and 
demonstrate that offering a menu of incentives can be beneficial for the firm. Rao 
(1990) studies the similar setting and derives the optimal incentive plan under the 
assumption that both the manufacturer and the distributor are risk neutral. It is 
interesting that the optimal plan can be implemented as a menu of linear contracts. 
Gonik (1978) propose that each salesperson is asked to submit a forecast before the 
selling season in the IBM Brazilian Operations. The incentive depends on the final 
sales and the initial forecast. More specifically, for fixed sales volume, the incentive 
decreases in the forecast error (measured by the absolute difference between sales and 
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forecast), thus providing incentives for the distributor to submit a truthful forecast. 
Establishment of CIP concept 
Many scholars have given the definition of channel incentive programs (CIP), 
among those are Frazier (2000) and Gilliland (2003).  
When incentivizing and ―managing‖ channels, Frazier (2000) suggests, ―Firms 
can rely on a mix of contracts, pricing and credit programs (e.g., functional discounts, 
margin guarantees, extended dating), promotional programs (e.g., market 
development funds, co-op programs, incentive or spiff programs, earned volume 
rebates, end-customer promotions), merchandising aids, training programs, and 
inventory buyback programs, among other components‖. Reviewing Frazier‘s (2000) 
channel incentive programs, these incentives are generally thought of in terms of 
margin discounts or spiffs, and practitioners actually use ‗‗a complex array of 
different tools-levers‘‘ 
Recently, Gilliland (2003) considered channel incentives as behaviors or policies 
described in the supplier‘s standard operating agreement, which are designed to 
motivate active intermediary support of the supplier‘s distributor. In Gilliland‘s 
opinion, Channel incentives have characteristic of one of the ‗‗back-end‘‘ dimensions 
of governance, along with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, because they are 
designed to keep a relationship on track by ensuring that the supplier‘s front-end plans 
are executed as anticipated.  
Properties of CIP  
Reviewing the sales channel selection literature, Properties of CIP can be distilled 
into four different frameworks, that‘s to say, scholars proposed channel incentives 
have four inherent properties, such as incentive magnitude, incentive intensity, 
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incentive compatibility and incentive equity, which accounts for the reseller‘s 
motivation to accept the offered incentive (Gilliland, 2004) (Table 1).  
The first property of CIP is incentive magnitude, which refers to the amount of 
financial gain that can be realized by the reseller (Murry & Heide, 1997). It‘s usually 
seen that suppliers typically give promotional allowances for the product being 
promoted or for other products. Klein and Leffler (1981) suggested that the more the 
allowance offered by a supplier exceeds the market standard or somehow represents a 
premium, the higher the likelihood that a distributor will agree to take part in a 
program. In Casson's (1991, p. 121-135) opinion, economic incentives and 
"enlightened self-interest" can improve participation. 
The second property of CIP is incentive intensity, which refers to how closely 
reseller performance is linked to monetary compensation (Zenger & Marshall, 2000; 
Williamson, 1991). According to most theories of incentives, the effectiveness of 
these group rewards should be a function of incentive intensity. Especially, Kruse 
(1993) defined incentive intensity as the marginal gains in pay individuals derive from 
group performance. 
The third property of CIP is incentive compatibility, which refers to the extent 
the incentive can be in alignment with the distributor‘s goals (Bergen et al., 1992). 
When the incentive is well in alignment with the distributor‘s goals, incentive 
compatibility is good. 
The fourth property of CIP is incentive equity, which refers to the extent the 
reseller perceives the incentive to be fair, given the effort required (Ring & Van, 1994). 
Thus, an incentive is more likely to be accepted (and is more likely to achieve control 
for the supplier) when it is high in magnitude, immediate, compatible, and equitable. 
With this background of control and motivation in mind, the many existing incentives 
used in practice are now addressed. 
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Properties of CIP  Explanation  
incentive magnitude  the amount of financial gain that can be realized by the 
reseller 
incentive intensity how closely reseller performance is linked to monetary 
compensation 
incentive compatibility the extent the incentive is in alignment with the reseller‘s 
goals 
incentive equity the extent the reseller perceives the incentive to be fair, 
given the effort required 
Table 1 - Properties of CIP 
Categories and types of CIP 
The study of channel incentive has gained urgency over the years (Gilliland, 2003, 
2004). Channel incentive can be categorized as the following four categories:  
Positive incentive and negative incentive 
Although there are many possible sources of power, French and Raven (1959) 
have defined five, which seem common and important: reward, coercive, legitimate, 
referent, and expert power. If manufacture exerts reward, legitimate, referent, and 
expert power on distributor, it is called positive incentive. If manufacture exerts 
coercive power on distributor, it‘s called negative incentive. In terms of distributor 
orientation, these incentives engage a positive (moving towards them) orientation. 
(Table 2) 
    In the existing literature, positive incentive is commonly defined as 
generalized meaning of incentive, such as margin discounts, sales bonuses, provision 
of sales leads, promotional materials, provision of automated information and 
automated transaction tools and so on (Gilliland, 2004). 
Negative incentive, which means punitive acts, indicate a "sick relationship" 
(Morgan & Hunt 1994), but they are legitimate (French & Raven 1959) in some 
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situations. For example, a supplier could take appropriate punitive action to halt one 
distributor whose dysfunctional behaviour undermines other distributors. A negative 
incentive is expected to create a ―moving away from) orientation: distributors are 
expected to avoid them by changing their conduct. Automakers impose previously 
negotiated fines on their JIT suppliers for late delivery. Scheer (1993) suggested that 
punitive actions do not always indicate malice, for they are sometimes necessary, 
appropriate, or fair. 
    Therefore, negative incentive is acts through which the firm intentionally 
inflicts damaging consequences on its partner (Gaski & Nevin 1985). A firm can 
affect its partner's outcomes negatively, either contingently through an associated 
explicit influence attempt, or non-contingently through a direct power exercise 
(Scheer & Stem 1992). Punitive actions include, for example, a supplier paying fines 
for late delivery per its prior agreement with an industrial customer; a grocer 
unilaterally taking unauthorized deductions off an invoice for a vendor's improper 
polarization; or a mega-retailer shifting inventory it previously carried to its supplier, 
while unconditionally demanding more frequent deliveries of smaller lots and no 










margin discounts, sales bonuses, provision of sales 
leads, promotional materials, provision of automated 







a supplier paying fines for late delivery per its prior 
agreement with an industrial customer; a grocer 
unilaterally taking unauthorized deductions off an 
invoice for a vendor's improper polarization; or a 
mega-retailer shifting inventory it previously carried to 
its supplier, while unconditionally demanding more 
frequent deliveries of smaller lots and no increase in 
wholesale price 
Table 2 – Positive incentive and negative incentive 
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Cash incentive and Non-cash incentive 
Gilliland and Bello (2001) suggested that manufacturer can compensate 
distributor by monetary-based payments or by services performed. (Table 3) 
It is very common that many incentives compensate the reseller directly through 
providing them monetary rewards because of improving performance of specific tasks, 
for example, trade discounts, cash rebates, and so on. So Chu & Desai (1995) and 
Zenger & Marshall (2000) concluded that one key element of any incentive offering is 
the nature in which it compensates the reseller for its efforts especially by cash. 
Non-cash incentives are not contingent on specific performance, for example, 
co-op advertising kits, sales support information and so on, and they can compensate 
the reseller indirectly through eventual sales or margin increases. Thus, besides trade 
discounts and other means of direct compensation, non-cash incentives include 
services performed, information shared, pledges made, and support tools provided to 
resellers (Rubin, 1990, p. 89-119). 
In fact, despite their theoretical usefulness, Heide (1994) thought these 
classifications can be called ‗‗an oversimplification of the manner in which incentives 






Cash incentive  Chu & Desai 
(1995) Zenger & 
Marshall (2000) 
compensate the reseller directly through 
providing them monetary rewards (e.g. 
trade discounts, cash rebates) 
Non-cash 
incentive 
Rubin(1990) compensate the reseller indirectly through 
eventual sales or margin increases (e.g. 
services performed, information shared, 
pledges made, and support tools provided 
to resellers) 
Table 3 - Cash incentive and Non-cash incentive 
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Channel incentives for high technology industry 
Gilliland (2003) examined high-technology suppliers‘ channel programs which 
including 170 unique channel incentives applied in the reseller programs of high tech 
suppliers such as Sun Microsystems, Microsoft, Cisco Systems, and others,  and he 
used qualitative data from the high technology industry and a grounded theory coding 
methodology to inductively derive a business-to-business channel incentives 
classification scheme. In his conclusion, the incentives are organized into 16 
subcategories and 5 major categories: Credible Channel Policies, Market 
Development Support, Supplemental Contact, High-Powered Incentives, and 
End-User Encouragements. Gilliland (2003) suggested that each incentive 
subcategory is a means of controlling reseller behaviors and defined these incentive 
subcategories as the following (Table 4): 
Credible Channel Policies are the supplier‘s ways to do business signaling 
dedication to a reseller-based selling model. These incentives mean the supplier‘s 
attempt to control reseller participation in its channel program from a control 
perspective. 
Market Development Support incentives are the tools that are provided for the 
reseller to promote the brand. They represent the supplier‘s control of specific tasks 
performed by resellers.  
Supplemental Contact incentives are programs, which designed to enhance 
reseller capabilities with extra-high levels of communication and information. These 
incentives are designed to control of the reseller‘s quality and efficiency of task 
performance. 
High-Powered Incentives represent direct increases in monetary compensation 
for reseller performance. They represent control of reseller output.  
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End-User Encouragements build unique channel value through joint activities of 








Expansion of approved customer list for resellers. 
Migration to 100% channel reliance in certain divisions of 
the firm. 
When a customer wants to buy direct, the reseller is still 
compensated for its efforts. 
Direct sales reps are compensated equally whether they 




Resellers are compensated for account development efforts 
if sale is stolen by channel rival. 










Customer care hotline for resellers to call for shipping, 
delivery, and technical information. 
White papers, including product information and case 
study applications. 
Technicians available to answer tough presale support 
questions. 
Post-support follow-up to monitor service quality. 




Promotional materials, sales leads, co-op programs, 
product demo programs, trade show support. 
Drop-in logos, free yellow pages advertising. 
Web-based event posting service so resellers can post 
information, share logos, exchange images, etc. 
Free release of all software upgrades. 
Personal Increase the number of channel managers from 3 to 12. 
22 
 
assistances Empowered channel support staff. 
Make joint sales calls with resellers. 
Hired a credible director of channel services. 
Discretionary 
funds 
Market development funds for resellers to apply to channel 
program as they see fit. 
Educational funds for resellers to acquire training outside 
normal market support program. 
Certification 
programs 
Sales lead prioritization for certified resellers. 
Advanced sales, product, and technical resources for 
authorized resellers. 
Certified partners are invited to annual sales meeting and 
given increased exposure to end-users. 







Video broadcasts of meetings to resellers. 
Holds quarterly update meetings on the state of the 
company. 
Communications program includes newsletter, fax blasts, 
e-mail announcements, channel broadcasts. 
Automated 
information 
Single portal access to online incentive, educational, and 
technical support. 
Online status report for everything resellers have sold, 
triggering earned rewards. 
Customized profiles allow resellers to control information 
and how it is received. 
Virtual new product launch seminars over the web. 
Quarterly CDs that update all technical information. 
Automated 
transactions 
Online configuration tool for pricing, quoting, and 
configuring orders. 













New, sellable service and leasing programs. 
Multivendor service contracts so reseller can support 
multiple brands in the field. 





Cash bonuses to resellers that introduce certain services to 
new customers. 
Cash rebates pegged to sales growth 
Resellers earn points for sales that can be redeemed for 
cash, prizes, and trips. 
Targeted, announced deep margins for products. 
Financial 
programs 
Discounts on smaller deals to improve reseller margins and 
lower end-user price. 
Quick bid program gives resellers quick responses to their 
special pricing requests so they can better-compete with 
companies that sell online. 







Nationally market reseller-developed solutions. 
Web site allows end-users to learn about resellers and link 
directly to them if desired. 
Resellers allowed to sponsor portions of end-user seminars. 
Comarketing Works with resellers to create bundled solutions for 
targeted vertical markets. 
Enterprise sales force works with resellers to stimulate 
customer demand in new markets. 




‗‗Try & buy‘‘ programs allow customers to ‗‗kick the tires‘‘ 
before committing to purchase. 




Table 4 - Channel incentive classification scheme 
(Adapted from: Gilliland, D. (2003) ‘Toward a business-to-business channel 
incentive classification scheme’, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol 32, No.1, 
page 55-67.) 
Channel incentives and channel member’s decision-making 
Just as generally thinking, channel incentives can cause incentive compatibility, 
which means channel incentives are congruent with the channel member‘s 
performance goals (Gilliland, 2004). A manufacturer might attempt to influence the 
actions of the members of its distribution channel in several ways by making it 
incentive compatible for them to engage in actions consistent with the firm's 
objectives (Bergen, 1992). Bergen (1992) suggests that incentive problems can 
sometimes be realized through various types of pricing mechanisms. For example, 
when the franchise fee is fixed, the retailer is better off selling a larger volume of the 
product and is thus motivated to do so (Moorthy 1987). 
However, some researchers have found that channel incentives can cause 
incentive rejection, which means the reseller will not support the supplier‘s product. 
(Gilliland, 2004). Suppliers often propose incentive programs that fail to motivate 
resellers, causing the offered incentive to be rejected outright (Narus & Anderson, 
1996). The rejection of an incentive is problematic because a supplier‘s potential to 
control its channel cannot be realized until the reseller accepts the offer and performs 
as specified (Frazier, 1999). Unfortunately, the problem described, reseller rejection, 
is so commonplace that Murry and Heide (1998) suggest it is often the reseller‘s 
―default position‖. Anand and Stern (1985) suggest that a supplier can influence a 
channel decision only if the reseller is willing to relinquish influence of that decision, 
and it is more likely to relinquish influence if doing so will enhance its performance. 
Thus, if an offered channel incentive does not contribute to higher reseller business 
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results it might be rejected by the resellers. Gilliland (2004) found that many 
incentives were rejected because the distributors perceived they might not able to 
achieve those sales goals. Gilliland prescribed a four-step, theory-based process to 
help suppliers craft attractive incentive programs, which involves identifying 
resellers‘ performance needs, recognizing how each need suggests a different basis for 
incentive rejection, designing an incentive package such that the incentives support 
specific reseller needs, and considering unique channel conditions. 
From the above review, we can infer that only channel incentive is not enough in 
order to motivate channel members. There may be some other factors to influence 
channel members behavior. 
Relying on only Channel Incentive Theories (economy view) has its advantages 
and limitations. Channel Incentive Theories (economy view), no matter positive 
incentive or negative incentive, cash incentive or non-cash incentive, or channel 
incentives considering to overcome reseller rejection, or channel incentives for high 
technology industry, is from economy view. Some researchers have relying solely on 
economic performance to explain why channel members choose to accept or reject 
channel incentive. It represents an economic approach. It does not recognize the 
development of trust-based business relationships (Mőller 1992), and concepts like 
Chinese culture & value ―Guan-xi‖ are not part of the framework. Thus, it ignores 
recent literature on relationship marketing and management (Anderson & Narus 1999, 
p. 121). In fact, the development and advantages of cooperative buyer–seller 
relationships is very important for channel incentive. The advantages of close 
cooperative relationships are, for examples, that, through routinization, uncertainty is 
reduced and costs are lowered, and, through an open exchange of information, joint 
problem solving is facilitated. However, western relationship and Chinese guanxi has 
some same character, but more difference. Guanxi is seen as a potential solution for 
most problems of entering and operating in China. But, Channel Incentive Theories 
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(economy view) ignore the influence of guanxi on channel incentive, so it is partial. In 
the following part, we will review the nature of guanxi, and the relationship between 
guanxi and channel behavior. 
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4.  Chinese Culture and Value “Guan-xi” 
(culture view) 
Chinese culture roots of Guanxi 
The nature of relationships depends on the long experience of those involved in 
building the relationships and depends on the institutional infrastructure of societies 
(Hill, 1995; and North, 2005, P. 131-150). Thus, the route to developing relationships 
can be very different in different cultures and belief systems. Not only are the paths to 
relationship building different, but also the relative importance of the attributes which 
comprise the kinship between people is likely to vary across cultures and in the same 
culture over time (Buttery & Wong, 1999). It is clear that Culture and belief systems 
are therefore important to understanding the nature and significance of social 
interactions (Dunning & Kim, 2007). 
In China, the interpersonal connections or relationships are called Guanxi, which 
is a Chinese term. Guanxi is seen as a potential solution for most problems of entering 
and operating in China, because in the Chinese cultural roots is Confucianism which 
emphasizes the importance of interdependent social connections. In order to 
understand the importance of guanxi and how it operates, China‘ s Confucian legacy 
must be understood. 
With a history of more than 2500 years, Confucianism has exerted a main 
influence on the Chinese thinking modes and behaving ways. Especially, since the 
Han dynasty (BC 206–AD 220), Confucianism has held a fundamental and significant 
position in China, and its influence could be felt in many facets of Chinese life 
(Jacobs et al., 1995). In Confucian societies, an individual is first and foremost a 
relational being and part of a communitarian social system. Because the Chinese live 
in a network of personal and social inter-connections, and their incentive structures 
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and enforcement mechanisms is informal and not formal (North, 1990). Social order 
and stability depend on properly differentiated role relationships between particular 
individuals, for example, family, kinship networks, colleagues, neighbors, classmates, 
friendship circles, and even casual acquaintances make up the social framework, into 
which they grow and form the institutional system governing their behavior. At the 
same time, because Confucianism is powerful, the influence of Confucianism is not 
limited to China and other East Asian countries such as Japan and Korea are deeply 
affected by Confucianism too. Luo (2000) accounted for the pattern of life styles and 
attitudes of the overseas Chinese, and indeed the social and commercial fabric of 
which they are part. 
Because of Confucian roots of Guanxi, nurturing and managing relationships in 
China at both the personal- or firm-level is hardly new. Many firms rely on friends 
and connections to do business. 
Defining Guanxi 
Because guanxi is very important, more and more scholars have studied guanxi. 
The existing publications on guanxi definition are summarized in Table 5. 
In the Chinese business world, guanxi refers to the concept of drawing on 
established connections in order to secure favours in personal relationships, and it is 
understood as a special form of relationship that can tie the business partners by 
reciprocal exchanges of favors and obligations voluntarily and regularly (Alston, 
1989). Thus, although guanxi is in general considered as an important element of 
Confucianism, it can also become an asset and a corporate culture at the firm level. 
Lee and Humphreys (2007) focus on firm-level guanxi which emphasizes the use of 
personal relationships in facilitating operations or problem solving in business 
transactions. More specifically, they define guanxi as a corporate culture stressing on 
the relationships between business partners for achieving mutual benefits and 
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involving the use of personal and/or inter-firm connections to secure favors in the 
long term. 
In the extant literature, guanxi has various connotations. For example, Pye (1982, 
p. 156-169) regards guanxi as friendship with the implication of continued exchange 
of favors. Luo (1997a) states that guanxi refers to the concept of drawing on 
connections or networks in order to secure favors in personal or business relations. 
Lee and Ellis (2000) define guanxi in terms of reciprocal but unequal exchanges, 
giving face, trust and commitment, wining and dining, and most important, 
interpersonal bonds when they explore the benefits and costs of guanxi. Hence, 
guanxi is an informal social bond through which individuals carry expectations and 
obligations to facilitate exchange of favors among them (Leung, Lai, Chan, &Wong, 
2005). It can be defined as a kind of interpersonal friendship in which individuals are 
committed to one another on a long-term basis by a hidden norm of reciprocity that 
concerns equity and exchange of favors (Ang & Leong, 2000). Also, guanxi involves 
cultivating personal relationships through the exchange of favors and gifts for the 
purpose of obtaining goods and services, developing networks of mutual dependence, 
and creating a sense of obligation and indebtedness (Yang, 1994, p. 102-131). 
Embeddedness theory suggests that economic action is embedded in structures of 
social relations (Granovetter, 1985). It also stresses the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures (or ―networks‖) of such relations in generating trust and 
discouraging malfeasance (Granovetter, 1985). If a transaction is embedded within a 
broader reciprocal social relationship, the transactors may rely on social sanctions to 
protect their interests (Dyer & Chu, 2000). Hence, as a kind of social relations, guanxi 
will have some connections with trust and risk to a certain extent. 
Scholars Guanxi definition 
Alston (1989) as a special form of relationship which can tie the 
business partners by reciprocal exchanges of favors and 
obligations voluntarily and regularly 
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Lee and Humphreys 
(2007) 
as a corporate culture stressing on the relationships 
between business partners for achieving mutual benefits 
and involving the use of personal and/or inter-firm 
connections to secure favors in the long term. 
Pye (1982) as friendship with the implication of continued exchange 
of favors 
Luo (1997) the concept of drawing on connections or networks in 
order to secure favors in personal or business relations 
Lee and Ellis (2000) in terms of reciprocal but unequal exchanges, giving 
face, trust and commitment, wining and dining, and most 
important, interpersonal bonds when they explore the 
benefits and costs of guanxi 
Leung, Lai, Chan, 
&Wong, (2005) 
an informal social bond through which individuals carry 
expectations and obligations to facilitate exchange of 
favors among them 
Ang & Leong (2000) as a kind of interpersonal friendship in which individuals 
are committed to one another on a long-term basis by a 
hidden norm of reciprocity that concerns equity and 
exchange of favors 
Yang (1994) cultivating personal relationships through the exchange 
of favors and gifts for the purpose of obtaining goods 
and services, developing networks of mutual 
dependence, and creating a sense of obligation and 
indebtedness 
Dyer & Chu (2000) guanxi will have some connections with trust and risk to 
a certain extent 
Table 5 - Summary of existing studies on Guanxi definition 
All these definitions are useful as they depict guanxi as special relationships. 
However, there are still some China concepts, such as xinyong, renqing and ganqing, 
should be distinguished from guanxi. In order to clarify the guanxi definition, it is 
vital to contrast the difference of related concept. Wang (2007) explored the 
underlying mechanism between Western relationship marketing and Chinese guanxi 
by examining the construct equivalence of the two concepts. In his literature, Wang 
(2007) defined some related Chinese terms and they are guanxi, xinyong, renqing, 




Guanxi is composed of two Chinese characters, guan (gate) and xi (connection). 
One must pass the gate to be connected to networks. As such, guanxi generally refers 
to relationships or social connections based on mutual interests and benefits (Yang, 
1994). It is a special type of relationship that bonds the exchange partners through 
reciprocal obligations to obtain resources through a continual cooperation and 
exchange of favors (Chen, 1995, p. 89-101). 
Xinyong can be directly translated as ‗‗credit‘‘ (the word ‗‗credit card‘‘ in 
Chinese is xinyong ka), and equals to the Western version ‗‗trust.‘‘ Trust, in Chinese 
business relations, is more based on one‘s credit of ability of return favors than relied 
on one‘s integrity and competency, as in the Western relationship context. Trust, along 
with commitment, is regarded as a fundamental building block of a relationship model 
(Garbarino & Johnson, 1999), as it motivates marketers to work at maintaining 
relationship investments and keeping long-term benefits rather than short-term 
alternatives (Dwyer et al., 1987). Trust is an important factor in determining 
long-term orientation because it fosters the focus on future condition, which reduces 
the likelihood of opportunism (Geyskens & Steemkamp, 1996). 
Renqing is a unique term in Chinese cultures, often referring to one‘s emotional 
responses when faced with various situations of daily life, a resource that one can 
present to another person as a gift in the social exchange process, and a set of social 
norms that one should follow to get along well with other people (Hwang, 1987). 
Renqing is the underlying mechanism of guanxi. The term renqing involves 
exchanges of favors following certain social norms and behavioral rules. Renqing 
provides leverage in interpersonal exchanges of favors and is much more highly 
elaborated and more tightly bound up with ideas of reciprocity than it is in many other 
cultures (Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1994). Hwang (1987) advocated that renqing can be 
understood in terms of two basic rules — reciprocity and empathy — depending upon 
the participant‘s role as a recipient or a benefactor in the guanxi. He defined 
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reciprocity as focusing on a recipient‘s behavior by the social norm expressed as ‗‗if 
you have received a drop of beneficence from other people, you should return to them 
a fountain of beneficence‘‘. He explained empathy as the ability to see a situation 
from another person‘s perspective and as focusing on the benefactor‘s behavior 
guided by Confucianism principle of forgiveness, propounded by the ‗‗do not do unto 
others that which you would not wish done unto you‘‘ and by its converse: ‗‗Do unto 
others as you wish done unto yourself‘‘ (Hwang, 1987).  
Ganqing refers to feelings and emotional attachment among members of 
networks. It is often an indicator of closeness of guanxi. The most intimate ganqing is 
the qingqing, which is a blood-based emotional attachment existed among direct 
family members only. In a business relationship where there is no qingqing existing, 
one usually does ganqing investment in order to build a good guanxi (Wang, 2007). 
On one hand, western relationship marketing and guanxi have some basic 
characteristics such as mutual understanding, cooperative behavior and long-term 
orientation. On the other hand, they have quite different underlying mechanisms. For 
example, guiding principles of a relational exchange in most Western cultures are 
driven by legality and rules, whereas guiding principles of relational behaviors in 
guanxi are driven more by morality and social norms (Arias, 1998). Trust, which 
plays a key role in relationship marketing, does not have the construct equivalence 
with xinyong in the Chinese culture and has limited impact on the development and 
maintenance of guanxi. Instead, what guides relational exchange behaviors in guanxi 
are reciprocal obligation and mutual assurance, which are based on renqing, a unique 
concept rooted in traditional Chinese culture. In particular, guanxi is cultivated and 
maintained through the exchange of renqing to attain mutual benefits. 
Concept Theoretic precedence Basic characteristics 
Guanxi Yang (1994)  
Chen (1995) 
relationships or social connections based on 
mutual interests and benefits; guiding 




Xinyong Garbarino & Johnson, 
(1999); Dwyer et al. 
(1987); Geyskens & 
Steemkamp (1996) 
based on one‘s credit of ability of return 
favors; maintaining relationship investments 
and keeping long-term benefits; reduces the 
likelihood of opportunism 
Renqing Hwang (1987); 
Hwang, (1987); Yang 
(1994) 
the underlying mechanism of guanxi; 
exchanges of favors following certain social 
norms and behavioral rules; two basic rules — 
reciprocity and empathy 
Ganqing Wang (2007) feelings and emotional attachment among 
members of networks; an indicator of 
closeness of guanxi; the most intimate 
ganqing is the qingqing 
Western 
relationship 
Arias (1998) guiding principles of a relational exchange by 
legality and rules 
Table 6 - Comparison of related concept of guanxi 
Traits of Guanxi 
Recently, Luo (2000) and Dunning & Kim (2007) have studied several important 
attributes of guanxi, which included utilitarian, reciprocal, transferable, personal, 
long-term and intangible. 
Guanxi is essentially utilitarian, because guanxi bonds two persons through the 
exchange of favours rather than through sentiment. This relationship does not have to 
involve friends, though, where possible, this is preferred. Guanxi related ties that are 
no longer seen to achieve objectives are easily broken.  
Guanxi is reciprocal because guanxi implies reciprocity in exchange for favours. 
The relationships established through the performance of reciprocal obligations means 
permanent, with one repayment requiring another expression of favour or 
consideration. Alston (1989) suggested that guanxi is not necessarily equally 




Guanxi is transferable. For example, when A has guanxi with B, and B is a friend 
of C, then B can introduce or recommend A to C or vice versa. The extent and success 
of the transferability of guanxi mainly depends on how much satisfaction B feels 
about his guanxi with both A and C.        
Guanxi is a highly personal concept, because guanxi operates at the level of the 
individual. Davies et al. (1995) advocated guanxi‘s essential ingredients are trust, 
honesty, reciprocity, respect and social status. This helps to explain why interpersonal 
loyalty is often more important than organisational affiliation or legal status in 
Chinese society.  
Guanxi is long-term oriented. Every guanxi relationship is regarded as a stock of 
relational capital being conserved or augmented in times of abundance and plenty, but 
it can be drawn upon in times of need. It is developed and reinforced through 
continuous, long-term interpersonal associations and interactions.  
Guanxi is intangible, because people who share a guanxi affinity are committed 
to one another by an informal and unwritten code of trust, forbearance, reciprocity 
and equity. The main enforcement mechanism is that disregarding these virtues often 
seriously damages one‘s respectability and social standings.  
Traits Description 
Utilitarian Guanxi is purposefully driven by personal 
interests 
Reciprocal An individual’s reputation is tied up with 
reciprocal obligations 
Transferable Guanxi is transferable through a third party as 
a referral 
Personal Guanxi is established between individuals 
Long-term Guanxi is reinforced through long-term 
cultivation 




Table 7 - Six traits of guanxi 
Adapted from Dunning J. H., Kim C. The Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An 
Exploratory Study. The World Economy (2007): 329-341. 
Levels of Guanxi Network 
The existing literature on guanxi network levels can be divided into two 
categories. 
Confucianism suggests that human relationships are leveled by the five cardinal 
relationships (Lee, Humphreys, 2007), which is the relationships between the ruler 
and subject, father and son, spouse and spouse, elder and younger brothers, and senior 
and junior friends. This category stresses the development of social harmony, order 
and stability by appropriate behaviors, for example, the seniors must be loving and 
benevolent to gain the respect and loyalty from the juniors, and vice versa. 
Another category is advocated by Duo (2005), who notes that guanxi can be 
analyzed on four levels including tendering favors, nurturing long-term mutual 
benefits, nourishing personal relationships, and cultivating trust. This stratified 
explanation of guanxi is more illustrative and understandable, but this does not 
necessarily mean that guanxi is built by one level upon another, or there must be four 
levels of guanxi.  
Tendering favor is achievable through many ways, but the most direct and useful 
method is by giving gifts. At this level, marketers are simply connected by reciprocal 
interests. Campbell and Peter (1998, p. 57-65) advocated a concise explanation of 
guanxi as it relates to two marketers. One marketer acts as a petitioner while the other 
serves as the resource allocator. Whenever the resource allocator is satisfied with 
requital such as a valuable gift from the petitioner, the allocator will help the 
petitioner acquire needed resources quickly and easily. Thus, guanxi can be 
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considered a common interest that binds the two parties. However, the survivability of 
this type of guanxi is low because it can be easily trumped by a third marketer 
offering more goods and services to the resource allocator. 
Nurturing long-term mutual benefits results in a symbiotic relationship. Jonathan 
Story (2003) suggests that guanxi sometimes is valued more than written contracts. 
For instance, guanxi in the political community can be understood as a power 
distribution network, in which the power is arrayed from the top to the bottom. To 
have guanxi means to have connections to certain authorities in the network and the 
upper level authority is more effective because power is more centralized. However, it 
is necessary for the company to be approved by officials if wanting to run a company 
efficiently. If a company has guanxi with senior officials, the company can get faster 
approval of business conduct. Once the tie is established, the company may support 
the official's political career in many ways. Thus, the official and the company 
become strategic cooperation. In one viewpoint, this also suggests that the overall 
efficiency of conducting business is impeded by guanxi because it limits fair 
competition.  
Nourishing personal relationships runs deeper than the above two levels because 
guanxi on this level is tied up with personal secrets and emotional intimacy on the 
basis of sincerity and frankness besides common interests. This type of emotion goes 
far beyond the connection that is set up by gift giving and wining-and-dining (Leung, 
Wong and Tam 2003). Once guanxi comes to this level, it is generally considered an 
intangible asset which is transferable, reciprocal, intangible, utilitarian, and personal 
(Richter, 1999, p. 171-192). 
The personal dimension of guanxi strengthens the importance of trust implying 
that moral obligation is more important than legal contract. Once the strength of 
guanxi network reaches this level, the Chinese culture of Confucianism becomes so 
strong that the rule of law is sometimes rendered ineffective or blatantly ignored. 
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Once this type of trust is established among businesspeople, this connection without 
any legal assistance actually creates an informative and strategic coalition that grants 
these businesspeople with many exclusive market advantages.          
Certainly, these four methods should be considered a continuous process rather 
than intermittent performance aimed at sustaining a strategic advantage through 
guanxi. 
Levels of Guanxi 
Network 
Theoretic precedence Description 
Tendering favors  Campbell and Peter 





Jonathan Story (2003); 
Duo (2005) 
If a company has guanxi with senior 
officials, the company can get faster 
approval of business conduct. Once the 
tie is established, the company may 





Leung, Wong and Tam 
2003; Richter 1999; 
Duo (2005) 
tied up with personal secrets and 
emotional intimacy on the basis of 
sincerity and frankness besides common 
interests 
Cultivating trust Duo (2005) implying that moral obligation is more 
important than legal contract 
Table 8 Levels of Guanxi Network 
Guanxi and distribution channel 
In China, the importance of business relationships is deeply rooted in Chinese 
society, characterized by Confucian codes of repeated favour-exchanges. Guanxi is 
important in a Chinese business context in that when a situation arises which is 
beyond an organization‘s or individual‘s capacity, the guanxi network could be called 
upon to achieve the desired results (Redding & Ng, 1982). In the literature, Davies et 
al. (1995) conducted an empirical study which suggests that there are three major 
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benefits resulting from the establishment of guanxi. First, when the information on 
domestic markets is limited for foreign investors, the guanxi network can be seen as 
an important source of information on market trends as well as on both present and 
potential opportunities and threats. Second, guanxi can get access to labor and 
physical resources as well as relations with local governments. Finally, guanxi 
provides benefits to a wide range of other issues, encompassing product transport and 
distribution to the building of organizational image and reputation. More recently, Lee 
et al. (2001) found that guanxi is positively related to organizational performance and 
offers ‗good means of facilitating transaction by allowing access to limited 
resource/information, preferential treatment in business dealings, and protection from 
external threats.‘ In addition, Park and Luo (2001) take important in guanxi by 
suggesting that while a relationship follows successful transactions in the West, 
transactions often follow successful guanxi in China. They further assert that when 
China‘s transition economy is uncertain, firms still can use guanxi as an 
entrepreneurial tool to bridge gaps in information and resource flows between 
unlinked firms or between firms and important outside stakeholders. Leung et al. 
(2007) explore how a quality business relationship is to be developed and maintained 
in a Chinese context and to explain the concept of expressive and instrumental ties of 
a guanxi model incorporating relationship-specific variables (face, favour-exchange 
and flexibility) and the quality of business relationship (cooperation, continuity and 
commitment) in the framework of capital exchange. 
Therefore, it‘s easily found that guanxi is very important in Chinese society. 
Especially, in supply chain management, Lee and Humphreys (2007) investigates the 
influence of guanxi on three elements of supply chain management: strategic 
purchasing, outsourcing, and supplier development. They collected survey data from 
175 companies in the electronics sector of Hong Kong and found that guanxi has a 
significant influence on these three supply management constructs.  
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Abramson and Ai (1997) noted that in China, the more of good guanxi-style 
buyer-seller relationships, the less of perceived uncertainty about the business 
environment, and the more of improved performance outcomes. Thus they concluded 
that guanxi-style buyer-seller relationships are a competitive advantage for the 
companies that use them in China. Moreover, Guanxi between a buyer and a supplier 
implies a hidden norm of reciprocity that concerns equity and exchange of favors and 
long-term orientation (Ang & Leong, 2000). This suggests that cooperative partners 
with close guanxi may care more about long-term development of the relationship and 
mutual interests in the future (Davies et al., 1995). Once the distributor is involved in 
a close guanxi with the supplier, and the guanxi is based on trust (Millington, 
Eberhardt, & Wilkinson, 2005). It can make the distributor believe that the supplier 
trusted by the distributor will look for long-term development of the relationship and 
mutual interests in the future, no matter a distributor has goodwill trust or competence 
trust in a supplier or not. What‘s more, since a supplier hoping to be dealing with a 
partner for the foreseeable future will not resort to opportunistic behavior (Joshi & 
Stump, 1999), the relational risk perceived by the buyer who believes in the supplier's 
goodwill and competence will decrease. 
Now, some Chinese researchers have taken importance on the relationship 
between guanxi and distribution channel. For example, based the theory of power in 
marketing channels , Zhuang Gui-jun and Xi You-min (2004) investigated the impact 
of personal guanxi on exercises of power in Chinese marketing channels. They found 
that the personal guanxi between the suppliers and the distributors did not have 
significant affection on the distributors‘ exercises of noncoercive power , but it did 
have both significant and negative affect on distributors‘ exercises of coercive power. 
Wang Xiao-yu, Chao Gang-ling (2007) noted that personal relationship is of great 
significance to inter-organizational relationship. The two scholars investigated the 
influence of interpersonal relationship on such key relational variables as 
interpersonal trust, inter-organizational trust and relationship specific investment 
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between firms and found that intimacy of personal guanxi perceived by distributor 
between supplier and distributor is positively related to trust between them. So, when 
suppliers want to make deal with Chinese, they should learn to keep a good 
relationship with their distributors. 
    From the above research, we can find that those who have study channel 
incentive and channel behavior exclusively from a non-economy perspective have 
focused on the importance of guanxi on channel behavior. However, channel incentive 
from economy view is also very important for channel behavior (Gilliland, 2003). A 
common principle behind both the economic and non-economic streams of research is 
that behavior and relationships are built and maintained as a result of the 
interdependence among channel members. However, little is known about the impact 
that economic and non-economic interactions have on channel behavior and 
relationships. Rosenberg and Stern (1970), saw the necessity to incorporate both 
economic and non-economic features of behavior and relationships into a single 
framework. Ignoring the combined effect of these factors presents an incomplete and 
distorted view of the situation. To understand the interdependence between parties and 
the interfirm exchange process better, Stern and Reve (1980) called for a simultaneous 
analysis of economic and non-economic factors. 
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5.  Organization Sense Making (cognitive view) 
Decision making has been described as a central human activity, fundamental to 
individual, group, organizational and societal life. Researchers trying to understand 
decision making have come round to the view that it needs to be viewed from 
multiple perspectives. Mintzberg and Westley propose that the thinking first, or 
rational, model of decision making should be supplemented with two very different 
models-a seeing first, or intuitive, and a doing first, or experimentation, model. 
Traditional organizational sense making and 
channel behavior 
Traditional Organization Sense Making 
Decision making has been described as a central human activity, fundamental to 
individual, group, organizational and societal life. Researchers trying to understand 
decision making have come round to the view that it can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives. In these perspectives, processes of perception and cognition have long 
been studied by psychologists interested in explaining individual behavior of decision 
making (Schneider, 1997). More recently, management scholars have become 
interested in studying perception and cognition to explain the organization behavior of 
decision making. While it may be worth noting that people in organizations perceive 
and think, even managers and members of top management teams, what is more 
controversial is to suggest that organizations may also perceive and think (Schneider 
& Angelmar, 1993). If we consider perception and cognition to be necessary functions 
of systems and consider organizations as systems (Miller, 1978, p. 79-86), then the 
question no longer is whether organizations perceive and think, but how they do so.  
Before we review how organization perceive and think, we need to know what is 
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sensemaking. ―Sensemaking‖ is a critical organizational activity (Weick, 1995, p. 
1-35). Sensemaking activities such as environmental scanning and issue interpretation 
are key tasks that significantly influence organizational decisions and strategic change 
(Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). 
Sensemaking is the process through which an organization acquires, interprets, and 
acts on information about its environment (Weick, 1995). Thomas et al., (1993) define 
sensemaking as ―the reciprocal interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription, 
and action‖. Similarly, Sackman (1991, p. 121-130) refers to sensemaking as a set of 
mechanisms that define an organization's ―standards and rules for perceiving, 
interpreting, believing, and acting that are typically used‖. Thus, organizational 
sensemaking is multidimensional based on the interplay of meaning and action 
(Weick et al., 2005). 
Sensemaking occurs in organizations when members confront events, issues, and 
actions that are somehow surprising or confusing (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Weick, 
1993, 1995). As Weick argued, ―The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an 
ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make 
retrospective sense of what occurs‖ (1993: 635). Thus, sensemaking is a process of 
social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 62) in which individuals attempt to 
interpret and explain sets of cues from their environments. This happens through the 
production of ―accounts‖— discursive constructions of reality that interpret or explain 
(Antaki, 1994, p. 58)—or through the ―activation‖ of existing accounts (Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996). In either case, sensemaking allows people to deal with uncertainty 
and ambiguity by creating rational accounts of the world that enable action. 
Sensemaking thus both precedes decision making and follows it: sensemaking 
provides the ―clear questions and clear answers‖ (Weick, 1993: 636) that feed 
decision making, and decision making often stimulates the surprises and confusion 
that create occasions for sensemaking. 
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Then, we will review two facets, one is how certain groups influence others‘ 
understandings of issues (Maitlis, 2005), and how to communicate with each other; 
the other is organizational sensemaking examining the social processes associated 
with sensemaking more holistically in face of complex environments (Maitlis, 2005), 
and how to interpret and analyze information. Research that has addressed the social 
processes of organizational sensemaking has tended to follow one of two approaches.  
The first facet investigates how certain groups influence others‘ understandings 
of issues. Leaders have received particular attention (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). For 
example, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) argued that a critical leader behavior during 
strategic change is ―sensegiving‖—which they defined as ―the process of attempting 
to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred 
redefinition of organizational reality‖. Building on this work, other studies have 
examined the varieties of leader sensegiving. Gioia and Thomas (1996), for instance, 
suggested that leader sensegiving strategies may vary depending upon the strategic or 
political nature of an issue; Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, and Humphries (1999, p. 
31-71) identified a range of different leader sensegiving strategies and found. All of 
this research highlights the importance of sensegiving as a fundamental leadership 
activity within organizational sensemaking. 
Although this research offers a valuable foundation for appreciating the social 
dynamics of organizational sensemaking, it largely ignores the interaction of different 
members‘ sensemaking behaviors and how this interaction affects sensemaking 
processes. While previous studies provide insight into some of the strategies that 
leaders use to shape organizational understandings and accounts of issues, they have 
primarily focused on the role played by just one party or the other. Thus, relatively 
little is known about the dynamics of sensemaking when different parties engage 
simultaneously or reciprocally in such activities, or about the ways in which the 
accounts they generate are reconciled––or are not reconciled. 
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In fact, interaction of different members‘ sensemaking behaviors and how this 
interaction affects sensemaking processes are very important (Neill et al., 2007). 
Achieving collective outcomes necessitates that organizations develop collaborative 
mechanisms that bridge the gap between functional departments and allow for the 
free-flow of ideas (Dougherty, 1992). To reflect the complexity of the environment 
requires informational exchanges from multiple individuals with diverse knowledge, 
skills, and values (Hutt et al., 1988). Through interactions and shared experiences, 
organizational members come to develop an understanding-or interpretation-of their 
environment. The communication component of sensemaking embeds the group 
perspective within the mind of the individual manager. Rather than seeing the 
organization as a collection of individuals, this perspective sees the individual as a 
reflection of the group (Cook & Yanow, 1993). Given the inherent challenges in 
strategy formation and the limited capacity of individual decision makers, the sharing 
of strategic information is a necessary component of sensemaking. Strategic 
information exchange is the degree that relevant information is shared among 
members of a decision making team. Past research has demonstrated that 
communication enhances effective marketing strategy formulation (Hutt et al., 1988). 
Communication allows information to be seen in a broader context, specifically by 
individuals who might use or be influenced by it (Slater & Narver, 1995). Rather than 
necessitating a single interpretation, communication is a mechanism allowing for 
organized action despite interpretative differences (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986) 
and is a central component of sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005). 
A second approach to organizational sensemaking has examined the social 
processes associated with sensemaking more holistically, but it has tended to do so in 
contexts that are marked by crisis or extreme circumstances. Sensemaking activities 
are particularly critical in dynamic and turbulent contexts, where the need to create 
and maintain coherent understandings that sustain relationships and enable collective 
action is especially important and challenging (Weick, 1993). Weick‘s (1993) analysis 
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of the Mann Gulch disaster, for instance, suggests a dialectical relationship between 
social structure and sensemaking: the accounts generated by sensemaking facilitate 
the formation and reformation of social structure (the social roles and relationships 
among some group of members), while social roles and relationships provide a basis 
for sensemaking. Thus, Weick argued that without social roles and relationships in 
place, sensemaking can be difficult or impossible, leading to confusion and distress. 
In a study of sensemaking on aircraft carriers, Weick and Roberts (1993) developed 
the concepts of ―collective mind‖ and ―heedful interrelating‖ to describe how 
organization members can generate reliable collective action. Their study moved 
sensemaking away from a strictly cognitive metaphor by associating collective mind 
not with a super-ordinate set of cognitions, but with ―a pattern of interrelated activities 
among many people‖ and by offering the argument that the intelligence of a collective 
mind depends upon the heedfulness with which people interrelate. 
In dynamic and turbulent environments, interpreting by simultaneously 
assimilating multiple environmental dimensions with increased strategic complexity 
and analyzing a greater amount and variety of information through multiple 
perspective consideration are very important (Neill et al., 2007). 
The notion of cognitive complexity has long been applied to individuals by 
measuring their ability to differentiate among and to integrate diverse stimuli 
(Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). Correspondingly, strategic complexity is the 
organization's capacity to construe its environment in a multidimensional way 
(Streufert & Swezey, 1986). Decisionmakers scan their environment and choose 
strategies based upon their preexisting schema (Hambrick, 1982). Schemas act as 
information-seeking structures that accept information and guide action (Neisser, 
1976, P. 121-132). In sensemaking, schemas function to label stimuli in such ways as 
to suggest possible actions (Weick et al., 2005). At the organizational level, strategic 
orientations act as schemas by selecting and actively modifying experience — in 
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effect, shaping perceptions of the strategic situation. The particular strategic 
orientation employed influences which salient environmental aspects the organization 
believes will lead to a competitive advantage (Day & Nedungadi, 1994). 
Several specific environmental domains serve as potential organizing schema. 
Boulding et al. (1994) identified four strategic dimensions as the cognitive framework 
for strategic decision making: competitor, customer, product, and 
macro-environmental. We adopt these dimensions in assessing an organization's 
strategic orientation. A competitor orientation focuses on current and potential 
competitors, while a customer orientation emphasizes the interests of target buyers. A 
product orientation represents an internal focus emphasizing quality and efficiency. A 
macro-environmental orientation emphasizes issues and trends outside of the 
organization's immediate industry. Strategically complex organizations are attuned to 
and utilize multiple dimensions when interpreting their environment and are capable 
of differentiating and integrating complex environmental information (Streufert & 
Swezey, 1986). Thus, strategic complexity is defined as an organization's capacity to 
construe its environment in a multidimensional manner. Through this cognitive 
framework, an organization makes sense of the situation by encoding and assigning 
meaning to environmental cues. 
The strategic decision making process engages multiple participants representing 
different points-of-view. Deciding on a course of action involves a mingling of beliefs 
among decisionmakers (Frankwick, Ward, Hutt, & Reingen, 1994) and is part of 
sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005). Decision making is a way of ascribing meaning 
(Weick, 1995). It involves not only an analysis of the situation but also the 
formulation of alternatives and selection criteria (Milliken, 1990). In other words, 
decision making is an effort by organizational members to develop meaning as well as 
determine choice, which is embedded in sensemaking. 
Multiple perspective consideration is defined as the differentiation and 
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integration of multiple perspectives during decision making. These perspectives entail 
the beliefs of organizational decision makers about the current situation, if action is 
appropriate, and what the consequences of those actions might be. In exploring 
multiple perspective consideration, this study considers three phases: identification, 
development, and selection. Mintzberg and colleagues (1976) have concluded that 
these phases are not addressed in a discrete, sequential manner, but rather are 
simultaneous, interrelated events. Organizations engage in complex decision making 
by simultaneously considering multiple perspectives during engagement in problem 
definition, alternative development, and solution selection. By cycling within the 
decision making process, organizations make sense of their environment by 
maneuvering from little understanding to deeper comprehension. 
Organization Sense Making and Channel Behavior 
The business environment is increasingly complex. This complexity derives in 
part from exponential increases in organizational information processing capabilities, 
an increasingly dynamic and global business environment, and increasing amounts of 
information about both the content and structure of this environment (Satish, 1997). 
Growing environmental complexity offers organizations both problems and 
opportunities. As interpretative systems (Daft & Weick, 1984), organizations can 
become overwhelmed with information. Managers commonly employ simplified 
―mental models,‖ focus on selected environmental domains, and utilize ―rule of 
thumb‖ heuristics for decision making; what Simon (1957, p. 120-136) terms 
―bounded rationality.‖ Interdependent action and communication among multiple 
independent members, potentially focusing on different environmental domains, 
further complicates information processing within an organization. This becomes 
increasingly evident as organizations confront situations marked by ambiguity and 
complexity, as is frequently the case during marketing strategy formation. 
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Organizations can either reduce or absorb complexity (Boisot & Child, 1999). 
Organizations that reduce complexity focus internally and attempt to buffer their 
internal systems from the distractions of environmental change. Organizations that 
absorb complexity develop ―complex adaptive systems‖ that seek to integrate and 
synthesize diverse and potentially conflicting aspects of their environment and 
consider multiple competing interpretations when formulating response options 
(Gell-Mann, 1994, P. 212-229). By developing more varied images of the 
environment, such organizations ―engage in sensemaking that is more adaptive 
than … organizations with more limited vocabularies‖ (Weick, 1995, p. 4). These 
organizations maintain a sensemaking capability, which is a bundle of collective 
routines that shape what information is assimilated, how it is interpreted, and which 
actions are considered (Sackman, 1991; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993; Weick, 1995; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Organizational sensemaking is a fundamentally social process: organization 
members interpret their environment in and through interactions with others, 
constructing accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively 
(Sackman, 1991; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Previous efforts to understand 
sensemaking in marketing have been based in market orientation. Studies of market 
orientation have examined the ability of a firm to collect and react to environmental 
information by generating, disseminating, and responding to information about 
customers and competitors (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Slater & Narver, 1995). Day 
(1994a) synthesizes these studies and argues that market driven organizations have 
superior market sensing and customer-linking capabilities. He, further, emphasizes 
that every discussion of a market orientation highlights the ability of a firm to 
continuously sense and act upon trends and events in the environment.  
Recent sensemaking research, however, has either tended to focus on its 
cognitive aspects (e.g., Griffith, 1999; Thomas et al., 1993) or has examined social 
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processes that play out in extreme conditions or crisis situations (e.g., Weick, 1993; 
Weick & Roberts, 1993). Less attention has been paid to the sensemaking that occurs 
among channel members as they address a range of issues with manufacturer. Such 
channel members engage in sensemaking from a variety of organizational positions 
and personal backgrounds that create divergent frames of reference and lead them to 
take on different roles in sensemaking processes. Despite the challenges raised by the 
inherently social nature of sensemaking, organization sense making and channel 
behaviour remain relatively under examined.  
 
Modern organizational sense making 
Hsee’s theory 
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest among psychologists and other 
social scientists in subjective wellbeing and happiness. Here we review selected 
contributions of Christopher K. Hsee who is the typical representative of behaviour 
science to this development from the literature on behavioural decision theory. Hsee‘ 
research in decision making can be divided in the following categories: 
Inconsistencies in decision making; joint and separate evaluation in decision making; 
Cross-national differences in decision making; Elastic justification in decision 
making. 
Inconsistencies in decision making 
Most effects that have intrigued scholars of behavioural decision theories can be 
characterized as ―inconsistencies.‖  
Inconsistencies of Decision and experience 
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A fundamental assumption of classic economic theory is that people are able to 
identify and choose what is best for them, conditional on being well-informed about 
their circumstances. This assumption is not an idiosyncratic doctrine of economics; it 
is shared by the general public.  
Recent findings from behavioural-decision research provide evidence that people 
are not always able to choose what yields the greatest happiness or best experience 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, P. 619-642). People fail to choose optimally, either 
because they fail to predict accurately which option in the available choice set will 
generate the best experience or because they fail to base their choice on their 
prediction, or both (Hsee & Hastie, 2006). 
To choose the experientially optimal option, decision-makers need to predict 
accurately the experiential consequences of their choice options. Individuals rely on a 
variety of strategies to make these predictions, including quick emotional responses 
triggered by associations with similar previous experiences, conscious recall and 
evaluations of related previous experiences, and savouring or simulation of future 
experiences to infer their hedonic qualities (Mellers, 2000). Behavioral-decision 
researchers have identified several systematic biases in these predictions, which 
include Impact bias, Projection bias, Distinction bias, Memory bias, Belief bias. The 
projection-bias research is concerned with the difference between prediction and 
experience in visceral states (aroused versus unaroused). The distinction-bias research 
focuses on the difference between evaluation modes (JE versus SE). The impact-bias 
research explores the extent to which non-focal events affect one‘s life and the extent 
to which a sense-making system operates. Experiencers are distracted by non-focal 
events and are immunized by the sense-making process whereas predictors are not. 
According to the memory-bias literature, experiencers undergo a sequence of 
momentary experiences as an event unfolds, whereas predictors base their prediction 
on a summary evaluation. And according to the belief-bias literature, experiencers 
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face specific circumstances, whereas predictors use lay theories derived from general 
circumstances. 
To choose the experientially optimal option, decision-makers not only need to 
make accurate predictions of future experiences, but also need to act on their 
predictions. Yet they do not always do so. Instead of choosing what they predict will 
generate the greatest overall happiness, they variously choose the option that has the 
greatest immediate appeal (impulsivity), that fits their choice rules (rule-based choice), 
that is easy to justify (lay rationalism), or that yields the greatest token reward such as 
money (medium maximization). 
Inconsistencies of Predicted Experience and Decision 
Decision-makers are sometimes depicted as impulsive and overly influenced by 
‗hot‘, affective factors. Hsee (2003) suggested that decision-makers may be too ‗cold‘ 
and overly focus on rationalistic attributes, such as economic values, quantitative 
specifications, and functions. In support of this proposition, he found a systematic 
inconsistency between predicted experience and decision. That is, people are more 
likely to favour a rationalistically-superior option when they make a decision than 
when they predict experience.  
Internal and substantive inconsistencies in decision making 
    Hsee & Zhang (2004, P. 61-73) suggested that these inconsistencies fall into 
two general categories: internal and substantive inconsistencies. Most existing 
research on judgment and decision making concerns internal inconsistency 
(Kahneman, 1994). An internal inconsistency occurs when people‘s decisions violate 
one or several basic axioms of rational decision theory, such as procedure invariance, 
descriptive invariance, cancellation, and transitivity. Hsee & Zhang (2004) point out 
that a prime example of internal inconsistency is the preference-reversal phenomenon, 
that the preference elicited using one method differs from the preference elicited using 
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a different -- but normatively equivalent -- method. This constitutes a violation of 
procedure invariance. Scholars of preference-reversals are interested in why decisions 
made under normatively equivalent conditions contradict each other and not in 
whether the decision in either condition is ―good‖ or ―bad‖ according to an external 
criterion. Hsee (1996) investigated a particular type of preference reversal (PR), 
existing between joint evaluation, where two stimulus options are evaluated side by 
side simultaneously, and separate evaluation, where these options are evaluated 
separately. He first examines how this PR differs from other the same alternatives 
types of PRs and review studies demonstrating this PR. He then propose an 
explanation, called the evaluability hypothesis, and report experiments that tested this 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, PRs between joint and separate evaluations 
occur because one of the attributes involved in the options is hard to evaluate 
independently and another attribute is relatively easy to evaluate independently.  
Inspired by Kahneman and his co-authors‘ work on decision, predicted, and 
experienced utilities, a new direction in judgment-and-decision research has emerged. 
It concerns the substantive inconsistency of decisions. A substantive inconsistency 
occurs when one‘s decision is suboptimal according to some external substantive 
criterion, such as the maximization of (predicted) hedonic experience (Kahneman, 
1994). The criterion requires decision-makers to choose the option that brings the 
greatest (predicted) experienced utility (Hsee & Zhang, 2004).  
Cross-national differences in decision making 
In recent years, researchers have come to discover systematic cross-national 
differences in many fundamental psychological effects, such as the construal of the 
self (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), the fundamental attribution error (Morris and Peng, 
1994), the need for control (Sethi and Lepper, in press), to name just a few. However, 
little is known about whether people in different nations differ in risk preferences. 
53 
 
Hsee & Weber (1999) explored whether there are systematic cross-national 
differences in choice-inferred risk preferences between Americans and Chinese. He 
found that the Chinese were significantly more risk seeking than the Americans, yet 
that both nationals predicted exactly the opposite - that the Americans would be more 
risk seeking. He then compared Americans' and Chinese risk preferences in 
investment, medical and academic decisions, and found that Chinese were more risk 
seeking than Americans only in the investment domain and not in the other domains. 
These results are explained in terms of a ‗cushion hypothesis‘, which suggests people 
in a collectivist society, such as China, are more likely to receive financial help if they 
are in need (i.e. they could be ‗cushioned‘ if they fell), and consequently, they are less 
risk averse than those in an individualistic society such as the USA. 
Elastic justification in decision making 
When making judgments, one may encounter not only justifiable factors, i.e., 
attributes which the judge thinks that he/she should take into consideration, but also 
unjustifiable factors, i.e., attributes which the judge wants to take into consideration 
but knows he she should not. Hsee (1996b) proposed that the influence of an 
unjustifiable factor on one‘s judgment depends on the presence of elasticity 
(ambiguity) in justifiable factors; the influence will be greater if there is elasticity than 
if there is not. He gave two studies involving different contexts to demonstrate the 
proposed elasticity effect and to suggest that the effect could be a result of a 
self-oriented justification process.  
What‘s more, Hsee (1995) studied task-oriented decision situations where the 
decision maker faces two options, one superior on a factor directly related to the given 
task (called the A factor) and the other superior on a factor not central to the 
accomplishment of the task but tempting to the decision maker (called the B) factor. 
According to the elastic justification notion, the decision maker may find it 
unjustifiable to choose the B-superior option over the A-superior option if there is no 
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uncertainty in the A values of the two options, but will construct a justification and 
become more likely to choose the B-superior if there is uncertainty. In support of this 
proposition, Hsee (1995) gave two experiments employing a simulated decision 
situation and found that subjects were indeed more likely to choose the B-superior 
option when there was uncertainty in the A factor than when there was not, no matter 
whether the uncertainty resided in one of the options or in both options. 
Hsee’s theory and channel behavior 
From the above review, we can find that Hsee don‘t study the behavioural 
decision theory about distribution channel directly, however his research can be used 
to explain distribution channel behaviour, because when channel members make 
decision, their decision may be effected by experience or by predicted experience, and 
even may be self-contradictory. Moreover, distribution channel behavioural decision 
may be cross-national differences, for example, Hsee & Weber (1999) pointed out 
there are systematic cross-national differences in choice-inferred risk preferences 
between Americans and Chinese, so, to some extent, when the manufacturer is US 
enterprise and distributor is Chinese enterprise, Chinese distributor may make 
decision in risk preference, for example, he may have more Channel opportunism. 
Hsee‘s theory can explain human being‘s behaviour and decision making well, 
however, Hsee don‘t study channel member behaviour directly. But, Hsee‘s theory 
helps to explain why channel member choose to coordination or conflict in future 





6.  Orientations of Channel Behaviors 
Channel behavior 
There are two main domains in western channel theory: one is the channel 
structure which is to study how channel constructs, the other is the channel behaviour 
which is to study how the channel members realize, construct and deal with channel 
relationships. In channel behaviour domain, how the channel members to cope with 
conflict and how the channel members to get competition advantages through 
coordination are the study emphasis of western channel theory. In the following part, 
the paper will state channel conflict and channel coordination individually. 
Channel Conflict 
Definitions of channel conflict  
In western countries, the theory of channel conflict derives from the research of 
conflict which comes from philosophy and sociology originally and forms conflict 
theory in organizational behaviour nowadays (Duarte & Davis, 2003). 
Conflict has been defined several ways in both channel and organizational 
behaviour literatures (Pondy, 1967). Early definitions of conflict focused on a wide 
variety of phenomena, including four parts: the antecedent conditions of behavioural 
conflict (e.g., scarcity of resources); affective states of the channel members involved 
(e.g., tension, hostility); the perception or awareness of a conflict situation; and actual 
conflict behaviour, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression (Pondy, 1967). 
Pondy (1967) considers attempts to decide which of these phenomena is really 
‗conflict‘ to be an empty controversy. Instead, he argues for a broad working 
definition to embrace the entire conflict process, and thus all the phenomena above. 
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Within the tradition of broad definitions, Thomas (1990, p. 651-717) defines conflict 
as ‗‗the process that begins when one party perceives that the other has negatively 
affected, or is about to negatively affect, something that he or she cares about.‘‘ 
For channel conflict, the study of conflict within channels of distribution has 
been a primary area of investigation for over forty years (Dant and Schul, 1992). Stern 
(1996) defined channel conflict as a situation in which one channel member perceives 
another channel member(s) to be engaged in behaviour that prevents or impedes it 
from achieving its goals. Gaski (1984, p. 11) considers channel conflict to be ‗‗the 
perception on the part of a channel member that its goal attainment is being impeded 
by another, with stress or tension the result.‘‘ While many definitions of channel 
conflict have been offered in the literature, (Gaski, 1984) the common theme appears 
to be that conflict exists within the channel if one channel member impedes the 
attainment of the goals of another channel member (Gaski, 1984). Pondy (1967) has 
conceptualized organizational conflict as a process comprising three main stages: the 
perceived, felt, and manifest conflict stages. Perceived conflict is a cognitive stage. It 
represents the point at which either the supplier or distributor becomes aware of some 
sources of conflict (perceptual incongruity, goal incompatibility and domain dispense). 
Felt conflict consists of stress, tension, or hostility resulting from perceived conflict. 
Manifest conflict is the behavioural or action stage of conflict. As Lusch (1976) notes, 
it is often characterized by verbal or written disagreements between channel members. 
The implications for the researcher are that conflict should not be considered to 
be a single phenomenon. It follows that channel conflict study should include its 
sources and its forms. 
Studies of channel conflict 
As we all know, conflict is pervasive and virtually inevitable in B-to-B 
relationships and particularly when there is a functional interdependency between two 
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businesses as in a marketing channel (e.g., Refs. [Reve& Stern, 1979]). In the last two 
decades, channel conflict issues in supply chains have received considerable attention 
from both practitioners and researchers, and a large number of theoretical and 
empirical studies have been performed.  
The research can be categorized into two opposite views. 
Some scholars take an opinion that channel conflict is negatively related to 
channel performance, thus can be dysfunctional. Some empirical studies have found 
the expected inverse relationship between conflict and performance (Cronin & Baker, 
1993).For example, Kelly and Peters (1977) argued that conflict is negatively related 
to performance, but developed limited evidence to support the claim. Webb & 
Hogan‘s (2002) findings indicate that hybrid channel conflict is an important 
determinant of both channel performance and satisfaction and the frequency of 
conflict, but not its intensity, has a negative effect on channel system performance. 
Their suggestion shows that whereas the hybrid channel conflict can reduce channel 
performance, it can also serve as a mechanism forcing internal channel coalitions to 
work harder and smarter to serve their markets. Lee D. Y. (2001) investigated the 
relations between power, conflict and satisfaction with channel relationships from the 
Chinese distributors' perspective, and the results indicate that there is negatively 
relationship between channel conflict and satisfaction with relationship. The primary 
construct linkages studied here are supported and are found to be similar to those in 
Western channels, but the strengths of the relations are quite different. Duarte and 
Davies (2003) explain the reason is that conflict is an opponent-centered behavior, it 
can ultimately degenerate into moves that intentionally aim to destroy, injure, or 
obstruct another party, thus being malignant not only for the parties involved but also 
for the entire channel system. The sources of channel conflict are an antecedent 
condition and reflect an underlying mechanism of incompatibility between channel 
partners (Brown & Day, 1981). Stern and Heskett (1969, p. 288-305) suggest primary 
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sources of conflict as goal incompatibility. Each channel member has its own set of 
goal and objectives to satisfy, which may be incompatible with those from other 
channel members. Goals are incompatible not merely when they are different, but 
rather when they are unattainable simultaneously (Cadotte & Stern, 1979). 
Incompatible goals are a potential cause of conflict, because they induce behaviour by 
one channel member that hinders the achievement of another channel member‘s goals. 
The primary emphasis of the past literature reduces conflict to a negative force that 
must be managed (Walters, 1974), reduced (Reve and Stem, 1979) or resolved (Dant 
and Schul, 1992). 
Other scholars take an opinion that channel conflict is positively related to 
channel performance, thus can be functional. For example, Pearson (1976) found no 
statistically significant difference in performance between channels with relationships 
characterized by conflict and those with relationships characterized by cooperation, 
while Rosson and Ford (1980) found manifest conflict to correlate positively with 
performance. Assael (1969), in a 2-year exploratory study in franchise channels, 
found that in the presence of special requirements, conflict can be constructive and 
may have a positive impact on channel performance. Lusch (1976), in franchise 
channels, found that conflict between car manufacturers and their dealers did not 
always reduce performance. There are several explanations for the lack of a clear 
relationship between conflict and performance. The most common is that conflict is 
not necessarily dysfunctional (Pondy, 1967). Stern et al. (1996) contend that without 
any conflict, a channel system may even lose its viability, because its channel 
members tend to become passive and non-innovative. However, while most of the 
previous research recognizes the potential of conflict to be either functional or 
dysfunctional, (Anderson and Narus, 1990) the functional nature of conflict has been 
largely ignored. From the work of Pondy (1967) and Brown and Day (1981), 
functional conflict is conflict where conflict aftermath or outcome results in long-term 
benefits to all (or both in the case of a dyad) channel members. The literature has 
59 
 
isolated numerous, possible benefits from conflict in the channel. Assael(1969) for 
example determined that functional conflict can: (1) require critical inquiries of 
organizational policies; (2) improve communication and grievance procedures; (3) 
standardize modes of conflict resolution; (4) result in more equitable distribution of 
power and resources; and (5) develop countervailing power. Others have suggested 
that functional conflict can produce a sense of unity (Walters, 1974), produce higher 
financial performance (Dommermuth, 1976), lead to a reappraisal of channel policies 
(Rosenbloom, 1973), and keep the organization responsive to the environment (Brett, 
1984). 
From the above literature, we can see that the literature has recognized that 
conflict may lead to functional or dysfunctional consequences (Anderson & Narus, 
1990). But whether conflict lead to functional or lead to dysfunctional consequences 
can‘t be discussed or regarded in the same frame of mind. It can‘t be concluded that 
conflict must lead to functional consequences or dysfunctional consequences. It 
depends on. Despite the emphasis in the channels‘ literature on the negative or 
positive effects of conflict, the notion of ―specific conditions, specific analysis‖ is 
widely held (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Past literature has suggested three different 
methods of determining whether conflict will be functional or dysfunctional: sources 
of conflict, levels of conflict, and conflict management (Hunt, 1995). 
The literature suggests that the source (cause) of the conflict will influence 
whether the conflict will be functional or dysfunctional (Ross & Lusch, 1982). For 
example, Litterer (1966) suggests that if conflict is caused by incompatible goals, then 
the conflict is (will be) dysfunctional; if caused by incompatible means, conflict is 
more likely to be functional because it may bring about a search for better means. 
The level of conflict literature suggests that it is the amount of conflict 
experienced by the parties involved that determines whether conflict aftermath will be 
functional or dysfunctional. That is, a conflict threshold exists. Below the threshold, 
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conflict has a greater probability of being functional. Above the threshold, conflict has 
a greater probability of being dysfunctional (Brown & Day, 1981). 
According to intensity, issue importance and frequency of conflict, Magrath & 
Hardy (1988, P. 88-101) divided channel of distribution conflict into three levels 
which are low levels, moderate levels and high levels of conflict. They thought that 
different levels of conflict exert different influence on channel efficiency. This 
division is reasonable on one hand, but unclear on the other hand. Rosenbloom (1973) 
has suggested that low levels of conflict may have little effect on channel efficiency, 
moderate levels may actually increase efficiency (for example, make channel 
members to strengthen adaptability, more hypersensitive to market opportunity), but 
that excessive conflict is dysfunctional, as it may detract from channel efficiency (for 
example, damage and retaliate each other among channel members). This research 
focuses on manifest conflict, because it is the only stage in which the distributor and 
the supplier communicate their disagreements to each other. 
Finally, the management of conflict literature suggests that ―the presence of 
conflict per se does not determine the outcomes, but the resolution processes which 
are operative‖ (Rosenberg & Stem, 1970, p. 45). Properly managed conflict increases 
the probability that conflict aftermath will be positive, and therefore, the conflict will 
be viewed as functional. On the other hand, poorly managed conflict will result in 
negatively perceived conflict aftermath and, therefore, conflict will more likely be 
viewed as dysfunctional. The key elements for proper conflict management are 
providing an environment of trust, openness and communication (Tjosvold, 1984). 
From the above research, we can found that it can‘t be deduced that conflict is 
good or bad simply, and whether conflict within the channel will be viewed as 
functional or dysfunctional is effected by the factors including the source of conflict, 
the level of conflict, and the management of conflict. So, manufacturer should make 




Effective coordination plays an important role in the successful operation of 
modern manufacturing and distribution systems. Achieving effective coordination 
between the supplier and the buyers is a current managerial concern as well as an 
important research issue. Past inter-organizational studies have included cooperation 
in conceptual model (cf. Frazier 1983b) and have recognized cooperation as a 
necessary component in channel relationships (Brown 1981; Frazier & Rody 1991). 
Retailers need to understand how cooperation is developed and maintained to 
experience long-term satisfying relationships (Childers & Ruekert 1981).  
Yet, most studies that have directly confronted the issue of cooperation have 
viewed the phenomena as either a form of satisfaction (Anderson & Narus, 1990), or 
the inverse of conflict (Ross, Lusch & Brown 1982). 
Definitions of channel coordination  
Channel coordination is defined as behaviour and behaviour intention of mutual 
benefit. Distribution of channel behaviour theory suggest that channel coordination is 
rooted from interdependence of channel member and interdependence is consequence 
of function specialization of channel member (Stem, 1992). Jeuland and Shugan 
(1983) demonstrated the concept of channel coordination in a simple 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain in their seminal paper. Their basic assumption was 
that the manufacturer and the retailer have separate profit and cost considerations that 
lead to different inventory policies. Typically, the retailer‘s order quantity is smaller 
than the manufacturer‘s production lot size. In order to coordinate the channel, the 
manufacturer offers the retailer an incentive contract in terms of quantity discounts to 
induce the retailer to increase its order quantity (Tarakci, 2006).  
So, we can conclude, to some extant, channel coordination is achieved if the 
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retailer‘s order quantity that optimizes profit under the incentive contract also 
optimizes the total profit of the supply chain.  
Channel coordination in game theory 
Over the past decade marketing scientists have developed a significant and 
multifarious literature concerning the structure and coordination in distribution, and 
its related issues have also generated considerable researches in both the marketing 
and economic literature (Choi, 1991; Coughlan, 1985; Douglas, 1975; Ingene & Parry, 
1995; Jeuland & Shugan, 1983; McGuire & Staelin, 1983). Many of these studies 
have limited to manufacturers and their channel intermediaries, and the analysis of 
competition and cooperation were used by game theory (Chen et al., 2006). 
McGuire and Staelin (1983) studied the impact of product substitutability on 
Nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer 
distributes its goods through an exclusive distributor. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) 
focused on channel coordination in the context of a single producer and a single 
distributor channel. They found that coordination between a producer and a distributor 
via a quantity discount schedule could lead to higher profit for channel members. 
Jeuland and Shugan (1988) analyzed the possibility of channel coordination without 
formal arrangement such as vertical integration or contracts. They argued that channel 
members, being aware of interdependencies between themselves, might form 
conjectures concerning other members' reactions to their own actions. Iyer (1988) 
studied channel coordination under both price and non-price (e.g., customer service) 
competition. 
In another expansion, Choi (1991) addressed channel profits when the channel 
structure consists of two manufacturers and a single common distributor. The model 
consisted of three non-cooperative games: the Manufacturer–Stackelberg game, the 
Retailer–Stackelberg game and Vertical–Nash equilibrium. Choi proposed product 
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differentiation and cost reduction as methods to encourage channel coordination. 
Sudhir (2001) extended Choi's channel structure by studying vertical manufacturer 
and distributor interaction as well as horizontal interactions between the 
manufacturers. Sudhir (2001) modeled manufacturer–retailer interactions by using the 
Manufacturer–Stackelberg and Vertical–Nash equilibrium games. 
Rather than two manufacturers using a common distributor, Ingene and Parry 
(1995) took the opposite approach and studied channel coordination by focusing on a 
single manufacturer using two competing distributors. They also used a 
non-cooperative Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer could apply either 
two-part tariffs or a schedule for quantity discounts. They found that while quantity 
discount schedule had facilitated channel coordination, the two-part tariff did not. 
Gerstner and Hess (1991) looked at a monopolist manufacturer distributed goods 
through a single, independent distributor with two types of customers: those who were 
willing to pay a high price and the others were only willing to pay a low price. They 
found that when the manufacturer used price promotion, it would motivate 
distributor's participation. In previous research, Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen (1994) 
extended their model by having a single manufacturer with several competitive 
distributors. The manufacturer employed a pull discount strategy by offering 
consumers a low price, and then set wholesale prices after observing the markup 
percentage used by distributors. Lee and Staelin (1997) attempted to provide a 
generalized model allowing two manufacturers to interact with two distributors. 
Manufacturers may coordinate with distributors through several different 
methods. In particular, the rise in distributor power has created significant problems 
and conflicts for manufacturers (Bandyopadhyay & Divakar, 1999). The growing 
power of large distributors (e.g., key accounts) has increased significantly in the past 
decade. Many of these large distributors depend on promotional allowances from 
manufacturers and no manufacturers can unilaterally stop offering trade allowance 
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without losing distributor support (Kotler, 2003). Segal-Horn and McGee (1989, p. 
24-48) suggested several methods for manufacturers to diminish these concerns 
including vertical integration, franchising and alternative channels such as a mail 
order, electronic commerce or telemarketing thereby reducing the importance of 
intermediaries (Keh & Shieh, 2001). 
From the above research, it can be found that the focus of the literature has been 
primarily on the channel coordination in game theory. The research context involves 
from ―a single producer and a single distributor channel‖ to ―two manufacturers and a 
single common distributor‖, then to ―a single manufacturer using two competing 
distributors‖; the research model involves from Nash equilibrium game to Stackelberg 
game. These research identified equilibrium marketing channel coordination by using 
a classical demand function, and classical economic theory often ignored transaction 
costs. In 2006, Chen et al. develop a transaction cost linear demand function to 
investigate channel decision marking when transaction costs exist, they use game 
theory to compare a non-cooperative equilibrium of a differential game played under 
Stackelberg strategies. By focusing on the effect of the distributor‘s transaction costs 
with respect to the marketing decision variables, especially the transaction cost and 
profit distribution, they obtain a fuller understanding of the entire decision structure. 
However, while the intention was to use a model as simple as possible to highlight the 
important issue, this work is obviously limited by some particular assumptions. In 
their paper, it is only assuming that the transaction cost efficiency index to customers 
is the same (e.g., k1=k2=k). In reality, they affect each other tremendously since 
locations are different, customers are different and there are different preferences for 
each type of distribution channel. So, it is important for future researches to consider 
the uniqueness of each distributor (e.g., services), preferences of different customers 
(e.g., perceived transaction costs), and an empirical analysis in the model. 
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Orientations amongst channel behavior 
Previous research in marketing (John P. Murry & Heide, 1998)), economics 
(Klein & Leffler, 1981), sociology (Granovetter 1985), and organization theory 
(Ouchi 1980) suggests that channel behaviour is influenced by two types of variables. 
The first is the nature of the interpersonal relationship that exists between the 
boundary personnel in the retailer's and manufacturer's firms, designed to reduce or 
eliminate goal incompatibility between the parties in the first place. The second are 
various organization-level variables, including incentive premiums (promotional 
allowances) , which make it economically attractive for a party to engage in particular 
behaviors. John P. Murry and Heide (1998) extend previous research by examining 
both the independent and joint effects of these factors on one of channel behaviour 
-retailer participation. On the basis of an empirical study involving a conjoint task, the 
authors show that the presence of a strong interpersonal relationship does not diminish 
the importance of other variables, such as incentives. Within the limits of the conjoint 
task, the results also suggest that interpersonal relationships are less important 
determinants of participation than economic incentives. 
As noted previously, conflict and cooperation are the two dominant sentiments 
that regulate exchange relationships (Dixon & Wilkinson, 1986). Conflict is defined 
as interference that hinders the accomplishment of individual and/or mutual goals 
(Stern & Reve, 1980). In contrast, cooperation is the joint striving toward individual 
and mutual goals (Brown 1981). 
Conflict and cooperation stem from the nature of the interdependence among 
exchange partners (Dixon & Wilkinson, 1986) and can co-exist in a relationship 
(Alderson & Narus, 1990). For example, a great deal of media coverage in the auto 
industry has focused on the impact of declining consumer demand on the financial 
performance of auto manufacturers and dealers. Manufacturers blame their poor 
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performance on dealers by complaining that unethical practices of dealer are ruining 
the industry‘s reputation. On the other hand, car dealers blame declining performance 
on manufacturers by claiming that manufacturers are preventing them from being 
innovative retailers (Treece, Zellner, & Konrad 1989). Despite this conflict, 
manufacturers and dealers cooperate with one another because they are dependent on 
each other to achieve desired goals (cf. Dwyer 1980). They choose to cooperate for 
both political reasons (Anderson & Narus 1984; Frazier 1983b) and economic reasons 
(Williamson 1988). Alderson (1965) established the notion that the economic survival 
and prosperity of individual firms are achieved within the channel by managing 
relations so that cooperation and conflict find some level of balance satisfactory to 
channel participants. 
The transactional cost and relational exchange literatures use cooperation and 
conflict as a middle ground for explaining the rationales for channel relations 
(Williamson 1988). Macneil‘s (1978) work on relational norms suggests that 
cooperation increases the mutuality, solidarity, and role integrity of channel relations, 
while Williamson‘s (1988) study of economic organizations emphasizes the 
importance of cooperation in safeguarding transactions against the hazards of 
opportunism. However, as was illustrated in the auto industry, neither conflict nor 
cooperation in isolation describe the dominant sentiments of the manufacturer-dealer 
relationship. 
While inter-organizational relationships can be characterized by conflict and 
cooperation simultaneously, conflict and cooperation do tend to be inversely related 
(Frazier 1983b). Previous research has not empirically examined the 
conflict-cooperation linkage; however, Frazier (1983b) has suggested that the 
resolution of conflict leads to cooperation. 
The manufacturer depends on resellers to perform a variety of functions on its 
behalf, including the provision of shelf space, local advertising, point-of-purchase 
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promotion, and implementation of an effective pricing strategy. However, differences 
in goals and preferences between a manufacturer and a reseller can lead to conflicts 
over how channel revenues and costs should be allocated among the participants and 
can produce incentive problems within the channel. If a powerful manufacturer 
attempts to increase profits by offering relatively low margins to a reseller, for 




7.  Manufacturer Objectives Implementation 
Transaction cost and producer business 
objectives  
Deciding what levels of integration the firm should use within its channels of 
distribution in various level markets is difficult for any firm(Erdem, 1993). At one 
extreme, the firm can perform all marketing and distribution functions itself. At the 
other extreme, the firm can choose not to perform any of the necessary functions, 
instead using outside merchants who take title to the firm's goods for resale to other 
middlemen and final buyers. Between these extremes, a continuum of market 
hierarchy options is usually available (Anderson & Gatignon 1986). 
Stem and El-Ansary (1988) stress that the channel integration decision is a 
critical component of any firm's marketing channel strategy. Choosing the right level 
of channel integration can make the difference between success and failure in a 
market, as it represents a point of vulnerability for the firm in terms of both market 
response and opportunity losses (Root 1987). Moreover, the correct decision must be 
made early, because initial commitments may not be easy to terminate. The question 
that must be answered is what degree of forward integration firms should choose and 
why. 
Most empirical research in the channels literature has centered on the 
management of ongoing dyadic channel relationships rather than on the structure of 
the channel. Fortunately, interest in channel integration issues has been rising among 
channels researchers in recent years, in part because of the development of transaction 
cost analysis by Williamson (1975, p. 56-85, 1985, p. 79-95; see Anderson and Weitz 
1986). Important empirical studies on channel integration have been performed by 
Erdem (1993), Mols (2000), Anderson (1985), and John and Weitz (1988). Erdem 
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(1993) relates TCA to the same channel structures in its original use, summarizes the 
major vertically integrated channel structures and emphasizes the significant role of 
exercised power in these systems. Mols (2000) analysed and explained the existence 
of dual distribution channels by the use of transaction cost theory. Anderson (1985) 
and John and Weitz (1988) developed and tested models based on transaction cost 
analysis. These studies represent an excellent start, but a variety of important research 
issues remain unresolved.  
To what extent should a firm perform all marketing distribution functions 
internally instead of relying heavily on outside intermediaries? The traditional answer 
in the marketing literature has been based on a production cost argument (Stem and 
El-Ansary 1988). The assumption has been that all firms desire more control, which 
leads to a preference for integration, but that such arrangements will not be feasible 
unless the associated fixed costs can be spread over a large volume of business.  
Furthermore, as the volume of business increases, firms are able to specialize in 
the performance of marketing-distribution functions and reap the benefits of 
economies of scale. Though production costs appear important, especially in terms of 
"efficiency" as opposed to "control," they alone are insufficient to explain variations 
in channel integration. For example, a production cost explanation cannot account for 
the use of market exchanges by large firms or different degrees of integration by firms 
of smaller size and less experience.  
Transaction cost analysis (Williamson 1975, p. 56-85; 1985, p. 79-95) offers 
another perspective to help us understand better the forces shaping channel structure. 
A transaction is a process by which a good or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable interface (Williamson, 1975, p. 56-85). In the classical 
economic theory it is not only argued that the price mechanism to be able to 
coordinate the behavior of transaction, but also assumed that consumer information is 
symmetric in the market. Since both buyers and sellers have the same amount of 
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information; the transaction can be executed without cost. In reality markets are often 
inefficient (e.g., information asymmetry) and uncertain (e.g., product and process 
uncertainty). In order to process a transaction, customers must conduct activities such 
as searching for information, negotiating terms, and monitoring the on-going process 
to ensure a favorable deal (Coase, 1937). The cost involved with such 
transaction-related activities cost represent transaction cost. McEachern (2000) argued 
that the transaction costs are the costs of time and information required to carry out 
market exchange.  
Transaction cost theoretically explains why a buyer or a seller chooses a 
particular form of transaction instead of the other. The principle of transaction cost is 
that people like to conduct transactions in a way that minimize their transaction cost 
because transaction cost provides no value to either the buyer or seller. Williamson 
(1979) observed that human nature and the environment of exchange can cause 
market failure due to unacceptably high transaction costs in transaction processes; 
differences in the character of exchange level such as uncertainty, frequency and asset 
specificity can influence the transaction cost.  
From the above analysis of transaction cost, we could see that the basic premise 
of transaction cost analysis (TCA) is that the firm will internalize activities that it is 
able to perform at lower cost and will rely on the market for activities in which other 
providers have an advantage. TCA is built on a microanalytic framework with strong 
behavioral reality. Channel members are assumed to be subject to bounded rationality. 
Furthermore, at least some actors are assumed to be opportunistic (i.e., having a 
tendency to cheat other parties) if given the chance. Imperfect, or asymmetric, 
information may give such actors an exploitable advantage in their dealings with other 
parties.  
Transaction costs (i.e., the costs of governing the system) tend to be low in 
highly competitive markets, thereby providing little or no incentive to substitute 
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internal organization for market exchange. In contrast, when faced with an inability of 
markets to impose behavioral constraints and enforce simple contracts, firms are 
expected to internalize transactions to reduce costs of exchange. A limit on integration 
is the fact that organizations are not perfect and transaction costs also are present 
within them. 
Though TCA tends to downplay the impact of production costs on forward 
integration, the objective is to minimize the sum of transaction and production costs in 
making forward integration decisions (John & Weitz 1988; Williamson, 1985, p. 
79-95). The higher the costs of contracting externally, the greater is the incentive to 
internalize transactions.  
Unlike production costs, transaction costs are very difficult to measure because 
they represent the potential consequences of alternative decisions. Researchers 
examining transaction cost issues almost never attempt to measure such costs directly, 
but rather test whether organizational relations align with the attributes of transactions 
as predicted by transaction cost reasoning (Williamson 1985, p. 79-95). "The level of 
specialized assets required to support the exchange, the uncertainty surrounding the 
exchange, and the frequency of exchange are identified as the principal factors that 
make market-mediated exchange inefficient" (John & Weitz 1988, p. 121-122). Asset 
specificity is the extent to which specialized investments are needed to support an 
exchange, whereas uncertainty reflects the ability to predict relevant contingencies, 
both internal and external to the firm. "Frequency" refers to the distinction between 
one-time and recurrent exchange. 
Relying on only transaction cost theory has its advantages and limitations. 
Transaction cost theory has restrictive, explicitly stated behavioral assumptions, and a 
number of testable propositions can be advanced from the framework. It represents a 
static structural approach, it does not recognize the development of trust-based 
business relationships. Thus, it ignores recent literature on relationship marketing and 
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management (Anderson & Narus, 1999). In fact, the parties in the relationship may 
view each other as extensions of the firm and thus as an external source of a broad 
range of resources such as people, knowledge and network connections (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Key elements in close relationships are the interdependence between 
the supplier and the distributor, the mutual trust and openness, shared objectives and a 
commitment to doing business with each other on a long-term basis. These 
business-to-business relationships have been found to have a complex pattern of 
interaction between the members of the two organizations and bonds of different 
types and strengths, i.e. economic, informational, organizational, knowledge, 
technical and social bonds (Hakansson, 1982, p. 98-108). By entering into a closer 
cooperative relationship involving investments in transaction-specific assets, it is 
possible to improve daily interaction, product and process developments and hence 
the performance of the companies in the relationship (Ford et al. 1998). 
Measurements of distribution channel 
performance  
Many scholars have studied the channel performance measurement. For example, 
Pegram (1965) found that most of producer take channel performance variable as 
sales performance, stock keeping, sales ability, attitudes of channel members, 
competition faced by channel members and development of channel members. Gaski 
and Nevin (1985) defined channel performance as the degree to which a supplier's 
relationship with a dealer contributes to fulfillment of the supplier's objectives. They 
propose that channel performance is the consequence of interaction of channel 
members and can be studied from coordination, satisfaction, promises and et al. 
Kumar, Stern and Aulakh (1992) integrated other scholar‘s opinion, and constituted 
four model (including rational goal model, human relations model, internal process 




From the above research, we found performance measurement has been 
categorized as either objective or subjective (Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980) (Table 9). 
Objective measures are those that require ―a direct assessment of organizational 
properties without any conceptual transformation‖; whereas subjective measures are 
those that require ―an indirect assessment of organizational properties by instruments 
which measure group perceptions‖ (Payne & Pugh, 1976). For example, objective 
measures of performance include cost reduction, production ratio, time efficiency, 
stock amount, etc. Unfortunately, previous research has not found little convergent 
validity of the two measures.  
In Pennings‘ (1973) research, he reported low correlations between the objective 
and subjective measures of group performance even when these measures were 
collected from the same sample base. But we can‘t draw a conclusion that objective 
measures are more valid than subjective measures, because objective organization 
documents can have serious limitations and sometimes are less accurate than asking 
respondents directly. 
    Subjective measure, such as, degree of dedication, developing potential, 
satisfaction, quality of distribution relationship and enterprise image, can be further 
divided into two categories: self-report evaluations and supervisors‘ evaluations. If the 
correlations between supervisors‘ evaluations and objective performance measures are 
low, then the correlation between self-report assessments and objective measures can 
only be worse. Indeed, Connolly, Jessup and Valacich (1990) even reported a negative 
correlation between them. As a result, they advise that both self-report assessments 
and objective measures should be used together to ensure measurement accuracy. 
However, objective measures may not exist for many real-world systems, that‘s to say, 
they can be very costly to acquire.  
To conclude, it is ideal to include both objective and subjective measures 







Objective measures cost reduction, production ratio, time efficiency, stock 
amount, etc 
Subjective measure degree of dedication, developing potential, satisfaction, 
quality of distribution relationship and enterprise image 
Table 9: Measurements of distribution channel performance 
Considerations of CIP to improve distribution 
channel performance 
Nowadays, supplier‘s incentive programs play an important role in keeping 
relationships with independent channel distributors. Previous research in marketing, 
economics, sociology, and organization theory suggests that two types of variables 
influence channel incentive. The first is the western channel incentive theory, and the 
second is Chinese guanxi. Therefore, considerations of CIP to improve distribution 
channel performance involve the two facets. 
There are many literatures in western channel incentive theory to study the 
relationship between CIP and distribution channel performance directly or indirectly. 
For example, Murry and Heide (1997) suggested that carefully crafted incentive 
program motivate distributors to participate in suppliers‘ promotional programs. Chu 
and Desai (1995) advanced that excellent incentive program can support suppliers‘ 
customer service objectives. Narus and Anderson (1996) showed that incentive 
program is able to seek continuation of an ongoing relationship. Also, because 
information is embedded in incentives, role ambiguity is reduced, end-user needs 
more clearly identified (Challagalla & Shervani, 1996), and opportunistic behaviors 
less likely to occur (Stump & Heide, 1996). Therefore, Gilliland and Bello (2001) 
draw a conclusion that these factors enhance the supplier‘s ability to control its 
channel and to subsequently attain high performance outcomes. Clearly, channel 
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incentives are so closely tied to specific performance, so they play a key role in 
allowing many suppliers to maintain productive relationships with channel members. 
Many researches examine how and when guanxi operates as a governance 
mechanism that influences firm marketing competence and performance in the 
transitional economy of China. Through the accumulation of trust, guanxi helps 
nurture goodwill and cooperative norms among partners in a channel system (Doney 
& Cannon, 1997). These shared values and norms are critical ingredients that offer a 
platform for channel partners to work together to expand their markets (Heide & John, 
1992). This is especially true with distribution channels in China‘s growing markets
（Gu et al., 2008). Mutual trust in channel members‘ reliability and integrity, when 
verified and reinforced over time, encourages collaboration (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh 
1987). Channel members also help firms resist environmental threats because channel 
partners bonded in a guanxi network would assume sacrifice in anticipation of 
reciprocal rewards when the threats subside (Zhang, Cavusgil, & Roath 2003). In 
short, guanxi reduces transactional costs and suppresses opportunistic behaviors that 
are typical problem areas in inter-firm relationships (Doney & Cannon, 1997).  
Guanxi also enhances channel capability through its intrinsic control benefit. 
Given the complex web of favors and obligations, control benefits of guanxi operate 
at both the firm and the individual levels. At the corporate level, China‘s SOEs and 
local-government-owned enterprises are known to first ―cooperate‖ with their likes 
before working with others (Boisot & Child, 1996). The shared organizational culture 
and operating procedures enable them to be more effectively monitored, leading to 
effective channel governance. This also makes interfirm transfer of favors easier. 
At the individual level, guanxi‘s control benefits are also strong. Vanhonacker 
(2004) notes that some managers are more effective than others because they have 
built up a set of obligations with other managers, and they can get things done by 
using people who ―owe‖ them. Brand managers in China cultivate guanxi among 
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managers of a channel system and among government officials (Park & Luo, 2001) to 
accumulate obligations from others. The managers have increased control over guanxi 
partners‘ attitudes, decisions, and behaviors because of a surplus of obligations. 
Through mutual obligations and reciprocal favors, corporate channel capability is 
strengthened with better controls. Especially, Gu et al. (2008) confirm guanxi‘s direct 
effects on market performance and its indirect effects mediated through channel 
capability and responsive capability. The findings suggest that firms can improve 
market access and growth through guanxi networks, but managers need to capitalize 
on them from the personal to the corporate level. This study shows that personal 
networks are popular universally, but in China, they have unique, distinct ways of 
operation. In summary, it is not difficult to find that the inherent benefits of guanxi 
can affect firms‘ market performance positively through improved channel capability. 
We can see from the above literatures that considerations of CIP to improve 
distribution channel performance involve the two important factors: western channel 
incentive and Chinese guanxi. However, there is little previous research to examine 
the two factors to influence channel performance. So, it‘s necessary to extend 
previous research by examining both the independent and joint effects of these factors 
on channel performance. 
77 
 
8.  Conclusion and Discussion 
In this review, we look at the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of 
channel incentive programs. There are three distinct views to assess the critical factors 
that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive programs.  
The first is Channel Incentive Theories from economy view. Categories and 
types of channel incentive programs include positive incentive and negative incentive, 
cash incentive and non-cash incentive, channel incentives for high technology 
industry and so on. The study of channel incentive program is very important is 
because that many research identify a conclusion that channel incentive program is 
positively related to distribution channel performance.  
The second is Chinese Culture & Value ―Guan-xi‖ from culture view. Guanxi is 
deeply embedded in the mindset of Chinese and in every aspect of their personal and 
organizational interactions (Park & Luo, 2001). Guanxi is very important is for 
channel behavior and channel relationship. For Chinese guan-xi, the review finds the 
Chinese culture roots of guan-xi is Confucianism which emphasizes the importance of 
interdependent social connections, give existing publications on guan-xi definition 
and draw a conclusion that guan-xi is a special form of relationship which can tie the 
business partners by reciprocal exchanges of favours and obligations voluntarily and 
regularly. Then the review compare related concept of guan-xi, such as ren-qing, 
gan-qing, western relationship, and study several important attributes of guan-xi, 
which included utilitarian, reciprocal, transferable, personal, long-term and intangible. 
Based on the review of guan-xi, the paper found that cooperative partners with close 
guanxi may care more about long-term development of the relationship and mutual 
interests in the future, easily get to channel coordination. 
The third is organization sensemaking from cognitive view. In face of complex 
business environments, different channel member will make different decision 
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because of different cognition and sensemaking. 
One may wonder why the supplier would not simply offer an incentive package 
that covers the spectrum of possible reseller performance concerns. Then, a reseller 
could select the incentive that addresses its particular situation, ignoring others on the 
menu until its performance needs change. In fact, recent research implies that 
suppliers are expanding the breadth of incentives offered (Gilliland, 2003; Narus & 
Anderson, 1996). While this may be a worthwhile strategy in some cases, two 
important issues should be considered. 
First of all, managing many different incentives burdens the supplier, particularly 
if the incentives promote opposite behaviours. For instance, if a supplier 
simultaneously encourages the reseller to focus on short-term selling activities and the 
long-term acquisition of expertise, confusion may result. The supplier should be 
aware that many incentives, such as providing personal assistance in the field and 
co-marketing, require the investment of a good deal of money and effort. It is unlikely 
that a supplier could devote adequate resources towards an incentive package that is 
overly broad.  
A more important consideration may be the incentive program‘s potential effect 
on supplier performance. Because of the control characteristics inherent in channel 
incentives, suppliers can craft incentive packages to address their own performance 
concerns. For instance, a supplier concerned with goal attainment may offer 
high-powered incentives in hopes that resellers will immediately pursue short-term 
selling activities. If the concern is adaptability, an incentive can be offered to motivate 
the reseller to expand into new markets. Thus, if a full range of incentives is offered to 
resellers, it is likely that some would detract from the supplier‘s own effort to achieve 
high performance. Thus, the incentive package should carefully consider both the 
resellers‘ and supplier‘s performance concerns. 
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When manufactures make channel incentive program, they need to consider 
orientations amongst channel behaviour, that is, why some channel member choose to 
coordination, why other channel member choose to conflict. In this review, we found 
that in China‘s business-to-business market there are many factors that will affect 
channel behaviour, among them, three factors are very critical, which are channel 
incentive program, organizational sense making and Chinese ―guan-xi‖. The three 
factors are the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive 
programs and are very important for future research.        
Future research 
As a way forward, the author has presented, via DBA Document 1 (research proposal) 
the future research. This will form the basis of the next stage of research designed to 
discover: 
 Why channel incentive program is important in B-to-B software market? 
 What are the criteria that the producers use to measure the effectiveness of 
channel incentive programs? 
 What are the issues limiting the effectiveness of channel incentive programs? 
 What are the factors that affect the effectiveness of channel incentive 
program most in producers‘ and channel member‘s views? Do they think 
differently or not, and why?  
 How can we evaluate those factors to identify the most critical ones? 
 What are the interactions among critical factors in the dynamic business and 
different culture environment? Can we build a framework? 
 How can the producers leverage the findings of proposed study to improve 
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As a key part of marketing process, distribution is an important antecedent that 
influences companies’ performance. Therefore, how to build up effective and 
efficient cooperate relationship between channel members, including 
manufacturers, distributors and resellers becomes a significant issue both in 
practice and academic research. Among various influential factors for 
distribution channels, the “channel incentive programs” (CIPs) is in particular 
crucial for improvement of cooperation and performance among different 
parties of channel distribution. (Waller and Bishop, 1990; Rajagopalan, 1997; 
McLean and Postlewaite, 2002; Raghu, Sen and Rao, 2003) 
In traditional marketing theory, channel incentive programs are tactically 
based on the assumption of information parity and fully rationalised decision. 
However, in most cases, channel behaviours are not fully rational (reference?). 
Thus, the author believes that besides the CIP, there are other kinds of factors 
influencing the channel members’ actions and the effectiveness of. Accordingly, 
the overall performance of the distribution channel will be influenced finally.   
Based on social exchange theory (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992) and 
bounded rationality theory (Lipman, 1991; Simon, 1995; March, 2006), the 
author argues that there are two kinds of antecedents affecting the effectiveness 
of the CIPs. The first includes rational elements that are based on traditional 
economic analysis and rational decision-making process, while the other 
includes social or cultural factors such as Guanxi in China and cognitive factors 
such as sensemaking in organisation behaviour. After reviewing literature, a 
conceptual model is to be proposed as basis of further investigation.  
In order to verify the author’s point of view, qualitative research was 
conducted through interviews with managers from a big manufacturer, its main 
distributor and reseller. This study used an interpretive approach to analyse the 
interview data to investigate the key influential factors for the successful 
planning and effectiveness of CIPs, with a purpose is to refine the original 
conceptual framework. 
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The author transcribed, interpreted, and identified some key influential 
factors after analysis of unstructured interviews, for improvement of the 
effectiveness of CIP, including economic considerations on benefit-cost analysis; 
cultural and social considerations, such as Guanxi and trust; and cognitive 
considerations mainly focusing on organizational sensemaking. It constructive 
to draw preliminary deductions, because they will drive a wider scope 
quantitative study in future research. .  
Overall, the current study conceptually and operationally investigates the 
influences of economic, cultural and cognitive factors on channel behaviours 
and effectiveness of CIPs. Based on previous research, the author proposed a 
conceptual framework and discussed several possible antecedents and their 
relationships in this framework model. Following introduction to methodology 
and data analysis, conclusions are drawn, resulting in a newly established model 
on improvement of CIP. Implications are provided at the end of the paper.   
2. Conceptual framework 
The framework developed in document 2 of this thesis was used as the 
foundation for the current research. Document 2 synthesised existing literature 
and documented three distinct perspectives of the factors that influence 
forecasting accuracy. In marketing channel research, a considerable amount of 
attention has been paid to channel incentive. Channel incentive is defined as a 
series of mechanism to motivate channel members, including economic and 
non-economic mechanism (Iyer, 1997). 
This study proposes that there are three views to explore the antecedents of 
channel behaviours and incentive program effectiveness. On the one hand, the 
relationship between suppliers and distributors is based on economic exchange 
and agency relationships (Bergen, 1992). In such relationships, economic profit 
dominants the behaviours of distributors, thus they further influence the 
effectiveness of CIP In order to making a rational choice, distributors tend to 
compare economic benefits with transaction costs and profits.  Then, they try 
to make the best choice on whether and/or to what degree to implement the 
original target of manufacturers effectively. This part is about economic 
consideration based on rational action theory (Goldthorpe, 1998).  
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On the other hand, according to bounded rationality theory, which is 
used to refer to economic actors’ behaviour that is ‘intended rational, but only 
limitedly so’ (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv), people cannot make complete rational 
choice even though they have the original motivation and purpose to do so. This 
is because as economic actors, humans only have a limited capacity to process 
information, address complexity and make optimal choices. Thus, even if the 
original consideration is a rational assessment on service quality, they cannot 
avoid irrational thinking from time to time due to a human’s bounded rationality 
limitation. 
Concretely, in distribution relationships, when distributors decide whether 
to carry out sales promotion as required by manufacturers, they cannot make a 
fully ‘rational’ decision. Hereby both cultural and cognitive factors influence 
people’s rational judgments based on economic considerations including 
transaction cost analysis and benefit evaluation from the incentive programs. 
Compared with Western countries, Guanxi plays an important role in business 
relationships in China. Guanxi tends to have some positive influence on trust. 
However, when Guanxi dominants the transactions between parties instead of 
contracts, problems may occur and damage the good Guanxi network between 
suppliers and distributors. Thus, Guanxi is supposed to have impacts on trust, 
channel behaviours and the effectiveness of CIP.   
In addition, sensemaking plays a central role in the determination of 
human behavior, regardless of people are acting in formal organizations or 
elsewhere (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). Compared to 
business-consumer relationships, business-business relationships among 
channel members are more complex involving with not only transaction 
relationships but also partnerships. As partners, distributors and manufacturers 
need collaborations. When a new CIP is launched by the manufacturers, how 
the channel members make sense of it becomes important, i.e., how do they turn 
the circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and 
that serves as a springboard into action, will influence whether they choose to 
cooperated or not. 
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Based on the discussion above, this paper aims to explore the impacts of 
economic profit, Guanxi and sensemaking on the effectiveness of channel 






Figure 1 Conceptual framework 
2.1 Channel incentive programs and the role of economic profit 
The concept and content of CIPs have been defined by many scholars such as 
Frazier (2000) and Grilliland (2003). Frazier (2000) suggests that firms rely on a 
mix of contracts, pricing and credit programs (e.g., functional discounts, margin 
guarantees, extended dating and so on), promotional programs (e.g., market 
development funds, co-op programs, incentive or spiff programs, earned volume 
rebates, end-customer promotions and so forth), merchandising aids, training 
programs, and inventory buyback programs, among other components.” 
According to Gilliland (2003), channel incentives are behaviours or policies 
described in the supplier’s standard operating agreement, which are designed to 
motivate active intermediary support of the supplier’s distributor. CIP can be 
viewed as one of the “back-end” dimensions of governance, along with 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, because they are designed to keep a 
relationship on track by ensuring that the supplier’s front-end plans are executed 
as anticipated.  
CIPs include four properties: incentive magnitude, incentive intensity, 
incentive compatibility and incentive equity, which account for the reseller’s 
motivation to accept the offered incentive (Gilliland, 2004). First, incentive 
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reseller (Murry & Heide, 1997). It is usually seen that suppliers typically give 
promotional allowances for the product being promoted or for other products. 
Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that the more the allowance offered by a 
supplier exceeds the market standard or somehow represents a premium, the 
higher the likelihood that a distributor will agree to take part in a program. 
Second, incentive intensity, refers to how closely is the reseller 
performance linked to monetary compensation (Zenger & Marshall, 2000; 
Williamson, 1991). According to most theories on incentives, the effectiveness 
of these group rewards should be a function of incentive intensity. Especially, 
Kruse (1993) define incentive intensity as the marginal gains in pay individuals 
derive from group performance. Third, incentive compatibility about the extent 
the incentive can be in alignment with the distributor’s goals (Bergen et al., 
1992). When the incentive is well in alignment with the distributor’s goals, 
incentive compatibility is good, otherwise, not. Fourth, incentive equity refers to 
the extent the reseller perceives the incentive to be fair, given the effort required 
(Ring & Van, 1994). Thus, an incentive is more likely to be accepted (and is 
more likely to achieve control for the supplier) when it is high in magnitude, 
immediate, compatible, and equitable aspects. With this background of control 
and motivation in mind, many existing incentives used in practice are now 
addressed. 
According to the analysis above, if a CIP contains high incentive 
magnitude, intensity, compatibility and equity, it means reseller will have a 
better attitude towards the CIP. They can get higher economic profit from 
improving sales; simultaneously they can achieve their own organizational goals 
better if the CIP has higher compatibility. Thus, reseller will tend to cooperate 
rather than conflict with the manufacturers. At the same time, manufacturers’ 
goals/aims can be better transferred to the distributor. Therefore, the higher the 
incentive magnitude, incentive intensity, incentive compatibility and incentive 
equity of the CIP is, the higher benefit the reseller will get and the more likely 
they will take coordinate rather than conflict orientation. Thus, economic profit 
could be the basic factor influencing the channel behaviour and the 
effectiveness of a CIP. 
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2.2 Chinese Guanxi and channel behaviour 
Guanxi is an important Chinese word with complex concept and has been 
studied broadly by academics in the field of social sciences. Davies (1995, p.22) 
defines the term Guanxi as “social interactions within the network place and its 
members in the equivalent of an infinitely repeated game with a set of people 
they know.” Interpersonal relationships or Guanxi orientations are rooted in 
Chinese culture (Jacobs et al., 1995). With Chinese culture background, people 
and organizations demonstrate obvious differences in their behaviours. Among 
many uniqueness of Chinese culture, Guanxi has been a core research topic on 
cross-cultural management and international marketing areas.  
In China, the importance of business relationships is deeply rooted in 
Chinese society, characterized by Confucian codes of repeated 
favour-exchanges. Guanxi is important in a Chinese business context whereby a 
situation arises which is beyond an organization’s or individual’s capacity, the 
Guanxi network could be called upon to achieve the desired results (Redding & 
Ng, 1982). 
Davies et al. (1995) conducted an empirical study that suggests there are 
three major benefits resulting from the establishment of Guanxi. First, when the 
information on domestic markets is limited for foreign investors, the Guanxi 
network can be seen as an important source of information on market trends as 
well as on both present and potential opportunities and threats. Second, Guanxi 
can get access to labour and physical resources as well as relations with local 
governments. Finally, Guanxi provides benefits to a wide range of other issues, 
encompassing products transportation and distribution that shape organisational 
image and reputation. 
In terms of the influence of Guanxi on business relationship, Leung et al. 
(2007) explored how a quality business relationship is to be developed and 
maintained in a Chinese context and explained the concept of expressive and 
instrumental ties of a Guanxi model incorporating relationship-specific 
variables (face, favour-exchange and flexibility) and the quality of business 
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relationship (cooperation, continuity and commitment) in the framework of 
capital exchange. 
Abramson and Ai (1997) note that in China, the more of good Guanxi-style 
buyer-seller relationships, the less of perceived uncertainty about the business 
environment, and the more of improved performance outcomes. Thus they 
concluded that Guanxi-style buyer-seller relationships are a competitive 
advantage for the companies that use them in China. Moreover, Guanxi between 
a buyer and a supplier implies a hidden norm of reciprocity that concerns equity 
and exchange of favors and long-term orientation (Ang& Leong, 2000). This 
suggests that cooperative partners with close Guanxi may care more about 
long-term development of the relationship and mutual interests in the future 
(Davies et al., 1995; Su et al., 2009).  
For particular incentive programs, if supplier and distributor have good 
Guanxi, distributors will show a higher intention of cooperative orientation.  
2.3 Sensemaking and channel behaviour 
A fundamental assumption of classic economic theory is that people are able to 
identify and choose what is best for them, when they are been well informed 
about their circumstances. This assumption is not an idiosyncratic doctrine of 
economics; it is shared by the general public. Recent findings from 
behavioural-decision research provide evidence that people are not always able 
to choose what yields the greatest happiness or best experience (Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003, p. 619-642). People fail to choose optimally, either because they 
fail to predict accurately which option in the available choices set will generate 
the best experience or because they fail to base their choice on their prediction, 
or both (Hsee & Hastie, 2006). 
In economic perspective, the prisoner's dilemma is a widely used example 
in game theory that attempts to illustrate why or how two individuals may not 
cooperate with each other, even if it is in their best interest to do so. It 
demonstrates that while cooperation would give the best outcome, people might 
nevertheless act selfishly. Channel members are assumed to be subject to 
 9 
bounded rationality. Some actors are assumed to be opportunistic (i.e. having a 
tendency to cheat other parties) if given the chance. Imperfect, asymmetric, or 
information may give such actors an exploitable advantage in their dealings 
with other parties. 
Being different from that of traditional economics, organizational 
sense-making is a fundamentally social process. As stated by Taylor and Van 
Every (2000, p.275), “Sensemaking is a way station on the road to a 
consensually constructed, coordinated system of action.” At that way station, 
circumstances are “turned into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in 
words and that serves as a springboard to action” (Taylor and Van Every, 2000). 
Sensemaking is more about the interplay of action and interpretation than the 
influence of evaluation on choice. Before people making their choice, they will 
first interpret the actions occurred with certain meanings, which is the process 
of sensemaking. However, sensemaking will influence their decision.  
In the context of CIP, when the manufacturers take an action (e.g., a new 
incentive programs), the distributors may probably interpret this action with 
some meanings, or ask, “What’s the story here?” After figure out their answers 
to this question, they may ask “now what should I do?” thus, they will make 
their choice and take corresponding actions with their sensemaking.  
The best situation is that the distributors make sense as what the 
manufacturers mean to give them, i.e. distributors’ sensemaking consists of the 
manufacturers’ sensegiving without misunderstanding. Sensegiving is a 
sensemaking variance undertaken to create meanings for a target audience, and 
the content of sensegiving and the target affect how people interpret the actions 
they confront (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). For example, when 
manufacturers launch a new incentive program, they have to take the possible 
sensemaking of the channel members into account. If they did differently or 
conflict sensemaking compared with the manufacturers’ original purpose, they 
will interpret manufacturers’ action (new incentive program launch) into a 
negative one and then tend not to coordinate (Bisel and Arterburn, 2012).  
Compared to economic view and cultural view, cognitive view seems to be 
under-development in the research (Cottam, 1989; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; 
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Rajagopal, 2009). Actually, without rational evaluation and Guanxi concern, 
sometimes people make decision with heuristic thinking in a Chinese context. 
The current research is aimed to explore relevant phenomena from a cognitive 
view.  
2.3 Channel behaviour and the effectiveness of the CIPs 
The transactional cost and relational exchange literature use cooperation and 
conflict as a middle ground to explain the rationale for channel relations 
(Williamson, 1988). Conflict and cooperation are the two dominant sentiments 
that regulate exchange relationships (Dixon & Wilkinson, 1986). Conflict is 
defined as interference that hinders the accomplishment of individual and/or 
mutual goals (Stern & Reve, 1980). In contrast, cooperation is the joint striving 
toward individual and mutual goals (Brown 1981). Sometime conflict can be 
lead to cooperation when it is solved properly (Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj, 
2004).  
The manufacturer depends on resellers to perform a variety of functions on 
its behalf, including the provision of shelf space, local advertising, 
point-of-purchase, promotion, and implementation of an effective pricing 
strategy. However, differences in goals and preferences between a manufacturer 
and a reseller may lead to conflicts over how channel revenues and costs should 
be allocated among the participants, as a result, this may produce incentive 
problems within the channel. For instance, if a powerful manufacturer attempts 
to increase profits by offering relatively low margins to a reseller, the reseller 
may not have adequate incentives to promote or price the product. 
While inter-organizational relationships can be characterised by conflict 
and cooperation simultaneously, conflict and cooperation do tend to be 
inversely related (Frazier1983). Frazier (1983) has suggested that the resolution 
of conflict leads to cooperation. 
Coordination. In channel relationships, coordination can be viewed as 
behaviour or behaviour intention of mutual benefits. According to Stem (1992), 
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channel coordination is rooted form interdependence of channel member, which 
is consequence of functional specialisation of channel member.  
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) demonstrate that the concept of channel 
coordination in a simple manufacturer-retailer supply chain in their seminal 
paper. Their basic assumption was that the manufacturer and the retailer have 
separate profit and cost considerations that lead to different inventory policies. 
Typically, the retailer’s order quantity is smaller than the manufacturer’s 
production lot size. In order to achieve channel coordination, the manufacturer 
offers the retailer an incentive contract in terms of quantity discounts to induce 
the retailer to increase its order quantity. 
Thus, this research proposed that channel coordination can be achieved if 
the retailer’s order quantity that optimises profit under the incentive contract 
also optimises the total profit of the supply chain. 
Conflict. Conflict has been defined several ways in both channel and 
organizational behaviour literature (Pondy, 1967). Early definitions of conflict 
focused on a wide variety of phenomena, mainly including four parts: the 
antecedent conditions of behavioural conflict (e.g. scarcity of resources); 
affective states of the channel members involved (e.g. tension, hostility); the 
perception or awareness of a conflict situation; and actual conflict behaviour, 
ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression (Pondy, 1967). 
For channel conflict, the study of conflict within channels of distribution 
has been a primary area of investigation for over forty years (Rosenberg and 
Stern, 1971; Dant and Schul, 1992; Hinds and Bailey, 2003; Cui, Raju and 
Zhang, 2007). Stern (1996) defines channel conflict as a situation in which one 
channel member perceives (an)other channel member(s) to be engaged in 
behaviour that prevents or impedes it from achieving its goals. Gaski (1984, p. 
11) considers channel conflict to be “the perception on the part of a channel 
member that its goal attainment is being impeded by another, with stress or 
tension the result.” Conflict have been offered in the literature (Gaski, 1984), 
the common theme appears to be that conflict exists within the channel if one 
channel member impedes the attainment of the goals of another channel 
member (Gaski, 1984). Pondy (1967) has conceptualised organisational conflict 
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as a process comprising of three main stages: the perceived, felt, and manifest 
conflict stages. Perceived conflict is a cognitive stage. It represents the point at 
which either the supplier or distributor becomes aware of some sources of 
conflict (perceptual incongruity, goal incompatibility and domain dispense). 
Felt conflict consists of stress, tension, or hostility resulting from perceived 
conflict. Manifest conflict is the behavioural or action stage of conflict. As 
Lusch (1976) notes, it is often characterised by verbal or written disagreements 
between channel members.  
Obviously, different channel behaviours, conflict or coordination, have 
different influence on the final effectiveness of the CIP. Effective coordination 
plays an important role in the successful operation of modern manufacturing 
and distribution systems. Macneil’s (1978) work on relational norms suggests 
that cooperation increases the mutuality, solidarity, and role integrity of channel 
relations, while Williamson’s (1988) study of economic organizations 
emphasises the importance of cooperation in safeguarding transactions against 
the hazards of opportunism. Studies that have directly confronted the issue of 
cooperation have viewed the phenomena as either a form of satisfaction 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990), or the inverse of conflict (Ross, Lusch & Brown 
1982). Rajagopal (2009) found that buyer-supplier co-dependency and 
relationship quality significantly affects the supplier performance. Thus, 
coordination has been viewed as a positive factor increasing a CIP’s 
effectiveness. 
Compared to coordination, conflict has more complex influence on a CIP’s 
effectiveness. Previous research shows that conflict may lead to functional or 
dysfunctional consequences (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Several factors will 
influence whether the conflict will be functional or dysfunctional (Ross & 
Lusch, 1982). The first factor is the cause of the conflict. Litterer (1966) 
suggests that if conflict is caused by incompatible goals, then the conflict will 
be dysfunctional; if caused by incompatible means, conflict is more likely to be 
functional because it may bring about a search for better means. Shrum, 
Chompalov and Genuth (2001) found that trust influence conflict in 
inter-organizational relationships, thus has impact on collaboration 
performance.  
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The second factor is the level and intensity of conflict. Brown and Day 
(1981) show that conflict has a greater probability of being functional when is 
below some kind of threshold; it will tend to be dysfunctional when is higher 
than the threshold. Rosenbloom (1973) has suggested that low levels of conflict 
may have little effect on channel efficiency, moderate levels may actually 
increase efficiency (for example, make channel members to strengthen 
adaptability, more hypersensitive to market opportunities), but that excessive 
conflict is dysfunctional, as it may detract from channel efficiency (for example, 
damage and retaliate each other among channel members). 
The third one is the management of conflict. Previous studies show that 
“the presence of conflict per se does not determine the outcomes, but the 
resolution processes which are operative” (Rosenberg & Stem, 1970: 45). 
Properly managed conflict increases the probability that conflict aftermath will 
be positive, and therefore, the conflict will be viewed as functional. On the other 
hand, poorly managed conflict will result in negatively perceived conflict 
aftermath and, therefore, conflict will more likely be viewed as dysfunctional. 
From the analysis above, we conclude that coordination usually has 
positive effects on a CIP’s effectiveness while conflict cannot be regarded as 
good or bad simply. Whether conflict within the channel are viewed as 
functional or dysfunctional is effected by the factors including the source of 
conflict, the level of conflict, and the management of conflict. Therefore, 
manufacturers should make fully use of functional conflict and turn 
dysfunctional conflict into functional conflict.  
This paper aims to investigate the impact of economic profit, Guanxi and 
sensemaking on channel behaviour, including cooperation and conflict, and the 
influence of channel behaviour to CIPs effectiveness.  
3. Research methodology 
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3.1 Methodology 
Methodology clarifies the purpose of the research and provides the rational for 
the way chosen to conduct the research the topics. In principle, there are two 
methodological approaches, positivism and interpretivism (see  
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991; Williams 2000). The positivism approach 
regards social reality as ordered and independent phenomena and is concerned 
with facts. The positivist paradigm, which has its origins in natural science, may 
not always be constructive in appreciating the management process, such as the 
intricacies in the embedded social processes (Srivastava and Teo, 2006). 
In contrast to positivism research, in the interpretative paradigm, from an 
ontological perspective, social reality is the product of processes, sociality, , 
interaction and construction between the various social actors in different 
situations. There is no absolute social reality, but it exists in the meanings of 
social construction (Bergerand & Luckman, 1967). Erickson (1986) defines 
interpretive research as a perspective including ethnographic case study, 
constructivism, and some other research approaches. This methodology reflects 
the main research objectives and determines the methods of information 
collection. The current research analyses the conceptual framework shown in 
Figure 1, aiming to make some counter measurements to improve the existing 
models and frameworks, thus the interpretivism is adopted. The research is to 
answer the following questions: 
1. What impacts does economic profit have on channel behaviour and 
effectiveness of CIPs?  
2. How does Guanxi influence channel behaviour and effectiveness of 
CIPs?  
3. How does sensemaking influence channel behaviour and effectiveness 
of CIPs?  
4. What are the interactions among economic profit, Guanxi and 
sensemaking, if any? 
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3.2 Methods 
This research applies both qualitative methods and quantitative methods. 
Qualitative methods, such as observation and in-depth interviews, are broadly 
used in interpretive research. Maanen (1988) argues that qualitative methods 
have been described as an array of interpretative techniques which seek to 
describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not 
the frequency, of selected phenomena in the social world.” Bryman and Bell 
(2007, p. 405) proposed several steps in qualitative research: general research 
questions; selecting relevant subjects; collection of relevant data; interpretation 
of data, conceptual and theoretical work and writing up conclusions. Keedy 
(2001) proposed that there are two themes regarding the interaction of theory 
and practice. In the first theme, interpretivists often use theory and constructs to 
establish frameworks, to build “shells” in which to collect data, or simply to 
clarify the researcher’s intentions. In the second theme, studying interpretations 
of discovered practices can represent emerging findings grounded in the data 
themselves. In the current research, the author follows these two themes to 
reach the final objectives. 
Case study 
Yin (2003) defines the case as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident. Case 
study research can mean single and multiple case studies. The case study entails 
a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. The most common use of the 
term – case associates the case study with a location, such as a workplace or 
organisation. In a case study approach, the case is an object of interest in its own 
right and according to Bryman and Bell (2007), the researcher aims to provide 
an in-depth elucidation of it. The strength of the case study lies in its ability to 
enable the researcher to intensively investigate the case in-depth, to probe and 
get at its complexity, often through long term immersion in (Arthur, et al, 2012).  
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This dissertation is specifically focused on the case of Motorola Solutions 
in China, along with its largest distributor in China, Digital China and one large 
reseller, Shanghai Shuteng.  
The reason why Motorola Solutions as been chosen is because: first, this 
company is a large B2B company, and has successfully operated in China for 
over 25 years since mid-80’s; second, the author had worked in this company 
for several years, and had taken charge of the CIPs. Most of these programs 
designed by the author and they are currently still in operation. The familiarity 
with such processes provides the author unique opportunities to understand the 
relationships between Motorola Solutions and its distributor China Digital, 
offering constructive insider insights. 
Digital China is its one of largest distributors in China. Motorola has over 
five years’ cooperative history with Digital China. Thus, it is useful for this 
study to explore and understand the effectiveness of CIPs and its influential 
factors in-depth via interviews with both Digital China and Motorola.  
company. A reseller in Shanghai has also been chosen. However, this study 
mainly focuses on analysing interviews of the manufacturer and the distributor 
for the following reasons: First, previous literature on channel behaviours shows 
that it is reasonable to use one channel tire for research, usually between 
manufacturer and distributor; second, some companies do not have a distributor, 
thus reseller also plays the role of distributor and they cooperate with 
manufacturer directly; third, the incentive effectiveness on distributor is the 
basis for the next tire of reseller.  
The following sections provide the background of Motorola Solutions 
(manufacturer), Digital China (distributor) and Shanghai Shuteng (reseller), 
respectively. 
Motorola Solutions’ background 
Motorola Corporation was divided into two divisions in January 2011 
including Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Motorola Solutions serves 
both enterprise and government customers with core markets in public safety 
government agencies and commercial enterprises. The company provides public 
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safety communications from infrastructure to applications and devices such as 
radios as well as task-specific mobile computing devices for enterprises. It 
produces data capture devices such as barcode scanners and RFID 
radio-frequency identification (FRID) products for business, and also brings 
unlicensed wireless broadband capabilities and wireless local area networks 
(WLAN) to retail enterprises. 
As a company provides solutions to business and government clients, 
channel business plays a crucial role for Motorola Solutions. Thus, the company 
has such channel programs as Partner Empower, which aims to build up “a new 
path to a successful relationship”. Partner Empower helps its partners expand 
their relationships with Motorola. The sales, marketing and technical benefits 
help them improve effectiveness at every stage of the sales cycle, while 
simplified systems and processes make it easier for the valued channel partners 
to conduct business with Motorola. Besides, Motorola has other CIPs in China 
to improve the relationships with channel partners and the market performance. 
In May 2012, Motorola has an organizational transform in a two-way radio 
business unit. The divisions, including Sell-in, Sell-thru and Sell-out, have 
changed into high-end special market (e.g., railway, police, petro, etc.) and 
low-end commercial market (e.g., construction, security guarding, food service 
and retailers, etc.).    
In 2012, Motorola launched several new products in low-end market. 
Together with the products under the brand of “SMT” (Shanghai Motorola 
Telecommunication) in Motorola’s joint-venture and acquired Japanese 
company Vertex’s product, there are a dozen of products. Although the low-end 
market has developed rapidly, the rivalry is also severe. Intense launch of new 
products has increased the market competition, and laid pressure on the channel. 
Thus, an effective CIP is important to prevent possible channel conflict.  
Digital China’s Background 
Digital China Holdings Limited (“Digital China” or the “Group”; Stock 
Code: 00861) is an integrated IT services provider in China. Digital China was 
listed on the main board of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited on 1 
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June 2001 following a spin off from the Legend Group. It focuses on providing 
customers with sophisticated and applicable IT solutions, driving technological 
innovations for work and life and enhancing the digitalisation process in China. 
In order to achieve these goals, the Group is striving to become the premier IT 
services provider with the most comprehensive services for a majority of 
Chinese users. Digital China focuses on eight major business segments in the 
China market: IT Planning, Business Process Outsourcing, Application 
Development, System Integration, Hardware Infrastructure Services, 
Maintenance, Hardware Installation, Distribution and Retail. A full range of IT 
services are available to industry clients, large enterprises, SMEs and individual 
consumers. 
Digital China has become the reseller of Motorola’s two-way radio 
business in 2008. Currently, it is responsible for the distribution of two low 
price two-way radio family - CP1200/1300/1660 and MagOne A8 (a sub-brand 
owned by Motorola). CP series with “Motorola” brand are the most expensive 
products among Motorola’s product range in the commercial market, and has 
gradually taken place of GP2000 series that has already been sold in Chinese 
market for eight years.  
Shanghai Shuteng’s Background 
Shanghai Shuteng Communication Device Co Ltd was set up in 2003, 
which is specialised on the sales and communication services of mobile devices 
and solutions. As Motorola authorized reseller, in 2005, Shuteng founded a 
subsidiary Shanghai Shuxing Electronic Device Co. Ltd as an agency 
exclusively for Motorola’s two-way radios. With this change, Shuxing wants to 
gain more support from Motorola by showing sales force commitment and 
brand loyalty. At meanwhile, it also minimized Shuteng internal sales person 
conflicts and competition. 
Interview 
As one of the most commonly recognised forms of qualitative research method, 
interview is a method for data collection in which selected participants are 
asked questions to find out what they do, think or feel (Collis & Hussey, 2009), 
 19 
however, interviews are more than questions and answers. All types of 
interviews can be conducted with individuals or groups, using face-to-face, 
telephone or video conferencing methods. Carolyn (cited from Arthur, 2012) 
points out in-depth interviews are purposeful interactions in which investigator 
attempts to learn what another person knows about the topic, what he or she 
thinks and feels about it, and what significance or meaning it might have.  
The interviews conducted by this research were semi-structured and  
tape-recorded. Compared to unstructured interviews with maybe just one single 
question that the interviewer asks and the interviewee is then allowed to respond 
freely (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 474), semi-structured interviews usually have an 
interview guide with a list of specific topics that would be covered in the 
interview. Semi-structured interviews are selected to prevent the interviewees 
being constrained as to the type and extent of information they have and could 
provide. 
As suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 420), a piece of research 
should minimize contamination of the social world by keeping research 
structure to a minimum to enhance the opportunity of “genuinely revealing the 
perspective” of the subject being studied, the author adopted semi-structured 
interview format. This would allow us to see the research issues through the 
eyes of research participants. The interviews started relatively open-ended and 
have fairly general questions rather than specific and focused research questions  
Totally, six in-depth interviews were conducted via phone with length 
from one hour to 1.5 hours. All of these interviewees are general managers or 
managers who are responsible for channel businesses. Details of interviewees 
were shown in the following table. 
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In order to getting more information about sensemaking, the author made 
follow-up interviewees with Wang H.L., Yu J., Yu L.B. and Zhang Z.H. for 
about 20 minutes, respectively, on July 25 2012.  
In all the one-to-one interviews, the meetings were audio recorded. The 
interviewees were aware of the nature of the interview and had signed the 
interview consent form. Leading questions were asked with following up 
questions to explore specific logic in depth. The questions and responses were 
subsequently transcribed based on notes taken during the interviews and 
referenced against the recording. The author makes effort to collect relevant 
information, analyse and synthesise some data and results and finally to obtain 
meaningful results and findings of his own. After data collection, the paper use 
content analysis as data analysis method.  
4. Findings and discussion 
4.1 Motorola’s CIP: content, designing and effectiveness 
There are three kinds of CIPs. Authorization incentive, sales incentive and 
marketing support. First, authorisation incentive is to give one reseller exclusive 
sales authority. Digital China has exclusive right to distribute MagOne A8 and 
CP series in China market. Second, sales incentives includes Sell-in Rebate, 
Sell-thru Rebate and Business Development Fund (Conditional Rebate One, 
CR1 and CR2) for resellers to achieve target sales volume or value. Business 
Development Fund is for supporting resellers to explore and develop the market. 
Third, marketing support refers to the Co-marketing Fund provided by 
Motorola’s Marketing Department. Besides, they also have MCR (Motorola 
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Chanel Reseller) Talent Club as supporting programs. Sales incentives are based 
on economic consideration, with overall rebate percentage of 15%-17%. Sell-in 
Rebate accounts for 5%-6%, Sell-Thru Rebate takes 5%-6%, CR1 takes 2%-3% 
and CR2 takes 2%.  
Motorola’s goals of CIPs are to increase growth rate, improve efficiency of 
resource use and increase resellers’ margin. Growth rate target is comprised of 
three parts: the base target, stretch 1 target and stretch 2 target. The reseller can 
get about 10% of the order price as rebate. However, our sales target will only 
achieve at stretch 1 level. At that level, the reseller will get another 3% for 
rebate. For stretch 2, they can get 2%-3% rebate.  
The design of CIPs with goals above is based on the flowing factors. First, 
it should be helpful for achieving the target sales value and volume. Second, it 
should be effective on stimulating channel behaviour. Third, CIPs should 
moderate the channel benefit distribution. Fourth, the manufacturer have a 
long-term orientation when designing the incentive programs.  
However, the effectiveness of the incentive programs seems not as good as 
what they were expected. Interviewees from Motorola don’t think Digital China 
has got essential improvement in business operation” and “have started to find 
other plans”. Interviewees from Digital China feel that “simple price rebate is 
not enough for our development now” and they need “more customized 
incentive programs”. Motorola means to help the reseller with training, but the 
reseller thinks that, “The training doesn’t help much for our distributors”. For 
distributors of reseller, they also think the reseller did not do well, “They just 
enjoy the fruit of Motorola…they didn’t explore the market but just maintain it”. 
Thus, we it can be seen the effectiveness of CIPs declines from the 
manufacturers to the reseller then to the distributors.  
According to the interviews, main factors that influence channel behaviour 
and CIP effectiveness include economic benefit, Guanxi and trust and 
sensemaking difference, which have been proposed in the previous section of 
this paper. The following part is to discuss respectively the role of economic 
benefit, Guanxi and trust and sensemaking in the channel relationship and their 
effects on CIP effectiveness.  
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4.2 Economic profit: the main objective of both parties 
From the interview data economic profit seems to be the most important factors 
to each party in the channel relationships. As one interviewee in Motorola said, 
 “I don’t think Guanxi and trust has any impact on channel 
incentive programs. Channel incentive program is an economic 
concept. The effectiveness of incentive program is something 
calculated by different parties with common benefits.” 
The reasons why the channel member care about economic benefits are 
various. First, compared to manufacturers with brand equity, channel members 
do not have brands asset and they care more about instant and short-term benefit. 
Therefore, manufacturers use principle of “maximising market share” while 
channel members operating under the “maximizing benefit” principle. Second, 
economic benefit influences distributors profit directly. As said by Shanghai 
Shuteng,  
“If the award amount is not high, for example just 10 or 15 thousands 
Yuan, we usually don’t care about that.”  
As described by Shanghai Shuteng, Motorola’s incentive programs are not 
strong enough as before because of performance decline, they could get 4-5 
Yuan per points before but just 1 Yuan now. And the cashing process is very 
long. So they are “not very active on that” (See interview 6 in Appendix). 
Second, as said by Digital China, Motorola has not paid CRI in time, and 
the reward level is too low to stimulate the distributors, so they don’t want to do 
that anymore. What’s more, the worry about economic risk lets the reseller take 
an uncooperative behaviour. Yu L.B. said, 
 “if the Sell-in volume exceeds Sell-thru for successive years, we would 
give up annual premium and quit if such situation lasts for a long time”  
Thus, it can be concluded economic profit is the fundamental factor 
influence the effectiveness of the CIP. 
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When taking economic earnings into consideration, the objectives 
consistence between manufacturers and distributors seem important. From the 
interview, it can be seen that the manufacturer believes the distributors just hold 
short-term views and only care about short-term monetary incentives.  
 “The distributor (Digital China) mainly focuses on turnover and benefit. 
In the past three or four years, its sales value has increased from millions to 
hundreds of millions RMB. At the same time, some problems emerged in the 
process of high growth, such as the increasing stock level, lack of ability to 
achieve the benefit target, etc. This year, they have acquired several product 
series, and are trying to focus on developing goals.”  
However, in fact, for distributors, they also focus on their long-term 
development.  
One manager from Digital China claimed, “Currently, Motorola put 
emphasis on price incentive programs but ignores to communicate with us on 
non-price factors…Motorola has to take more customized incentive program. 
Simple price rebate is not enough for our development now. Price and volume is 
just surficial incentive measures. They are lack of further incentive programs 
and weak on market research.”.  
Thus, the distributors are more aware of the profit, turnover and cash flow. 
This is not because they do not care about non-monetary, but because Motorola 
does not offer such kind of incentives. 
Also, the manufacturers and resellers seem not to understand the goal of 
each other. Digital China has complained,  
“We are not clear about each other’s strategies and market 
positioning… …Motorola doesn’t have accurate expectation and positioning on 
Digital China. Digital China initiated with low-end product. Gradually, we 
think we have got advantage on high-end market with high profit ratio. But 
Motorola still regards us as low-and-middle reseller.” 
Pei B. from Shanghai Shuteng mentioned,  
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“Motorola doesn’t know their operations well. First they may feel no need 
to know; second they may believe they have done well on market shares and 
don’t pay much attention on us. Motorola doesn’t do very well. Another 
manufacturer that is the competitor of Motorola Hytera can help the 
distributors resolving problems and deeply understand their business.”  
Therefor, in order to let these CIPs based on economic consideration work 
well, Motorola has to pay more attention to understand the business objectives 
and real needs of their channel members. 
In conclusion, the manufacturer aims to design an effective CIP with two 
main economic factors, “the rebate ratio and price”. However, their 
inconsistence and misunderstanding of each other’s business objective reduce 
the effectiveness of the CIP, even though they are clear about the surficial target 
of the incentive program. Manufacturer regards itself as long-term oriented and 
distributors as short-term oriented. Actually, manufacturers ignored the fact that 
distributors also care about long-term business even brand development.  
In previous research, financial factors are usually regarded as the most 
important factor in CIPs. Because it is involved in the contract and often takes 
up the most time during negotiations, economic benefit is usually viewed as the 
core of CIP, just as indicated in the interviews above. However, it is 
recommended that financial factors are just the appearance, what does matter is 
the underlying factor. Win-win CIPs should be developed from mutual 
beneficial relationships combining short- and long-term benefits, based on deep 
understanding of each other. Financial factors are just the appearance or tool of 
such relationship. From the interview data, it is very common to equal CIP to 
“financial incentives” simply. 
4.3 Guanxi: a two-edged sword 
Guanxi was usually considered having positive influence in business 
relationships. Also, this study originally proposed that Guanxi is good for 
cooperative channel behaviour. However, from the study, it was found that 
Guanxi is a two-edged sword. On the one side, it is good for communication 
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and complementation effectiveness. On the other side, from a long-term view, 
using Guanxi to deal with business may damage their relationships. This finding 
is useful and has high practical implications that are discussed as follows. 
Good Guanxi usually means manufacturers and channel members have 
high trust on each other. Then they can communicate openly to each other. 
Besides, with good Guanxi, channel members will more likely show 
coordination behaviours to the manufacturers. As Wang H.L. (can you show the 
name? number the managers otherwise, and indicate which department) said,  
“Communication cost would be very high without trust… even become 
suspicious.”  
Pei B. from the reseller said, “If we have good Guanxi, I can do what I can 
to help you. For example, if you call me to stock 200 more two-way radios, and 
we have good relationship, I’ll not hesitate.”  
If the channel members do not trust the manufacturer, they will suspect the 
reasonableness of the target and be reluctant to cooperate. Therefore,  Guanxi 
tends to have obviously positive effects on effective communication and CIP 
effectiveness. 
Sometimes Guanxi can help “resolve” the problem quickly. However, 
when a problem or accidence occurs, it leads to other problems and may 
consequently damage each other’s relationship. In terms of the source of trust, 
one interviewee mentioned that if their co-operator’s action consistent with their 
words, they will trust them. Otherwise the trust will be damaged. Also, 
manufacturer’s shifting to other resellers will damage existing reseller’s trust.  
Interviewee from Motorola, Wang H.L., talked an example when using 
Guanxi finally damage their relationships.  
“Guanxi is two-edged. Good Guanxi can help ‘resolve’ the problem 
quickly. However, this will probably lead to further problems in the future. We 
have experienced such situations. Once a time, Digital China helped Motorola 
store to  prepare for an incoming project. Two parties came to an agreement 
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for time and fee via e-mail. Then some problems occurred. The unexpected 
problems damaged the trust between the two parties. If this were done under 
contract rather than oral promise and e-mail confirmation based on Guanxi, 
there.”  
Thus, Guanxi is good for the communication and complementation of CIPs, 
but it should be used carefully. When an interviewee looked back for an 
experience under the guide of Guanxi rather than contract, he said, 
Pei B. said,  
“Even with good Guanxi, we have to do business according to the contract. 
Without contract, Guanxi could bring risk. Sometimes we don’t sign contract 
because of Guanxi, but they have problems, it will be hard to get money back . If 
your distributors express difficulties to you, you also feel uncomfortable to force 
them to do what is required by the manufacturer.” (See interview 6 in 
Appendix). 
In addition,, how to transform Guanxi from an interpersonal level into an 
organisational level is another question. As Yu from Motorola described,  
“The critical issue is to establish trust between companies. Even if we have 
good personal Guanxi, we still couldn’t achieve common sense without trust 
between our companies.”  
Realising Guanxi may have negative influence; some interviewees try to 
avoid being influencing by Guanxi when making decision. Wang H.M. from 
Motorola said:  
“For me, neither Guanxi nor trust should be the factors I take into account. 
I think these two factors are social one. I try to avoid being affected by Guanxi 
or trust…Channel incentive is some kind of science. We use group decision and 
process to avoid personal Guanxi and trust.”  
Also, Zhang Z.H. from Digital China said, “I’ve built up good relationships 
with people in Motorola for businesses. But I won’t be influenced by personal 
relationships when making decision.” 
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Thus, Guanxi is an influential factor for the effectiveness of CIPs. 
However, the effect is on double sides. As Yu L.B. said,  
“Guanxi, trust and benefit interact with each other and will lead to positive 
or negative circles.”  
The main positive affect of Guanxi that is that it can increase the 
cooperation efficiency, while negative affect is that the abuse of Guanxi will 
damage their long-term business relationships. Some interviewees have realised 
the negative affect of Guanxi and try to avoid being influenced by it.  
It is interesting that businessmen’s attitudes towards Guanxi has changed 
dramatically in China. After decades of economic development and 
internationalisation, more and more people (such as Wang H.M. and Zhang Z.H. 
in this study) tend to view traditional Chinese Guanxi as “outdated” concept. All 
interviewees in this research have mentioned that Guanxi does play a role in 
channel cooperation and has influence on the effectiveness of CIPs. However, 
most of them are trying to avoid being influenced by Guanxi. This contrasts 
with the view regarding Guanxi as important “intangible asset” ten years ago. 
Many professional managers such as Wang H.M. are trying to use “rational 
decision” as the criterion of their professional competence instead of traditional 
Guanxi. However, this tendency has conflicts with Chinese traditional business 
practice. During the process of building up new rules with traditional practice 
abandonment, it is natural that some conflicts and inconsistence will take place. 
4.4 Sensemaking: an important but usually ignored factor 
 In principle, compared to economic consideration and Guanxi, the 
interviewees seem not to realise the existing sensemaking problems. Most 
interviewees have said that they try to consider economic profit and avoid being 
influenced by Guanxi. However, they did not even realize the importance and 
influence of sensemaking. This is mainly because of human being’s cognitive 
limitation. Human beings have willingness to make sense of one event to deal 
with cognitive dissonance in sub-consciousness, which is usually not realised by 
themselves. What they notice is just the result that they have a judgment or 
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conclusion. What is more, they will make decision with such judgments based 
on “the fact they believe” rather than the “fact”. 
Making sense of an event is human being’s cognitive instinct. Thus, every 
CIP will be definitely made sense by the manufacturer, distributor and reseller 
respectively. This paper found that there exist obvious sensemaking differences 
for them. In channel relationships, each party holds their own sense on one same 
thing, which is usually different from each other. When the manufacturer takes 
an action, the purpose may be misunderstood by resellers and distributors, thus, 
the action would seem not to make sense to them. Although all of parties have 
mentioned that economic benefit is important in channel incentive, distributors 
have taken the Annual Sales Plan as usual and for granted, while the 
manufacturer still view these incentive as “effective”, and spend much time on 
designing, communicating and complementing this kind of incentive program. 
Another example is the meeting every two months between Motorola and its 
distributors. Motorola has a meeting to communicate the sales target and its 
feasibility with distributors every two months. Yu J. from Motorola said,  
“It is very helpful for the two parties. But they (distributors) don’t think so. 
They view that as a waste of time and the time will be more productive if they do 
other work.” 
Besides, the manufacturers view temporary promotion as an important one 
and believe the resellers and distributors care most about short-term benefits. As 
Wang H.M. from Motorola said,  
“The manufacturers pay more attention to long-term development while 
their channel members care about short-term benefit more” (See interview 3 in 
Appendix).  
However, in fact, both resellers and distributors lay more emphasis on 
long-term incentives or non-economic rewards, such as the Platinum and 
Golden Award. Motorola also focuses on long-term development of the market. 
So the manufacturer and channel members should have common goal for 
long-term growth. What caused the misunderstanding between each other’s 
emphasis and real purpose? 
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Manufacturers believe the channel just care about short-term and direct 
money incentive; but they themselves need long-term market development. 
Resellers and distributors trust that the manufacturer just cares about the sales 
number, while they need more help on long-term planning and support. In short, 
they have misunderstood each other’s real need thus could not get what they 
need. No matter monetary or not, the channel appeals for more CIPs based on 
the understanding of their businesses. 
Once a time Motorola planed to give 200 thousands to Digital China for 
promotion. It was thought as a good policy by Motorola for Digital China. But 
out of Moto’s surprise, Digital China refused. Economically, there was no 
reason to refuse. Because the fund offered by Motorola can be used to improve 
the distributor’s sales. It was a win-win deal. However, cognitively, Digital 
China was worried about the actual pay of this money. One incentive policy, 
which seems to be good to both sides, does not work for the distributor (See 
more details interview 3 in Appendix). 
As a result, the examples above indicate the problem of fatigue of CIPs. In 
the past five years, Motorola has not changed the structure of their CIPs. 
Distributors are very clear about it and thus become fatigue some. Interviewees 
from distributor and reseller all mentioned that Motorola’s CIPs are lack of 
innovation, and Motorola pays no attention to them at all. Is this the truth? Or, 
this conclusion is just their imagination from sensemaking. In the interviewees, 
Motorola representatives said they work hard to understand the market seriously 
to design/update CIPs every year. The cognitive inconsistence seems obvious 
between the two parties, which influences the CIP’s effectiveness. The reasons 
behind these issues need to be addressed.  
First, sensegiving has been ignored by the manufacturer. Sensegiving is 
“the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442). It usually takes place as a result of 
top-down communication, and most sense is made through the social processes 
of sensemaking at the recipient level. In the channel incentive program system, 
manufacturer plays the sensegiving role; they should pay attention to helping 
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the channels to make sense of their CIPs via various actions. However, most 
times they just know that the problem exists but are not aware of ways to deal 
with it.  
Second, stereotypes hold by the two parties cause the inconsistence. People 
tend to have the stereotype that manufacturer has their own brand and cares 
about long-term development, while distributors are lack of strategic 
consciousness. Thus, people in these organisations tend to hold these kinds of 
stereotypes and make sense of each other’s action with this. As discussed before, 
this influences the attitudes and decision-making process of each party. In fact, 
for manufacturers, some managers are short-term profit oriented; while 
distributors believe they are more long-term oriented because they themselves 
in some cases, are the owners of the company. In order to make the incentive 
programs meaningful for each party, manufacturer and channel members have 
to realise and try to avoid such kind of stereotypes when making decisions. 
Third, sense is in the eyes of beholder, and is formed by persons with 
different identities. According to sensemaking theory, identity is a resource for 
sensemaking. The sensemaker is singular and no individual ever acts like a 
single sensemaker, because each individual has a lot of identities. When 
distributors make sense of one promotion event, on the one side, they represent 
the company, and always try to make a rational decision from economic view. 
On the other side, they are individually connected with the person in charge 
from the manufacturer; thus, they cannot avoid making decision according to 
personal emotions. For example, some interviewees mentioned that they try to 
make decision based on company’s benefit avoiding personal relationships:   
“We have to do business according to the contract.” (See interview6 in 
Appendix). (Manager, Pei B.) 
 “Channel incentive is some kind of science. We use group decision and process 
to avoid personal Guanxi and trust.” (Manager Wang H.M.) 
However, in fact, when they actually make sense of one event, they are still 
affected by their personal identities (See interview1 in Appendix). 
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These problems may be attributed to lack of communication. However, in 
fact, Motorola have formal communication with distributors and resellers every 
month. Thus, communication is just the superficial reason, while behind that it 
is the cognitive problem. They have not realised how did they make sense of 
co-operator’s actions, and what kinds of damage misunderstanding of 
sensemaking has on their businesses. It is recommended by this research that the 
possible reasons are the ones listed above rather than only communication 
issues.  
After Motorola and its channel members realise that and pay attention to 
what in their mind, they can solve these problems and reach an agreement to 
some degree. In short, the cognitive inconsistence for sensemaking is a crucial 
factor influencing CIP effectiveness. However, this factor has been under 
studied in previous literature. This may be because of understanding 
sensemaking needs careful observation, and it is hard to be measured 
quantitatively. Mention how Guanxi becomes a good example here as a 
two-side sword. 
4.5 Interaction among these factors 
There are interactions among economic benefit, Guanxi and sensemaking 
as discussed above. These factors are not independent but related with each 
other.  
Economic consideration is the basis of Guanxi, it also is the starting point 
when they make sense of each other’s action. As one interviewee claimed,  
“Neither Guanxi nor trust is the most important. Benefit is the ultimate 
goal. Maybe you can do business based on Guanxi or trust for one time, the 
thing that matters in the long run is more beneficial. Thus, both Guanxi and 
trust are established on the basis of common benefits. Achieving the target and 
obtain profit is critical.”  
The above means that economic consideration is the most important factor 
when manufacturer and channel members make decision.  
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However, this does not mean their final decision is really based on rational 
economic analysis. When one tries to make rational choice just based on 
economic calculation, and finally one believes that s/he has made a rational 
decision, that may not be the truth. For example, the GM of Motorola Business 
Channel said, he believes “90% of our decision is rational”. However, from the 
inconsistence of his understanding and what the distributors really thought, it 
can be seen that his decision is just what he thought “rational”.  
Economic factors are basic and important for effectiveness of CIPs, but 
this relationship will be influenced by the other two factors dramatically, 
Guanxi and sensemaking. If one policy is economically beneficial for the 
distributor, it may still does not work if the Guanxi has been damaged between 
them. At the same time, if they have bad Guanxi thus with low trust on each 
other, they will probably not make sense of what should be making sense from 
rational and economic analysis. The promotion fund example is just evidence. 
When Motorola planned to give 200 thousands to Digital China for promotion. 
Economically, the fund offered by Motorola can help improving the 
distributor’s sales. However, Digital China was worried about the actual pay of 
this money. Thus, they refused. 
On the other side, if manufacturer and channel members have good Guanxi 
and high trust, they will tend to make sense of their actions from a positive view. 
Thus, this will strengthen their economic analysis and further improve the 
effectiveness of CIPs.  
In short, economic profit is the basic consideration when channel members 
make decision, however, Guanxi and sensemaking will influence their economic 
analysis thus finally influences their decision. Compared to Guanxi, which has 
been regarded by most interviewees as a double-side sword and try to avoid 
doing business with “Guanxi”, sensemaking is a factor that has seldom been 
realised by them. Both in practice and research, economic and cultural factors 
have been paid much attention to, while cognitive factors are usually being 
neglected thus far away from being explored. This is the one most important 
contribution of this study.  
 33 
Finally, trust is some result of Guanxi and previous cooperation. It has 
obvious effect on sensemaking. Trust level will influence whether the channel 
member make sense of manufacturer’s CIPs from a positive view or not. With 
low trust, channel members will suspect the target and the aim of the 
manufacturer. This may further lead to the termination of cooperation. 
Moreover, trust has impact on channel members’ performance and economic 
benefit. Therefore, these factors are interrelated to each other, and together, will 
influence channel behaviour and effectiveness of the CIP.  
Based on both previous literature and new findings, a new conceptual 
framework is proposed as Figure 2. This conceptual framework includes the 
following points: 
(1) Economic profit, Guanxi and sensemaking interact with each other. 
(2) Guanxi has impact on channel behaviour through the mediation of trust.  
(3) Economic profit and sensemaking have impacts on channel behaviour. 
(4) Trust influences channel behaviour and sensemaking. Good Guanxi has 
positive impact on cooperation, negative impact on conflict, and positive impact 
on sensemaking. 
(5) Sensemaking will moderate the relationship between economic profit 
and channel behaviour; while economic profit will moderate the relationship 
between trust and channel behaviour.  
(6) Channel behaviour, including cooperation and conflict has impact on 
effectiveness of CIPs. 
Figure 2 New conceptual framework 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Contribution and implications 
Based on the framework integrating economic, social and cultural and cognitive 
perspectives, this paper aimed to investigate the antecedents of channel 
behaviour and effectiveness of the channel incentive programs. With six 
one-to-one interviews from a large international manufacturer, Motorola, one of 
its largest resellers, Digital China, and one distributor, Shanghai Shuteng, this 
paper generates important results. The findings show that economic benefit, 
cultural Guanxi and trust, and cognitive sensemaking are three influential 
factors to the channel behaviour and the CIP’s effectiveness, forming both 
theoretical and practical implications.  
Theoretically, the paper proposed the sensemaking perspective and 
combined it with two other common factors, economic profit and Guanxi. 
Cost-benefit analysis and Chinese Guanxi have been widely used in previous 
literatures for investigating channel behaviour and supplier-buyer relationships. 
However, there is a gap in this field on the consideration of sensemaking, which 
is a deeper influential factor behind people’s behaviours and choices. The 
findings of this paper is helpful to fill this gap by explore how channel members 
make sense of manufacturer’s CIPs and what impact does this kind of 
sesemaking have on reseller and distributor’s channel behaviours. Second, it 
challenges the traditional view that channel members tend to think relatively 
about short-term benefit (Shipley, et al., 1984) and show that they also have 
long-term views and strategic orientation. This research shows that economic 
benefit is not enough for stimulate channel members, and they are interested in 
such honours as “platinum and golden award”. Finally, in traditional marketing 
theory, channel incentive programs are tactic based on the assumption of 
information parity and fully rationalized decision. This research shows that 
channel behaviours are not fully rational but will be influenced by Guanxi or 
sensemaking. This calls for attention on other factors that is not economic 
related but also has impact on channel behaviours and effectiveness. Further, 
Guanxi has been found to not only support relationships but also sometimes 
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damage established relationships, when channel members make choice just 
based on good Guanxi regardless of economic analysis and contract restriction.  
The paper also offers some practical implications. First, manufacturers 
have to figure out the real need of its channel members and make customised 
CIPs Distributors are usually considered as short-term and profit driven. 
Actually, this research shows that they are becoming keen on long-term 
development. Thus, manufacturers should shift from aiming at simple and 
universal incentive program to delivering diversified ones according to dynamic 
needs of channel members.  
Second, all channel members should use Guanxi carefully. The findings of 
this research emphasis that Guanxi should be used under regular business 
guideline and ethics, otherwise, it may lead to problems of damaging each 
other’s relationships and trust. In fact, some practitioners have realised this 
point and try to avoid being affected by personal Guanxi network. They believe 
this helps to make a rational decision.  
Third, both manufacturer and channel members are recommended to make 
positive sense of each other’s actions and pay attention to non-economic factors 
especially cognitive sensemaking. Most businessmen try to make rational 
decisions based on economic analysis. This behaviour increases their “benefit 
orientation”. With different goals, manufacturers and each member in the 
channel become keen on game play to earn their own benefits. This may lead to 
zero-sum result and damage their trust. In one word, all players in the channel 
assume that they are rational and “self-profit maximisation” oriented. This has 
led to many misunderstandings even conflicts.  
According to this research, the author argues that economic-based game 
play should not dominate the channel, while a partnership view should be 
adopted. A partnership view calls for regarding each other as the partner with 
common benefit rather than competitor, understanding the partners’ real need, 
thus making full use of channel resources and improve the incentive 
effectiveness.  
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5.2 Limitations and further research 
This paper has some limitations. It is a qualitative research with interpretive 
analysis method. Therefore some points of view may not be able to avoid the 
author’s subjectivity. In order to support the propositions more soundly, a 
further study with empirical data and evidence is needed.  Future research can 
be quantitative to, test relevant findings. Related scales for measurement of the 
important constructs in this framework can be borrowed and developed 
including perceived benefit, Guanxi, sense making, coordination behaviour, and 
incentive effectiveness for quantitative testing. Then, a survey could be 
conducted with questionnaires with these measurements. Regressions, Structural 
Equal Models and other quantitate analysis methods will be used with SPSS, 
AMOS or other analysis software.  
Out of these three factors, sensemaking could be the focus of future study 
too. First, cognitive factors are lack of research compared with economic and 
cultural factors. Second, from this study, it can be seen that sensemaking is an 
important factor influencing the effectiveness of CIPs. Thus, to study how 
sensemaking influences channel members’ attitude and behaviours is important 
for improving the CIP’s effectiveness. Conducting a further research on 
sensemaking is meaningful both practically and theoretically. 
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6. Appendix: Interview Transcripts 
Interview 1: General Manager of Channel Business, Wang H.M. 
What factors do you take into account when design the channel incentive 
program? 
First, it should be helpful for achieving target sales value and volume. 
Second, it should effective on stimulating the channel behaviour. Channel is 
the expansion of the manufacturers and their behaviour represents the 
manufacturer’s behaviour. However, manufacturers and their channel 
members have different emphasis. The manufacturers pay more attention on 
long-term development while their channel members care about short-term 
benefit more. This is mainly because that they have different goals. Third, 
the CIP aims to moderate the channel benefit distribution. When the 
distributors are exclusive sales, they will share the most part of benefit. 
Thus, we will conduct support programs for the distributors directly, for 
example, we have financial or other support for core projects or target 
industries to allocate part of the benefit to the second or third tire channel 
members. This is also because we have different goals with our distributors. 
Fourth, we have a principle as “support for urgency not for the poor”. We 
held a long-term orientation when designing the incentive programs. For 
example, we have certain clients such as those in the forestry, which has 
low budget for communication. Therefore, the distributors and resellers 
don’t want to invest on develop these market. However, these areas have 
high potential in the future market. As we have a long-term view, we invest 
on these markets to improve our market share and aim to obtain satisfying 
reward in the future.  
The existence of incentive program is just because we manufacturers, 
resellers and distributors have different goals and sometimes there are even 
conflicts. Thus, it is necessary for us to use money to stimulate them 
according to our sales target and strategic goals. 
The manufacturers have brand equity in the market, thus, we are aware 
of the long-term development of our brands. But the channel usually don’t 
have brands asset and they care more about instant and short-term benefit. 
Manufacturers use principle of “maximizing market share” while channel 
members operating under the “maximizing benefit” principle. 
Manufacturers hope to keep moderate competition in the channel, but 
channel members prefer low competition and exclusive sales is what they 
want most.  
These differences are unavoidable. There is no need to understand or 
try to resolve them. This is a game play between manufacturers and the 
channel members. As long as the channel can achieve the goal set by the 
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manufacturers, then the relationship will keep on going. Let along the 
differences, we try to find out our common stand for cooperate. 
We are laying more emphasis on supporting our distributors than 
resellers. This is because the performance of Digital China is declining, and 
we want to keep it as Motorola’s distributor as we have not found right 
candidate. Thus, we compromised on sales target and decreased the price to 
Digital China.  
What did you plan to help Digital China with this program?  
Digital China doesn’t have enough capability to improve the market, so 
we give them more resources to help them go through this tough period. 
And we hope it can recover into growth after this year. 
Have you achieve the target goal in the past half year with this program? 
It seems OK for the sales of A8. But I don’t think Digital China has got 
essential improvement in business operation. We have started to find other 
plans for next year.  
What is the influence of manufacturers on channel members? 
With increasing influence of A8, our channel members hope we can 
help maintain the price. Thus we have adjusted the promotions. CP series 
have gradually taken place of GP2000. We will help the distributors with 
advertising on CP to attract previous GP2000 customers.  
Motorola has been paying more attention on low-end market and 
increases the market input. There exist conflicts among SMT, MagOne and 
Vertex in Shanghai. 
 What is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
I don’t think Guanxi and trust has any impact on channel incentive 
programs. Channel incentive program is an economic concept. The 
effectiveness of incentive program is something calculated by different 
parties with common benefits. 
We usually build up trust with familial affection, but Westerners with 
faith. Guanxi and trust is the same. In Western world, people are 
encouraged to build up “social network”. I think it is not easy in China to 
build up trust among people. For me, neither Guanxi nor trust should be the 
factors I take into account. I think these two factors are social one. I try to 
avoid being affected by Guanxi or trust.  
Theoretically, in the recruitment stage, Guanxi and trust does matter. 
After that, we have to treat our partners fairly. Channel incentive is some 
kind of science. We use group decision and process to avoid personal 
Guanxi and trust.  
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I think 90% of our behaviour is reasonable. Difference does exist 
because we are human beings.  
Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and their 
distributors? 
No doubt there is. The manufacturer oriented to the west, but 
distributors went to the east. Similar phenomena can be found in promotions. 
There are two reasons, first is because of market change, and second is 
because of designing flaw. This is the failure of channel incentives.  
This could not be avoided completely. We cannot capture all possible 
variables when we design the program. Also we may have mistakes when 
allocating weight on each variable. So I don’t think there is 100% successful 
CIP. 70% is already wonderful. 
I don’t have any assessing approaches, but just use our working 
experiences. One important factor is your competitor. We pay much 
attention on our competitors’ promotions to keep our competence.   
Interview 2: Channel Sales Director, Wang H.L. 
What are main incentive programs to the distributors? 
There are three categories of our incentive programs: authorization 
incentive, sales incentive and marketing support. Authorization incentive is 
to give one distributor exclusive sales authority. Digital China has exclusive 
sales for A8 and CP series. Sales incentive includes Sell-in Rebate, 
Sell-thru Rebate and Business Development Fund (or Conditional Rebate 
One) for resellers achieving target sales volume or value. Business 
Development Fund is for supporting distributors to explore and develop the 
market. Marketing support refers to the Co-marketing Fund provided by 
Motorola’s Marketing Department. 
Besides, we also have CR2 (Conditional Rebate 2) as the premium 
fund for the distributors sales performance and MCR (Motorola Channel 
Reseller) Talent Club of the Marketing Department. The Talent Club is used 
to select excellent reseller and give them reward in the end of the year.  
The distributor (Digital China) mainly focuses on turnover and benefit. 
In the past three or four years, its sales value has increased from millions to 
hundreds of millions RMB. At the same time, some problems emerged in 
the process of high growth, such as the increasing stock level, lack of ability 
to achieve the benefit target, etc. This year, they have acquired several 
product series, and are trying to focus on their developing goals. 
What is the percentage of sales incentive programs? 
The overall percentage is 15-17% of the order price. It should not be 
much higher in case that the retail price would be raised and influence sales 
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volume; also not be too lower to stimulate the channel. Sell-in Rebate 
accounts for 5-6%, Sell-Thru Rebate takes 5-6%, CR1 takes 2-3% and CR2 
takes 2%. This year Sell-Thru Rebate was cancelled, which helps reduce the 
order price and transfer some funds to CR2 for supporting resellers. This is 
because Sell-Thru has some negative effects. For example, the distributor 
will allocate more stock to the next channel members, which may lead to 
the risk of cash withdrawal. Besides, it is hard for our governance on what 
reported by the distributors. 
In terms of marketing activities, we lay emphasis on product and brand 
promotions, public relationships, MCR and the premium for channel 
members in the end of each year. At the beginning, sales and marketing 
department communicate with the distributors about the annual plan, and 
they also have communication and coordination in implementation process. 
Main targets include: (1) growth rate; (2) efficiency of resource use 
(capital, working force and other cost); (3) increasing resellers’ margin. We 
can help them increase the margin but not the profit.  
Growth rate target is comprised of three parts: the base target, stretch 1 
target and stretch 2 target. The reseller can get about 10% of the order price 
as rebate. However, our sales target will only achieve at stretch 1 level. At 
that level, the reseller will get another 3% for rebate. For stretch 2, they can 
get 2-3% rebate.  
We have a formal communication with our distributors every season 
and one or two times for problem solving every month. These meetings 
usually cover the following topics: the network, number and support of 
second-tire agency, market share and brand maintenance.    
What is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
Trust is very important. Communication cost would be very high 
without trust. Two parties may have different interpretations on the same 
issue and even become suspicious.  
Guanxi is two-edged. Good Guanxi can help “resolve” the problem 
quickly. However, this will probably lead to further problems in the future. 
We have experienced such situations. Once a time, Digital China helped 
Motorola store a good prepared for an incoming project. Two parties came 
to an agreement for time and fee via e-mail. Then some problem occurred. 
The unexpected problem damaged the trust between the two parties. If this 
were done under contract rather than oral promise and e-mail confirmation 
based on Guanxi, there would be fewer problems with the unexpected 
change.  
The biggest positive affect of Guanxi and trust is that they can increase 
the cooperation efficiency.  
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Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and their 
distributors? 
There does exist sensemaking difference. For example, the 
manufacturer has a promotion policy with “get one battery for free if bought 
two two-way radios”. But the distributors may not give the battery for the 
end consumers but leave them for selling. Some distributors may take the 
batteries back to the manufacture for asking for cash withdraw, because 
they see this policy as some cash bonus for their sales.  
However, I think at most times, we can get same understanding after 
communication.  
Interview 3: Channel Sales Manager, Yu J. 
Who do you discuss with when make decision? 
I report to and discuss with the Channel Sales Director and he will ask 
for approval from the General Manager.    
What factors do you take into account when design the channel incentive 
program? 
There are two factors: the rebate ratio and price. If the ratio is too high 
it will influence the retailing price; if too low it will lack of incentive effect.  
Do you have written rules and process for the goals and expectations of the 
two parties? 
We has written ones ourselves, but we just make phone or oral ones 
with our distributors. 
Do you have certain mechanism to evaluate the resellers’ target 
complementation? 
No. But we have feedback when they didn’t achieve the goals. We 
could not help them with the profit, but we calculate the margin. If they 
didn’t achieve the target, we’ll have meeting with their boss to discuss the 
reasons. Their possible reasons include the target was set too high, or the 
product doesn’t take profit. However, the margin of our product is very high, 
but the profit was covered by their cost. We help them to analyse their 
business profiles and to figure out what cost can be reduced.  
What do you think is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
If our Guanxi is good, they can tell me some true information; if not 
good, they just say some surficial words. 
Trust is the most important. If the channel member doesn’t trust you, 
they will suspect the reasonableness of the target we set for them, and try to 
bargain for as lower price as possible. Sometimes they may think the reason 
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why we set this goal is just because we don’t want them to achieve that and 
get the premium, or we just want to let them out.  
In one word, channel members will suspect the target and aim of the 
manufacture. What’s worse, that may lead to the termination of cooperation. 
What do you think is the relationship between Guanxi and trust? 
I think Guanxi usually exists in personal level and is informal. It helps 
us improve the communication effectiveness and know more about the truth 
of each other. In organizational level, trust is more important. The critical 
issue is to establish trust between companies. Even if we have good 
personal Guanxi, we still couldn’t achieve common sense without trust 
between our companies. 
For example, person in charge in Digital China can talk me frankly 
about their purpose and plan. But return to the business, as we represent for 
each other’s company, he felt Motorola is not trustworthy and he then went 
to Motorola’s Asian-Pacific headquarter to ask for more resources. Then, a 
vicious circle emerged and the trust level decreased.  
 Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and 
their distributors? 
Yes. There exists such difference. For example, we have a meeting to 
communicate the sales target and its feasibility with distributors every two 
months. We think it is very helpful for the two parties. But they don’t think 
so. They view that as a waste of time and the time will be more productive 
if they do other works. 
Is that phenomena common? 
It is much more common than before. For example, the original 
purpose of our target is to increase each party’s benefit. But distributors 
may think we set goals just for showing to our boss, and that is not 
achievable. Then they will not want to cooperate and sit down for a meeting 
on that.  
There is another example, once a time we want to give 200 thousands 
to Digital China for promotion. But they refused. Possible reasons are as 
following: they are afraid of the actual pay of this money and they asked 
Motorola cooperate with the distributors directly. This is related to low trust 
and their forecast of the market.  
Interview 4: General Manager of Telecom Business, Zhang Z.H. 
What are main incentive programs from Motorola? Can you give some 
comments on these programs? 
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Motorola accounts for 95% of our business. They have Sell-in Rebate 
and Sell-thru Rebate for us. We are one of its 11 resellers; I don’t know 
whether they have the same programs as us. A8 is the high-end product in 
the low-end market. But the launch of A6, SMT has put high pressure on 
A8. CP series will take place of GP2000 this year completely.  
Motorola has to take more customized incentive program. Simple price 
rebate is not enough for our development now. Price and volume is just 
surficial incentive measures. They are lack of further incentive programs 
and weak on market research.  
In my opinion, channel incentive is price and positioning. Programs 
based on price include Order price, Sell-in & Sell-thru Rebate, CR 1, etc., 
all of which are about money.  
Other kinds of incentive issues include: (1) Product positioning: What 
are the target market and industry? (2) Channel strategy: What are the 
proper distributors? (3) Product line strategy: What is the future of the 
product? How to separate the market from other products? If the 
manufacturers continually put new products into the market, these products 
and their resellers would invade our existing market. For example, put a 
new product with adding functions on an existing product. This kind of 
behavior is irresponsible.   
 Currently, Motorola put emphasis on price incentive programs but 
ignores to communicate with us on non-price factors. Thus, distributors are 
more rational and aware of the profit, turnover and cash flow.  
Why do you think that the manufacturers and distributors seem to not 
understand the goal of each other? 
We are not clear about each other’s strategies and market positioning. 
For example, Motorola doesn’t have accurate expectation and positioning 
on Digital China. Digital China initiated with low-end product. Gradually, 
we think we have got advantage on high-end market with high profit ratio. 
But Motorola still regards us as low-and-middle reseller. We have high cost 
to cover, thus we are going to step to high-end market with digital product 
developing. They haven’t taken the advantage of Digital China. And our 
demand has become very clear already. It is so clear now but hard to change. 
This restrains the developing of our cooperation. 
Have you ever communicated that with Motorola? 
Last year, we want to do high-end products such as Moto Turbo. So we 
started cooperation with Kenwood. However, Motorola gave us high 
pressure so we cancelled the cooperation with Kenwood. Motorola didn’t 
give us positive support but great pressure.  
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The biggest problem Motorola is facing with is neither price nor 
incentive, but the crisis of trust! It does matter that whether they are willing 
to face and resolve that. 
 What do you think is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
There are two kinds of Guanxi, one is based on work, and the other one 
is personal relationship. The latter is usually based on cooperation.  
When it comes to trust, we have to hear what they say and see what 
they do. If the words consist with the action, we’ll increase our trust on 
them. Otherwise, our trust will be damaged.  
Overall, Guanxi and trust is very important. Compared with affections, 
they are established on rational basis of business performance and 
development. For example, we have sold out 310,000 two-way radios since 
2007 for Motorola. We also do business for its other products such as tablet 
computer. Although we didn’t make much money on that, we have 
established a good team. Also I’ve built up good relationship with people in 
Moto for business. But I won’t be influenced by personal relationship when 
making decision. 
Moto has damaged our trust recently by such issue as the market 
change of GP2000 series and their shifting to other resellers for CP products. 
So our Guanxi and trust is deteriorating dramatically. 
Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and their 
distributors? 
This is an important point. There exists sensemaking difference that 
influences our decision-making and result. It is natural that we have 
different view on whether the sales target should be 60 or 80 thousands. But 
it is crucial to find out “right point” to design an effective program. 
Interview 5: Product Director of Telecom Business, Yu L.B. 
What are main incentive programs for distributors from Motorola? Can 
you give some comments on these programs? 
For distributors, most incentive programs are rebate for target 
achievement or excess. Also they have supports for marketing activities and 
training. But the training does help much for our distributors.     
How do you discuss with the manufacture on incentive program designing?  
In the past, we did well. However, as the manufacturer has higher 
performance pressure, they no longer set the target according to fact of the 
market. They just care about our stock but not how many we could sell out. 
If the Sell-in volume exceeds Sell-thru for successive years, some resellers 
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will give up the annual premium. We would quit if such situation lasts for a 
long time.  
What is the reason for the probable quit? 
The Asia-Pacific headquarter of Motorola has too high expectation on 
China, which goes far away from the reality of Chinese market. Since 2008, 
many products were overstocked. Their requirement for growth rate goes 
beyond what can be achieved.  
Do you often communicate with Motorola about that? 
The problem is that who we can get touch and communicate with 
usually doesn’t have decision-making authority. Thus, the whole process of 
communication will be very long from 4 to 6 months. After communication, 
we can achieve some goal accepted by both. However the goal is still very 
high, Motorola just reallocated the volume on us to other resellers. This year 
we signed the MOU in the middle of the year. We try to finish the goal in 
the first three seasons, but it is usually hard in the fourth season.  
Now Motorola has abandoned many incentive programs. We still hope 
they can have fund to support our sales. 
How do you stimulate your distributors? 
We used CR1 program. But the manufacturer hasn’t paid in time. And 
the reward level is too low to stimulate our distributors. So we don’t want to 
do that anymore.  
Why the manufacture’s high target is regarded by “pressure” rather than 
“growth” by you?  
The growth rate kept around 20% in the past several years. As Moto 
has launched several low-end products, it is hard for us to keep the same 
growth rate as before for existing products. At the same time, the 
manufacturer reduces the support and resource to us with cost consideration. 
There exist promotions to the distributors from Moto and Digital China 
respectively. We provide the following incentives to our resellers: regular 
rebate, promotions and training. We have Digital China University for 
improving sales skills.   
In your communication, do you have clear aim and target?  
We have clear aims with Motorola. But it may not be so clear when 
communicate with our distributors, which depends on their capabilities and 
competencies. Communications with distributors is conducted by our sales, 
whose personal skills and capabilities is importance for distributors’ 
acceptance. 
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 What is the main content of goals with manufacturers and distributors 
respectively?  
With Moto there are two goals: improving sales volume including 
sell-in and sell-thru; and keep certain numbers of distributors, which could 
be achieved via developing new ones. 
With the resellers our main targets include sales volume and other 
business terms such as delivery time and service. 
I don’t think there is any misunderstanding of Digital China on Moto’s 
target. We have consistent goal with Moto, but when it comes to the 
understanding and complementation of our distributors, inconsistence 
occurs. Maybe we set too high sales target to them. 
Do you communicate with manufacturers and resellers about the purpose 
of the business? 
Because these products are low-end with little profit, the distributors 
have not enough energy to make such kind of discussion or do market 
research. There exists some rigid demand for certain products as A8 
products. Thus, even there is just 10-Yuan profit; the distributors still keep 
this business.  
For new products, we need more incentive programs.  
How to achieve target consistence between you and the resellers?  
First, choose some key resellers and let them drive other small resellers. 
Key resellers are our extension. We use different strategies for different 
products. For popular products with low profit, we incentive the resellers 
with volume. For new products needing long-term operation we set 
promotion with resellers together.  
What do you think is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
Neither Guanxi nor trust is the most important. Benefit is the ultimate 
goal. Maybe you can do business based on Guanxi or trust for one time, the 
thing matters in the long run is till benefit. So both Guanxi and trust are 
established on the basis of common benefit. Achieving the target and obtain 
profit is critical.  
However, Guanxi and trust can reduce communication cost. Without 
good Guanxi and trust, well-designed incentive programs may not get good 
result. 
Guanxi, trust and benefit interact with each other and will lead to 
positive or negative circle.    
Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and their 
distributors? 
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We have very clear goals. Thus there is seldom any misunderstanding 
between the manufacturer and us. When we design an incentive program, 
we also take account of the resellers’ needs. 
Do you collect feedbacks and make adjustment during the 
complementation process?  
We discussed with the key resellers when designing the program.  
 
Interview 6: General Manager of Distributors, Mr. Pei B. 
What are main incentive programs to you from the manufacture and 
distributor? 
From Moto, first is Moto’s Talent Club. Motorola’s incentive programs 
are not so strong as before because of performance decline. We get the 
reward with sales points. In the past, one point deserves 4-5 Yuan but now it 
is just 1 Yuan. And the cashing process is very long. So we are not very 
active on that. They have Talent Club for well-performed distributors’ 
traveling award. Second is the annual award. The amount is not high and 
cashing process is very long. So we don’t care about that, either. Third is 
seasonal award. This is temporarily set when they felt there is difficulty for 
achieving target.  
If the award amount is not high, for example just 10 or 15 thousands 
Yuan, we usually don’t care about that. 
From the distributors, they have different policies for resellers. 
Basically all are with money.  
Which do you care about more, the manufacturer or distributor? 
Personally, I think the manufacturer is more importance. The 
distributor is just Moto’s co-operator. In most cases Moto’s decisions will 
influence the view and behaviours of their distributors. Especially for such 
big manufacturers as Moto, we do their business not only for economic 
earning but also consider their reputation, authority and other soft benefits 
such as training and guiding. 
Business is not only decided by the income or profit.  
However, to many small resellers, they are not so care about the 
manufacturer but focus on profit. And cooperation relationship is not so 
important for them.  
Shanghai is a city with high brand awareness. If you don’t cooperate 
with Motorola, it seems loosing face. But there are also some distributors 
who performed well without close relationship with manufacturer. 
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Distributors’ voice power in the channel incentive programs depends 
on the performance and market influence. If we take 30-40% of the overall 
sales of Digital China, we’ll have higher voice power. 
How well do you think Motorola and Digital China know your operations? 
Not well. First they may feel no need to know; second they may 
believe they have done well on market shares and don’t pay much attention 
on us. Motorola doesn’t do very well. Another manufacturer that is the 
competitor of Motorola Hytera can help the distributors resolving problems 
and deeply understand their business. However they also can’t provide 
customized service, either. Hytera have no distributors so their resellers are 
stickier to them. Doing business directly with Hytera give distributors more 
support and resource. Motorola pay much effort on the end consumers 
rather than the channel.  
How do think the reseller’s work?  
They are enjoying the fruit of Motorola. They didn’t explore the 
market but just maintain it. The pressure of reseller leads to the result that 
who sells most that gets most. When they have high pressure, they will take 
temporary promotion measure for emergency. Resellers keep most resource 
and manufacturer may feel lack of power to explore the market. 
What do you think is the role of Guanxi and trust? 
In China they are very important. If we have good Guanxi, I can do 
what I can to help you. For example, if you call me to stock 200 more 
two-way radios, and we have good relationship, I’ll not hesitate. 
Trust is very important in business. It can reduce communication cost.  
However, even with good Guanxi, we have to do business according to 
the contract. Without contract, Guanxi could bring risk. Sometimes we 
don’t sign contract because of Guanxi, but they have problems the money 
will hard to be back. If your distributors say difficulties to you, you also feel 
not comfort to force them.  
Do you think there exist sensemaking difference between supplier and their 
distributors? 
In terms of sales target, I think it’s clear after communication. 
However in terms of the perception of manufacturer and resellers’ purpose 
behind a behaviour, there may be difference or misunderstandings. The 
Talent Club is not so good as before. I don’t know why. If I think why 
Digital China gives us support is because the product is not attractive or has 
little potential, I’ll refuse to do the business.  
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Distributors may have little understanding on manufacturer’s 
behaviour and try to figure out possible reasons. But they usually know the 
distributors’ promotion well.  
I think both manufacturers and distributors will not tell us their real 
reason or purpose. So we have to make judgment.  
Comparative interviews on effectiveness of CIP 
This study involves three parties in the channel, manufacturer, 
distributors and resellers. In order to compare their views, I asked them 
three common questions related to the effectiveness of CIP. Following is the 
brief transcript.  
Could you please list three most effective incentive measures? 
Motorola Mr. Wang: Exclusive distributing authorization; channel 
rebate; market promoting. 
Motorola Mr. Yu: Channel rebate; monthly distributor promotion 
(mainly for the second-tire distributor of Digital China); customer 
promotion.  
Digital China, Mr. Zhang: Rebate is OK but too short-viewed. 
Splitting the product lines also works. Backward of Motorola’s CIP is as 
following. First, they don’t give us a long-term strategic orientation on each 
product. This is what we care about. Second, Motorola didn’t designed 
different CIP to different distributors. They should customize the training 
and supporting plan for distributors specializing in certain industry and 
those not.  
Digital China, Mr. Yu: Project-based authorization (usually for 
government and state-owned enterprises); annual rebate; platinum and 
golden resellers.   
Why do you think these are most effective ones? 
Motorola Mr. Wang: (1) Exclusive distributing authorization: as 
Motorola is the leader in this market, give them distributing itself is a kind 
of support, which means a long-term commitment. (2) Channel rebate: it’s 
money and influences resellers’ profit directly. (3) Marketing promotion: 
this means resources for supporting their market exploration.  
Motorola Mr. Yu: Channel rebate and monthly distributing promotion 
can increase their profit. Customer promotion improves sales.   
Digital China, Mr. Yu: These programs increase our benefit, or make 
us have a feeling of honour (platinum or golden reseller). 
Do you think manufacturer and the channel members have the same view 
on that? 
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Motorola Mr. Wang: I think we have the same overall view, despite of 
possible ranking difference.  
Motorola Mr. Yu: I think the resellers may prefer distributing 
promotion and customer promotion better because they can be fulfilled 
quickly. Rebate may be viewed as a measure just for manufacturers’ sales 
target and benefit. 
Digital China, Mr. Yu: Manufacturer and resellers have different 
standing points. Manufacturer want to earn highest profit with least invest. 
But resellers require more resources. 
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